

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO-BICOCCA

SYLLABUS DEL CORSO

Games and Strategic Behaviour

2021-2-F5602M017

Learning area

Applications of strategic interaction theory

Learning objectives

This course is an introduction to topics in APPLIED game theory. Its objective is to equip the students with tools essential to study economics of information and of strategic behaviour and for setting up and solving a wide range of economic problems, both micro and macro.

Contents

- 1. rational behavior both under certainty and under uncertainty
- 2. game representations: extensive form, strategic form and Bayesian games
- 3. Nash equilibria and refinements in extensive form, with applications
- 4. Nash equilibria and refinements in strategic form, with applications
- 5. Bargaining models and applications

Detailed program

Presentation of the course and utility maximization

- 2. 2. Set 1 of Experiment
- 3. Rational Behavior under Uncertainty
- 4. Set 1 of exercises
- 5. Discussion of Experiment and Solution of Set 1 of Exercises
- 6. Extensive Form Games-1
- 7. Set 2 of Experiment
- 8. Discussion of Experiment
- 9. Extensive Form Games-2
- 10. Strategic Forms Games
- 11. Set 2 of exercises
- 12. Set 3 of Experiment
- 13. Solution of set 2 of exercises
- 14. Discussion of set 3 of experiment
- 15. Bayesian Games
- 16. Dominance: strict and weak, iterated
- 17. Bayesian Rationality and Rationalizability
- 18. Set 3 of exercises
- 19. Solutions of set 3 of exercises
- 20. Nash and Bayes Nash Equilibria
- 21. Set 4 of experiment
- 22. Discussion set 4 of Experiment
- 23. Calculation of Nash Equilibria
- 24. Application of Nash and Bayes Nash Equilibria
- 25. Set 4 of Exercises
- 26. Solution of Set 4 of Exercises
- 27. Equilibria in extensive form games
- 28. Sequential rationality in imperfect information games
- 29. Set 5 of Experiment

- 30. Discussion of set 5 of Experiment
- 31. Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
- 32. Set 5 of Exercises
- 33. Sequential Equilibria
- 34. Solution of set 5 of Exercises
- 35. Refinements of Sequential Equilibria 1
- 36. Refinements of Sequential equilibria and applications
- 37. Set 6 of Exercises
- 38. Sequential Equilibria and signaling games 1
- 39. Sequential Equilibria and signaling games 2
- 40. Applications of Signaling Games
- 41. Set 7 of Exercises
- 42. Bargaining Theory 1
- 43. Bargaining Theory 2
- 44. Set 8 of Exercises
- 45. Students' presentations
- 46. Review and mock exam

Prerequisites

Basic economics and mathematics

Teaching methods

Lectures, exercises, on line experiments and students' group presentations

During the Covid-19 emergency, the lectures le lezioni will be on line partially asyncronous and partially in syncronous video conference.

Assessment methods

Short students' paper and written online examination

Textbooks and Reading Materials

- 1. Jurgen Eichberger, Game Theory for Economists, Academic Press,1993.
- 2. P. K. Dutta, Strategies and Games, The MIT Press, 1999 = D.
- 3. H. S. Bierman L. Fernandez, Game Theory with Economic Applications, Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1993 = B-F.
- 4. Lecture notes