Ch.7

Migrants and European Institutions: A study on the Attempts to Address the Economic and Social Challenges of Immigration in EU Member States

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Introduction

The aim of this contribution is to shed light on the motivations, the strategies and the discourses of the European institutions about migrants and, moreover, it seeks to address the evolving challenge of integrating successive waves of immigrants arriving from candidate countries, from new member States, as well as from African and Asian countries[1]. More particularly, this paper shows the reaction of the European institutions regarding the influx of migrants from the Italian Mezzogiorno, the Iberian peninsula and Eastern Europe during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. It also examines the influence of the institutional and reconversion challenges posed by the Southern enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1980s. Furthermore, it analyses the socioeconomic implications of the political decision to go ahead with an East-West 'reunification' of the continent via the Eastward enlargement of the European Union (EU) which started in the early 1990s.

The main sources adopted for this study are the Historical Archives of the European Commission relating to the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), the governmental archives concerning some of the European countries studied here (such as Spain and Germany), the Archives of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission, amongst others[2]. These sources help to throw light on the causal relation between the evolving position of the European institution with regard to this issue, and allow us to understand the reactions and proposals of the major players and the ensuing decision to channel migration vectors. The sources also include a set of interviews with those who occupy positions of power within the European institutions and within their respective governments, the European institutions and on the topic of the risks, the opportunities and the conclusions reached in relation to the synchronized enlargements and the correlated EEC/EU migration processes from the 1980s onwards.

This article also takes into consideration published works relating to the phenomena of emigration towards the richest countries of the EEC. This enables us to show how the European institutions have attempted to address the social and economic challenges linked to the successive arrival of intra-European migrants and third country nationals. It shows that the approaches and rules of the European institutions varied in relation to the migrants' country (and whether or not they belonged to the EEC) on the one hand, and their professional skills on the other (level of instruction and job specialization). This paper also analyses the experience of socialization of migrants during the 1980s and 1990s at the European level and explores the extent to which different contingents also helped to disseminate a socio-political spillover effect in the communities of the migrants; an effect which contributed to the opening up of new democratic political cultures in the countries to which they returned and which had experienced dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. So, it underlines the effects of migrants on the political and diplomatic agenda of the host countries and on the relation between the EEC/EU and successive candidate countries. Furthermore, this paper looks into the actual economic impact that migrants have had on the internal development of their native countries; it draws attention to the significance of migrant remittances and the specific professional qualifications which former immigrants have acquired. Finally, the paper reflects upon the integration schemes affecting former and current European migrants' integration, highlighting ways in which good practices can be applied to the new present challenges which involve the migration waves still taking place in our continent, and it emphasises the salience of one

of the fundamental principles of the European integration process: solidarity and its related cohesion expectations and compromises.

The ECSC and EEC encounter the "migrant problem" during the first phase of the European integration process

Before analyzing how during the 1950s and 1960s, the European institutions tried to solve the main problems linked to emigration within the boundaries of the new Europe, it is important to underline the fact that different migrants arrived in the richest ECSC/EEC countries. This means that European institutions were faced with a variety of problems and, therefore had to offer different solutions (CECA, 1957a; CEE, 1966). Furthermore, it is important to note that migrants who were communitarian citizens benefited from the treaties creating ECSC and EEC: the privileges covered by the treatise did not extend to the problems involved in finding a job or accommodation. The legal situation of communitarian migrants was certainly better than that of other migrants. Moreover, it is important to state that in the early 1950s, all ECSC countries registered a surplus of unskilled manpower, and so migrants were able to take up jobs that were physically demanding s (e.g. mining) and which were often underpaid and short term (e.g. building) (Molinari, 1958; Faidutti-Rudolph, 1962; Böhning, 1972a; Salt and Clout, 1976, Martens, 1976; UN, 1979; Grassi, 1994; Schor, 1966; Goedings, 2000; Spire, 2005; Illegal, 2014).

In 1951 the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICCME) was founded, indicating that Western Europe had great difficulty in assimilating immigration within its boundaries, and that it had to foster) European emigration towards North America, Latin America and Oceania[3].

For the period under investigation, it is possible to identify several categories of migrants in Europe; to observe their positive labour skills and the benefits that migrants brought to the countries they settled in: it is also possible to detect the kind help that come from European institutions.

These migrants came from the least economically advanced regions of the EEC (in particular from Southern Italy): they often had a low level of specialization (or were unskilled) and sought a job in order to support their families (who often remained in Italy). Once they had found a job, they were able to use the extremely useful networks which had been created by Italian migrants in the period stretching from the end of the 19th century to the 1930s. but clearly, they needed training courses which would enable them to improve their language and labour skills. Besides, when migrants did not belong to a category mentioned in the particular agreement among the ECSC/EEC governments, e.g. they did not appear in the agreements concerning Italian migrants who arrived in Belgium to work in the mines, one of the main job opportunities for Italians until 1956 (Morelli 1988), there existed the problem of the reunification of the migrants family. The migrant had a job and was able to pay for the accommodation of his wife and children, but countries could not accept all members of families (Faidutti-Rudolph, 1964; Dumoulin, 1989; Romero 1991 and 1993; Besana, 2002; Blanc-Chaléard, 2003; Colucci, 2008; Rinauro, 2009).

One category of migrants included refugees from European countries governed by dictators or other forms of authoritarian government; amongst these we may count the Iberian countries (Pereira 2012; Dreyfus-Armand 1999; Sanchez 2004) the East European countries under the USSR' authority (Dufoix 2002), and those who had fled the military dictatorship in Greece in the period from 1967 to 1974 (Alexiou 2004). These migrants wanted to live in democratic countries; they usually had good work skills. East European people speaking Magyar and Slavic languages typically had the necessary work skills and were able to quickly learn the language of the country to which they had immigrated. Their professional skills favoured their integration. The question of whether the influx of these particular immigrants would increase the opportunity for spying arose, and, at the same time, governments were concerned about the ideological bias of immigrants arriving from Iberia and Greece, who may have belonged to the communist party.

Furthermore, there was the particular case of the German people who in the post war period remained in their East European countries and then decided, in the 1950s and in the early 1960s, to

escape to West Germany: they arrived from German regions which became part of new socialist republic of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. In this case they knew the language and it was easier to find a job even if they did not have any family members in West Germany. Before the “German economic miracle”, it was possible to have relevant discussions between “local Germans” and “foreign Germans” in particular in the rural areas. The public authorities obviously had the problem of controlling that they were not spies or obliged “to become spies” (meaning unclear). In general the immigrants possessed considerable work skills. And indeed, it was in order to stop this “haemorrhaging of the best brains” that the Berlin Wall was built in August 1961 (Dreyer, 1961; Korte, 1985; Herbert and Hunn, 2001).

Other migrants from Belgium, Holland and the French former colonies had few problems with the target language (McDonald, 1965; Simon, 2002; Le, 1997; Cornet, 2004). There was no problem for people of European nationalities who typically had good professional skills, but emigrants from Africa and Asia were faced with greater difficulties. These people often had had little education and were generally unskilled. Europeans were, on the whole, less willing to accommodate people having a different religion and/or colour of the skin. The integration of Muslim or black people was evidently more complicated and the risk of creating some ghettos in the outskirts of the main towns was high.

Finally there was a privileged category of migrants: the executives of the new European institutions. In this case governments wanted to guarantee their employment in host countries by guaranteeing high salaries, accommodation, good services, fiscal privileges and the creation of special structures for families (such as international schools where children could learn a variety of European languages including their native one).

It is interesting to explore the questions of how the European institutions attempted to address the social and economic challenges linked to the arrival of intra-European migrants and third country nationals. The European institutions had to manage the arrival and integration of migrants: this meant that they had to control the emigration flows and allow the host countries to organise their labour markets so as to avoid exploiting this new labour through excessively low wages and also overly priced accommodation, moreover they sought to avoid the segregation of immigrants in the *ghettos.* Migrants had to be fully integrated in the new countries if social problems were to be avoided: if they had regular work it was obviously easier to create conditions conducive to social peace. The aim was to develop public spaces where migrants could meet their compatriots, but also establish the necessary structures so that they could learn the language and customs of the country where they worked. These policies implied limiting the number of migrants. European institutions could not handle unlimited numbers of migrants: the arrival of too many people would not allow the ECSC and EEC to establish the rules so that migrants could become integrated in the host country. If they established that communities and factories which received migrants had to create workers' villages including accommodation, schools and leisure areas (for dancing or playing sports), it was still evident that these measures could only be achieved if the number of migrants was limited (Stoetzel, 1954; Gibellini, 2010). The European institutions affirmed the need to address the issue of health assistance (in case of workers injuries or sickness), also for people arriving from third countries. Yet, these were mere statements of intent since a lot of measures could not concern clandestine migrants who did not exist in official statistical prospects[4]. So, while several agreements concerning the social protection of migrant workers were signed from 1948 to the end of the 1950s and the European Institutions also envisaged the creation of new forms of assistance and pensions which might guarantee the welfare of all European workers (Mazzetti, 1975; Bikkal, 1975; Gui, 1975; Masini, 1975), new *ghettos* of foreign workers were developed (in particular in the outskirts of the main towns) and did not allow a real European social integration. The European institutions endeavoured to create and organise a new “Europe of work” (which was linked to the activity of the ILO), but they were not able to face to the increasing number of migrants related to the economic growth of Western Europe (CECA, 1957b; Leboutte, 2006; Taccolini, 2006; Mechi, 2013).

The problem of migrants did not concern the ECSC/EEC members only: all Western European countries belonging to the Council of Europe (or European Council, EC) were involved, and the EEC countries shared their migration policies with the other EC members. All these institutions dedicated a lot of time to the solution of the most serious migrants' problems and the EC promulgated many "resolutions" concerning accommodation. Governments were supposed to check that accommodation was hygienic. They were also supposed to provide information which would give migrants the knowledge they needed. Other directives concerned the participation of migrants in the organisation of the businesses and the areas where they lived and worked[5].

In the early 1950s, ECSC members knew that finding solutions to the problems of migrants would directly impinge on the development of the processes of European integration, and it would also have consequences for the future of the wider social and economic systems of Europe. So the ECSC Consultative Committee promoted the improvement and harmonisation of labour conditions and the control of the real wages. Following the US advise during the European Recovery Program (ERP), the ECSC (and the EEC afterwards) tried to improve work conditions and, at the same time, increase productivity so as to reduce the unit costs and final prices. This result could allow European institutions to create an economic and social system which could be an alternative to the USSR Marxist model and also to the US capitalism (even if the US army protected Western Europe).

The existence of good political and economic relations between the six EEC members depended on the kind of living conditions available to migrants. Italy exported workers, and the country demanded that their rights be respected. The problem of integration depended on solving the problems of migrants and so those countries who took in migrants were expected to improve conditions for Italian workers. This expectation was not related to any "contractual power" possessed by the Italian government, rather, it related to the general political conditions which existed in the 1950s and 1960s. European institutions were concerned to demonstrate to EEC citizens that the "western choice" offered a better way than the "Marxist solution" to be found in the Eastern European countries. In Italy it existed the greatest communist party in Western Europe and it could gain power if the Italian government (led by the Christian Democracy party and its allies) failed to protect those Italian emigrants who went to other EEC countries. If the Italian Communist Party (linked to the USSR) emerged victorious in Italy, a country which belonged to the NATO, the process of European integration would have been endangered, and the strategic equilibrium between the USA and the USSR imperilled. The Italian government was therefore able to ask their European partners to improve the conditions of Italian workers: if Italian emigration had been interrupted, the ensuing social problems would have favoured the rise of the Communist Party in Italy. So the European institutions had to allow Italian workers to move freely within the ECSC/EEC countries, which also paid for the economic development of the Mezzogiorno, the poorest ECSC/EEC region.

While OECE members could reject Italian demands and hence prohibit the free circulation of Italian workers, the ECSC members could not act in the same manner, because article 69 of the Treaty obliged members to accept workers who were qualified to work in mines and iron and steel industries. Italy wanted to delegate to the High Authority of the ECSC all powers to manage the labour market, but the opposition of other countries led to a compromise: article 69 only concerned those workers who had two years of experience and particular professional skills. Moreover, the High Authority established new rules for the social security of those migrants who worked in the mines and in the iron and steel factories. Furthermore new rules also concerned the organisation of vocational trainings for workers (to facilitate their "réadaptation" and to give more opportunities to find a job, in particular if they emigrated) and the building of houses for workers (to guarantee a lodgement, in particular for migrants). Finally new ECSC subsidies were established for the unemployment related to new technological innovations and the growth of the competition on the ECSC market: from 1953 to 1960 115,000 workers benefited of European subsidies and at the half of the sixties they were 500,000. All these new rules clearly implied that ECSC members had to

invest for the improvement of the quality of life of migrants and of their professional skills (Mechi, 2000; Leboutte, 2005; Locatelli, 2014).

The Treaties of Rome and the creation of new instruments to develop the economies of Western Europe and to reduce unemployment and migrants

New ECSC rules about the free circulation of workers affected few people. They took effect as from 1957, when the Treaties of Rome were signed. The problem of Italian migrants clearly inspired the new articles relating to the issue of the economic and social cohesion of Europe. This process required greater economic development in the more backward regions of Europe. The Italian government obtained from the EEC greater liberty for its unskilled migrants in the European labour market, but also more European funds for the improvement of the professional skills of jobless people and for investment in the Mezzogiorno.

Article 48 of the EEC treaty permitted the free circulation of workers when and where demand for such workers existed. New articles belonging to title XVII of the Treaties of Rome also provided a new way to promote the economic development of the Mezzogiono. Integrating migrants was recognised to be one of the most important issues in European economic and social cohesion. In order to achieve this aim, the Treaties of Rome also envisaged the creation of the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). It became clear that in order to promote a better way of life for migrants, new financial resources would be needed, and new programs would have to be created to guarantee that the money invested would be spent appropriately.. The EEC attributed to the ESF and EIB several aims concerning the solution of the "migrants problem". The EIB had to reduce the number of migrants facilitating the creation of new enterprises in the European backward regions. The ESF had to help those communities which received migrants to build houses and the necessary infrastructures for the utilities. It also invested to organize training courses to raise professional standards, and they sought to enable migrants to learn new language.

The ESF sought to boost the professional skills of workers so that they could adapt to the requirements of the new EEC market. It contributed until 50% of the finance required by projects which would improve employment opportunities. It attempted to find solutions to facilitate the transition from school to the work of young people. This involved financing vocational training for less-skilled people seeking a job. This policy gave EEC migrants more opportunity to find better jobs.

Besides, as from the early 1970s, a new awareness within European societies led to projects which would help hitherto disadvantaged groups, the ESF also aimed to facilitate the prospects for unskilled women and for unemployed people who had no experience in the labour market. It also sought to help those who had worked in agriculture or those industrial sectors which were now in decline. So the ESF organized training courses for more people and this implied the increasing of financial resources invested in ESF projects by EEC members. This policy improved the labour skills of a lot of EEC citizens who, sometimes, found a new job in their countries and so they did not emigrate. Finally, from the 1970s, the ESF also financed training courses for people with physical handicap and laws were passed which facilitated their employment in both the public and private spheres (Collins, 1975, p.40-70; Laffan, 1983; Mechi, 2006; Leboutte, 2008, p.653-663; Tomé 2013)

The building of new infrastructure and the creation of new industrial areas were in part financed by the EIB in less economically developed areas of the EEC and in particular in the Italian Mezzogiorno (Kipping 2002; Dumoulin, Bussière and Willaert, 2008; Coppolaro, 2009; Leboutte, 2009): this led to a reduction of unemployment and thus of the number of migrants. In addition, the EIB financed other infrastructures relying the Mezzogiorno to the EEC countries and this helped the economic development of Italian regions where new motorways and railways passed through. Thanks to this new infrastructural network, these regions (in the centre and north of Italy) could absorb a great share of migrants arriving from the Mezzogiorno (Tedeschi, 2008).

A new advisory body was founded, entitled the Economic and Social Committee (ESC). It grouped the representatives of European industrial and rural workers, entrepreneurs, consumers. It advised on issues relating to the EEC economy and also EEC policies for the labour market. Although it had no financial resources, in the 1960s it assumed a relevant role in the development of the EEC social policies and the new rules for migrant workers (Varsori 2000 and 2006a).

The EC also decided to create, in 1956, a special *fund de reétablissement* whose aims included the financing of projects for the integration of refugees, the development of infrastructure and the modernisation of the unfavoured European rural regions, the creation of schools for vocational training and foreign language learning solely reserved for migrants, as well as the construction of social housing and shelters for migrants[6].

So, by the end of the 1950s, the EEC and the EC had more instruments to analyse and solve the juridical, economical and social problems arising from the presence of migrants in their new countries. They were also concerned to solve those problems relating to the return of migrants and their families to their native countries, which involved their re-integration. During the 1960s the rise of incomes allowed some migrants to return to their native countries. This meant that the EEC and the EC felt obliged to organize and facilitate the social reintegration and the re-placement of such citizens into their native countries[7]. Many migrants preferred to accumulate foreign currency rather than being promoted. They preferred to earn more rather than take training courses and even gave up holidays, working in a second job. They sought to buy property in their native countries or restructure their old parents' house (they also purchased rural instruments to cultivate the old parents' arable land or vines or orchards). On the contrary, their children, who only knew their parents' dialect, preferred to seek social amelioration in the country where they were growing up. Young women in particular had no desire to return to the South of Italy, to a way of life which no longer satisfied their aspirations. They considered that their grand-parents sunny land was perfect only for holidays[8].

The EEC and the EC also had to solve the problem of seasonal migrant workers who enabled the "receiving" countries to maintain a more flexible labour market. These workers obviously helped the "exporting" countries to partially reduce the negative effects of unemployment: so they assumed an important role for a lot of western European countries. Adequate plans had to be set in place to cope with fluctuations in the workforce. New laws were passed regulating sickness subsidies and benefits for involuntary and temporary unemployment[9].

Such issues led to the realisation that some kind of social statute should be created in order to define the rights of migrant workers in countries belonging to the EC. Issues also arose relating to the "naturalisation" of refugees and the organisation of aid for those people who did not want to gain refugee status as they hoped to return home sooner or later. So the EC suggested the creation of the "Centres Europe" for giving migrants a lodgement and also a place to facilitate the meeting between foreigners and natives[10]. However, the European institution attitudes on refugees and their integration were not always coherent with this aim: Europe could be heaven or hell for refugees and this depended on the country and the shelter where they arrived (Joly, 1996; Lindstrøm, 2005; Rifugio, 2006; Cherubini, 2012).

The ESF was the means by which problems in the EEC labour market were addressed and, until the early 1970s, this body was especially useful in solving problems arising from intra-communitarian emigration. From 1958 to 1971 the ESF financed projects dealing with the problem of unemployment in southern Italy; it also sought to improve the professional skills of migrants (in particular Italian workers) in West Germany, France and Belgium. The ESF financed vocational training; it provided 50% of the costs, the rest being paid by the country which organised such processes, whether the "exporting country" (Italy) or the "importing countries". From 1961 to 1973, 1,713,650 workers benefited from the ESF projects: Italy received 65% of the funds and West Germany had 25,5% of the funds. Such data shows that Italy exported the majority of workers in the EEC and required substantial investment in order to finance these projects. From the early 1950s to the early 1970s there were more than 5,580,000 Italian emigrants, 75% of these came from the

Mezzogiorno. From 1946 to 1957 the difference between those immigrating and those emigrating came to a total of 1,941,000. This number was reduced to 780,000 at the time of the Italian economic miracle (1958-63), and further reduced to 387,000 between 1964 and 1969[11]. The ESF data also show that West Germany got more than a quarter of the ESF funds: it received the majority of workers arriving from other EEC members and it had to invest to facilitate their integration.

The EEC effort to support ESF action was significant: from 1961 to 1972, the ESF budget received 420 millions of "unités de compte" (1 u.c. = 0,88867088 grammes of gold), and this very considerable investment demonstrated how important it was considered to solve the immigrants issue and to help migrants to participate to the European social and economic development. Underlying the ESF budget was the idea that solidarity between EEC members was of fundamental importance. So Italy contributed to only 20% of budget, while West Germany paid 32% as did France, meaning that these countries were subsidising Italy (Leboutte, 2008, p.654). Helping the poorest country was not only a philanthropic choice, but such solidarity aimed also at showing that the West European model actually worked. Such pragmatic approach reduced the risk that the delay in the social and economic development of the Mezzogiorno favoured the increase of the electoral consensus for the communist party.

However, such policies were no longer viable after the fall of the international monetary system and in particular after the oil shock of Autumn 1973. West Germany and France temporarily closed their frontiers to all immigrants accepting only those coming from EEC countries or those covered by special cooperation agreements. The need for new policies to come with the increasing number of immigrants coincided with the economic downturn. Comparing the situation of the early 1950s with that of the early 1970s (before Denmark, Eire and the UK joined the EEC), we note that foreigners living in EEC countries totalled about 2,881,000 persons while twenty years later the number had risen to 6,945,000. While this number had more than doubled, the total EEC population had risen by only 19%. Clearly, there were consequences in those EEC regions to which migrants had transferred. In November 1972, the two main issues considered were "young people in the labour world" and "the condition of migrant workers in Europe". Concerns related to vocational training for young people, security in the workplace and the rate of unemployment for young people and women. Although twenty years had passed after the founding of the ECSC, it was still essential to create policies to integrate migrants and their families in the host countries, to enable them to learn languages and unite their families, find accommodation. Attempts had to be made to reduce clandestine work and social protection had to be extended during economic decline. Despite all the work that had been accomplished by European Institutions, many targets had not been reached and future prospects did not appear promising[12]. Data concerning migration flows partially justified this result and in particular showed how the demographic panorama of some EEC countries had strongly changed. Luxembourg represented the country with the higher rate of immigration: from the early 1950s to the early 1970s migrants passed from 29,000 to 63,000 (that is from less than 10% to 18.5% of total population). Belgium also registered a great growth in the number of migrants: they passed from 368,000 to 886,000 (that is from more than 4% to 9% of total population). As only a small share of the migrants worked in the European institution, it was evident that the main aim consisted in the improvement of life conditions of migrants and their families. Most migrants obviously moved to the main EEC members that is France and West Germany: in the early 1950s foreigners living in France were 1,765,000 (more than 4% of total population), while in West Germany they were 568,000 (1%, including people living in Saarland and West Berlin); in the early 1970s foreigners become 2,621,000 in France (5%) and 2,976,000 in West Germany (almost 3.5%). Migrants also increased in the Netherlands where, in the same period, they passed from 104,000 to 255,000 (from 1% to almost 2%). A positive trend was registered in Italy too: immigrates were 47,000 in the early 1950s, 62.800 in the early 1960s and 144,000 in the early 1970s: however they represented an inappreciable percentage (between 0.1% and 0.25%), because Italy continued to be a country which exported workforce and it had a low appeal for foreign migrants[13].

The international migration debates in the seventies and their influence on EEC institutional positions

Since the beginning of the seventies, new political and scholarly considerations on the social and economic effects of immigration enter the public discourse, causing a lasting influence on the evolution of EEC policies and measures in this realm. One important example is constituted by the Conclusions of the Committee for International Coordination of National Research on Demography (Tapinos, 1974), in which it is stated that "all economic growth, indeed, involves some form of mobility (internal or international). There is, accordingly, a clear relation between international migration and economic development". From this mindset, Western European countries promoted freer mobility in this period, resulting in migration becoming fully liberalised within the boundaries of the Scandinavian labour market and the European Community member States. In addition, migrants coming from outside these areas were granted different privileges codified in agreements between the receiving and sending states. Nonetheless, such measures did not result in making migration advantageous to all parties involved, since they were mainly designed to serve the instant needs of the receiving labour markets. Indeed, they greatly overlooked the promotion of development within a larger region, a view which particularly stood in contradiction with the self-stated cohesion aspirations of the European integration process.

The preference for short-term considerations in EEC migration policy at that time was also evident in the restrictions that some countries (for example the West Germany) imposed in response to the effects of the oil crisis in that period. As a matter of fact, many nationals of industrialised countries who formerly considered leaving the continent under more stringent economic conditions decided to stay, and many Southern Europeans preferred then to move and work just temporarily in nearby relevant industrial nodes. Despite these trends, an upsurge of overseas migration, comparable in scale and structure to the then rapidly evolving intra-European migration, would have been rather unlikely. Against this backdrop, the receiving countries in Western Europe competed mainly for skilled rather than for unskilled labour, which made up the bulk of intra-European migrants.

Coming down to the illustration of migration figures in this period, it should be noted that there were, approximately, "11.5 million foreigners living in OECD countries in 1972, among them 7.7 million workers. Most of them were employed in the West Germany (2.3 million), in France (1.65 million), and in Great Britain (1.55 million)" (Tapinos, 1974). This distribution reflected both longstanding affiliations between specific sending and receiving states, as well as newly-established connections. Following such new tendencies in the seventies, we can observe that: most immigrants to Sweden come from Finland. In Switzerland, Italians dominated over other nationalities. France was the preferred destination of migrants from North Africa and Portugal, and Great Britain continued to employ large contingents of Irish workers. Furthermore, in West Germany (which started to attract foreign migrants much later than the other states) Yugoslavs and Turks outnumbered Italians, who formerly were the largest group. However, the network of flows within Western Europe was much tighter. There were, indeed, large population flows coming from Greece to West Germany and Sweden and from Spain to West Germany, France and Switzerland, as well as intensive return migrations from all parts of Western Europe to all regions of Southern Europe. Besides, migration among industrialised countries gained in significance, although less than could be expected as a result of the fact that citizens coming from EEC members and the Scandinavian labour market could move freely within these areas. In addition, there were many connections with other continents (especially those coming from North Africa, but also from the Middle East and the Caribbean) and even with Eastern Europe. Apart from France, the Netherlands and the UK, which were then the main destinations for migrants from their former colonies, West Germany also admitted increasing numbers of non-European migrants under various recruitment and assistance schemes.

Nevertheless, foreign workers in most West European countries did not face very advantageous conditions in this period: they were often forced to accept unskilled, scarcely paid jobs; they usually could not bring their families with them and their sojourn was strictly limited by contract; they were not supposed to stay in the receiving country to fully integrate; they were regularly discriminated by the nationals of each given host country and sometimes even by national trade unions (Böhning, 1972b). If they could go through all these impending difficulties, it meant that the economic advantage of emigration had to be really high. And that seemed to be the case: the possibility of securing employment at wages three and four times higher than, for instance, in Spain, was a strong inducement for migration for workers whose consumption standards did not adjust to such high wages on a permanent basis and who saw emigration as a way to fund their families' well-being in their home country. If such was the motivation in Spain and other sending countries, their development rate was at least below the level required to adequately use their labour potential (Tapinos, 1974). In other words, if the space of development was going to be accelerated, emigration was expected to decrease. As International Labour Organisation (ILO) analysts then stated: "With continued economic growth it may be anticipated that emigration from Italy will continue to decline" (ILO, 1972). It should have been the same also for other Southern European countries, but in some of them, like Spain and Greece, the repression of any organised labour movement kept wages artificially low in contrast to most West European industrialised countries. In such conditions, emigration went on longer, despite gradual internal development. Especially suggestive of the rapidly increasing labour surplus in the least developed sending areas such as Turkey, Tunisia or Morocco was the incidence of clandestine migration, not only towards key industrial nodes, but also toward Southern Italy and parts of Greece and Spain, which became short of certain kinds of low-paid agricultural labourers as a result of excessive outward migration.

In this context, EEC industrialised countries were, hence, faced with a choice of three possible options to enhance GNP growth: "(a) To substitute capital for labour, as annual production generated a constant share of savings to be invested (assuming a constant propensity to save); (b) to invest abroad; or (c) to invest in the domestic economy but to import foreign labour to man the factories" (Castles and Kosak, 1972; Becker, Dörr and Tjaden, 1971; Schiller, 1971). Since the end of the Second World War, Western European industrialised countries were more in favour of the last option. Indeed, it was for this reason that the challenges of migrant workers was posed once full employment was being attained and industry became incapable to guarantee further reserves from the agricultural sector.

From a more global perspective, it is important to bear in mind that both inward and outward migration flows were institutionalised during this period within the framework of Multilateral Treaties, including those consolidated by various international organisations such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe, which were engaged in the coordination and unification of treaties in this field. The aim of these agreements was to avoid conflict between different systems and to ensure some basic common standards. On the one hand, the "ILO Agreement 97" in this period aimed at promoting an appropriate free service designed to assist migrant workers and, in particular, to provide them with accurate information. Moreover, the Council of Europe adopted a European Social Security code and incorporated in the European Social Charter a section on the right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance: this code comprised facilities for departure, travel and reception of migrants, regulations on equal treatment and special provisions for the maintenance of established rights (European, 1966). These bodies also made recommendations to their member States aimed at unifying and coordinating action undertaken by the various national authorities. Some examples include ILO recommendations on the housing of workers and the EEC recommendation on Social Services for migrants (Kamp , 1971; CIMC, 1974, p.252).

Furthermore, also the influence of the judiciary at the EEC level left a lasting trace in the implementation of EC-wide measures regarding intra-European migration. One significant example could be that of the 1975 *Rutili Judgment*, in which the European Court of Justice provides a strict

interpretation of the public policy reservation which may possibly restrict the free movement of workers in the EEC member States. As an exception to a fundamental principle of Community law, its application must comply with all Community rules. Accordingly, any measures which may be taken by a Member State must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual posing a genuine and sufficiently serious threat, and must apply indiscriminately to nationals of the member States and to other Community nationals (Judgement, 1975). However, it is important to note that a new and more open line was defined in contrast to this judgment when Eduardo García de Enterría was elected: he was the first Spanish judge at the European Court of Human Rights in April 1978, a position he held until 1986. Indeed, he upheld that Spain also became party to the various conventions and Treaties adopted by the Council of Europe, such as the *European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers*, thus introducing leverage, as well as a tempering measure with respect to previous and more restrictive rules in Community migration issues.

Political transitions and socioeconomic dimensions of European migration from the 1970s to the new millennium: challenges and trends in EU migration policy

The context of change of the mid-seventies in Southern European non-EEC Member States, such as Portugal and Spain, was also defined by an important trend, namely, return migration (Address, 1975), which coincided with a major parallel process of transition to democracy and of political negotiations for EEC accession. This trend was explained by the economic impact of the oil crisis, especially in West Germany and in France, which temporarily closed their frontiers to immigration, leaving them accessible only for migrants coming from EEC Member States and for other national collectives under the aegis of special cooperation agreements (Latorre Catalán, 2006). Within this context, the number of Spaniards regarded as emigrants in 1970 has been estimated at about three and a half million. The majority, especially as far as emigration to EEC member States is concerned, represented a rural mindset, both in relation to the level of occupation, attitude, and as to geographical origin, employment and career plans, etc. Similar features could be evidenced from the emigration records of other states in the Mediterranean area, like Italy, Greece, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. In relation to the very notion of return migration, Mediterranean migrants seemed to prioritise the accumulation of foreign currency over occupational promotion and career concerns. At the same time, the paradigmatic Mediterranean migrant of this period seemed to prefer "the multiplication of hours of overtime to the sacrifice of some time and money to various training courses. He does not appear to be as much interested in social mobility in the host society, in relation to which he feels himself in a fringe situation, as in economic and social improvement in his society of origin". Against this backdrop, "his frequent aims are generally related to the purchase of an apartment and of agricultural machinery, to generating bank savings and self-employment, etc. This explains why only 6% of foreign workers employed in the Federal Republic of Germany in the mid-seventies were in the specialist grade" (Del Campo and Garmendia, 1974). However, the Mediterranean migrant was usually considered, in this context, merely as a labourer both as a result of lack of technical know-how and due to the fact that he was more useful and profitable in practical and low-skilled tasks.

As the flow of Spanish emigration to other EC countries developed, it underwent a period of crisis as the potentiality of accumulating savings gradually decreased. That was the case of Spanish migration to France, where migration policies encouraged longer stays. Spanish citizens moulded to this new context by means of associative activities, which gathered a good numbers of Spaniards living and working in France (Díaz-Plaja, 1974). Such associations, also promoted integration tools within a variety of EC initiatives, provided a space for socialisation and a means of recreating the culture of origin. Some of them, furthermore, even acquired a critical awareness of the emigrant condition (Garson and Loizillon, 2003; Babiano, 2002). These activities played also a fundamental role in offering a radically different transnational civic values socialisation and politicisation experience to migrant workers coming from countries under dictatorships, since it allowed them to

contact and participate in labour organisations, in democratic political parties and in political organisations centred on the particular conditions of economic and political exile, which also had a remarkable influence in activism patterns during transition periods in return migrant communities.

The Spanish first migration wave to the EEC, from 1973 to 1986, also coincided with the first oil crisis and with a general lack of contracts for Southern European migrants in the most developed EEC member States. In the next phase, from 1986 to 1992, Spanish and Portuguese migrants ceased to be considered as such to become EEC workers, holding equal rights to those of EEC member states, even if free circulation was dependent on transition periods. From this moment on, Southern European workers started moving to a different EEC Member State as highly qualified professionals (PIONEUR, 2006), and also benefited from an high educational capital to develop transnational careers, seek particular working environments, innovative lifestyles and diverse consumption patterns (Alaminos Chica and Santacreu Fernández, 2010, p.201-211; Straubhaar, 1984). This trend was remarkably consolidated via EEC/EU diploma recognition schemes, which gradually implemented a harmonised method of professional qualifications recognition in old and new EU member States, constituting a key socioeconomic factor of European integration deepening (Alaminos Chica, 2006). In this respect, it is also fundamental to address the political and socioeconomic impact of the Schengen Agreement and of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997)[14], as well as the special attention paid to the *EU Social Policy Agreement*, and to the subsequent EU-wide provisions on the free movement of persons with regard to visas, asylum and immigration.

As already mentioned, the Spanish economy had experienced a very significant development in the mid-seventies. In this context, migrants' remittances became an actual trigger of economic growth (Powell, 2011). By contrast, the overall economic growth which followed EEC accession fed a wave of extra-European migration during the late eighties, specially focused on agricultural labour from the Mediterranean basin, which became socially acknowledged only at the end of the nineties. In this respect, Spain started following the same pattern of Greece and Italy, notably characterised by low fertility rates, population aging as well as increasing education levels. This resulted in a refusal of younger generations to concentrate on the primary sector, thus prioritizing a search for more qualified jobs. Hence, the internal demand coming from sectors such as agriculture, household jobs, construction work and catering increased accordingly. This new extra-European migration provided manpower mainly to SMEs but fell, in many occasions, into the realm of the informal economy. From this viewpoint, it is important to bear in mind that "in highly segmented labour markets, immigrants occupied and still occupy the worst positions, not only regarding salaries and work conditions, but also in terms of instability and lack of Social Security protection" (Alvarez, 2006).

In the period that goes from the nineties to the beginning of the 21st century, Southern Europe, but very particularly, Spain, became the main destination of a new wave of extra-European migration in the EU. Indeed, according to Eurostat, "Italy and Spain received 56% of total EU immigration that arrived during the period 1997-2008, while Spain alone received 50% of the total during the past decade, 2000-2009"[15]. The fact that Spain was at the forefront of a new wave of extra-European migration deeply transformed its role and attitude in relation to the measures taken by the EU in this field. For instance, Spain gradually acquired a more proactive role in the design of an evolving EU migration policy and promoted the establishment of FRONTEX in 2004. At the same time, Spain gradually demanded an increasing involvement of Northern EU member states in addressing the challenges of migration in the EU. Indeed, "the establishment in 2007 of a European financial fund for the return of irregular migrants or the launching of European repatriation joint flights were also results of this Spanish demand for a bigger involvement of Northern countries in the financial cost of immigration management" (González Enríquez, 2011). It was also remarkable that integration initiatives and associate activities regarding extra-European migration in Spain were mainly encouraged and maintained within the sphere of Spanish civil society.

In 2008, Spain was also actively involved in the elaboration of the *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*, resulting from a French proposal, which included a restrictive notion of

creating an “immigration contract”. However, such initiative was later refused by the Spanish government of the time, despite the acceptance to incorporate an institutional blocking of mass regularizations within the Pact. In this respect “the European Union has played a double role in the Spanish immigration process: Spain has obtained EU support in the financial and political effort to reduce irregular migration, especially coming from Africa, and has used EU decisions as external legitimization for the introduction of domestic policies that could arouse opposition” (González Enríquez, 2011; Drozdz, 2011; EEC, 2007; Luedtke, 2005; Herz, 2003; Cornelius, Martin and Hollified 2002; Lu, 1999; Callovi, 1992).

From a different perspective, it is essential to take into account that the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements implied radical political and socioeconomic transformations in Europe that also affected intra-European migration flows. Above all, they directly influenced common European prospects and definitions of welfare systems, especially within the framework of the *European Employment Strategy and the Social Agenda*.

Scholarly analysis in this field shows that “(a) EU enlargement had a significant impact on migration flows from new to old Member States, (b) restrictions applied in some of the countries did not stop migrants from coming, but changed the composition of the immigrants, (c) any negative effects in the labour market on wages or employment are hard to detect, (d) post-enlargement migration contributes to EU growth prospects, (e) these immigrants are strongly attached to the labour market, and (f) they are quite unlikely to be among welfare recipients. These findings point out the difficulties that restrictions on the free movement of workers bring about” (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010; Carrera and Merlino, 2010; Shafagatov and Aygun, 2005; Messina, 2002).

Following the 2004 EU enlargement, Ireland, the UK and Sweden opened access to their labour markets immediately. As for social benefits, access to the welfare systems in Ireland and the UK depends on the duration of residence and employment. Sweden was deeply in contrast with these trends by applying European Community rules. In the second phase of these arrangements, eight more member states opened their labour markets by November 2008: Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010). Restrictions in national access regimes continued in some economic sectors in Belgium, Germany and Denmark, which felt a fear of mass migration similar to that of past EEC/EU enlargements. Also, similarly to these past cases, mass migration never became a reality and the potentialities of economic development coming from migration (specially from high skilled labour) never seemed to be fully explored, encouraged and discussed in a EU-wide dialogue analysing also positive interdependencies. Last but not least, in a context characterised by the socioeconomic challenges of debt crisis and the shrinking of a European social dimension, it would be advisable to openly address the issue of how regional imbalances could be more easily superseded through a coordinated action towards free circulation of workers within the EU. In sum, a more European wide perspective, beyond national interests, would be advisable to find articulated migration strategies in line with the evolution and potentialities of the European integration process.

Conclusion: preserving the “fortress Europe”?

The EEC/EU institutional initiatives to address the social and economic challenges related to the intra-European and extra-European migrations were developed to a remarkable degree. From the first steps of European integration to the new millennium, the main targets of the policies of the European institutions with regard to migrants and their families included: a full integration in the host countries, the teaching of European languages, the finding of healthy accommodation and workplaces, the reunification of families with respect to European laws, the fight against the clandestine work (which also concerned illegal immigrants) and the establishment of a possible social welfare during periods of economic decline and difficulty (Ireland, 1998; Trépant, 2002; Kaelble, 2007; Fassmann, Haller and Lane, 2009; Hamida, 2010).

In the 1990s all Western European countries had a positive balance for migration (only Eire sometimes had a negative balance, but for 5-6,000 persons only) and received migrants arriving from Eastern Europe as a result of the end of the cold war: for the first time all Western European countries had the same problems concerning migrants and the new migration flows needed new European policies (King and Black, 2002; EU enlargement 2002; The New Face, 2008; Cuschieri, 2007; Black et al., 2010). Furthermore, a new phenomenon arose in the EU: an increasing number of retired people decided to retire to Mediterranean countries (and in the last years in the new Balkan EU members too) where the weather conditions are better, and the real value of their pensions allowed for a higher quality of life. These factors increased the transfer of money towards the Southern EU countries and also modified the redistribution in the EU economies of welfare costs: retired people did not spend their pensions in their native countries, but the costs of their welfare (in particular hospital services) were charged to their native countries (Older Migrants, 2004).

In any case, such new migrant flows did not produce sufficient economic advantage to the Mediterranean countries to counteract the disadvantages deriving from the influx of migrants from South-eastern European countries, as well as those from the Third World. These migrants considered all EU countries the perfect destination: the quality of their lives would be improved and, as had happened to European migrants from the West previously, they risked their lives in order to attain their objectives. A growing consensus for movements against immigration emerged amongst European countries (and in particular those countries with land or sea frontiers with Africa and Asia): however, the hard discussions about the real impact of migrants on the EU labour market showed that positive effects were prevalent on negative ones and that the European institutions continued to help all the migrants (Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Livi Bacci, 2005; Dupâquier and Laulan, 2006; Venturini and Villosio, 2006 and 2008; Papademetriou, Sumption and Somerville, 2009; D'Amuri, Ottaviano and Peri, 2010; Keereman and Szekely, 2010; Eichhorst et al., 2011; Brücker and Eger, 2012). Migrants and their families helped not only the European social and economic development with their work, but they also influenced the attempts of European institution to create a new European common identity which had to coexist with the "old" national cultures. This was, and remains, a very strong challenge for its implications concerning the EU society (different religions and "systems of life") and moreover the EU economy (common currency, common welfare, and common agrarian and industrial policies in the new world markets) (Beers and Raflik, 2010; Spohn and Triandafyllidou, 2001; Milza, 1994). A new European culture could come into being only if European institutions promoted teaching projects dedicated to the migrants and their families: the improvement of migrants' professional skills depends on a better education too (Bekemans and Ortiz De Urbina, 1997; Varsori, 2006b; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011).

All the initiatives of the European institutions were the result of the programs and politics demanded both at the international level (OIT, OCDE, etc.) and at the domestic level. These initiatives depended on the evolving political spectrum and on the growing and diversifying civil society of the new EEC/EU members: they were also linked to European political transitions and global socio-economic transformations. The European countries welfare systems and social policies had to change and to include new prospects for migrants integration.

The evolution of migrant flows toward the west European countries also influenced and modified the existing correlation between migration waves and EEC/EU accession negotiations both at the level of the European institutions rules on migrants' integration measures and on the relationship between migration and economic development. European institution firstly focused their attention on the feedback relation of employment-related migration: this was evident during the post war reconstruction and it was progressively reduced during the "golden age" until the early 1970s. New rules were linked to the realization of the European solidarity: ECSC and EEC members had to show that the "western choice" was winning and they did not allow that parties linked to the USSR won in the backwards regions. So European institutions tried to help the poorest regions to reduce their unemployment rate and, at the same time, to guarantee a good quality of life for migrants.

Secondly, from the mid-1970s onward, the European institutions had to face the social and economic impact of the oil crisis which provoked new migration arrangements in parallel with new requests for EEC accession arriving from countries which "exported" workers. So, during the 1980s, the European institutions reassessed the impact and foreseeable long term effects of return migration, not only in economic terms, but also with regard to transfers of political culture and of democratization of socioeconomic relations at the domestic level. At the same time, the European institutions focused on the role of migrants in the EEC labour market which helped moulding new legal frameworks towards the constitution of a strongest political union: it was clear that only this latter, established with the Single Act in 1986, could guarantee more opportunities for the best workers in a wider and regulated new European market.

The reform of the ESF in 1988, and moreover the doubling of its budget, increased the effort of the EEC to help all European workers, including migrants. Conversely, during the decade of the 1990s, the issue of extra-EU migration, increasingly linked to irregular migration flows forced a shift of EU policies from an economic dimension to the realm of justice, security and home affairs which was evidently very difficult to realize. This period was also characterized by the migration challenges of an enlarged Europe after the end of the Cold War, which implied a renewed attention in the establishment of transition periods concerning the Eastern European countries (which became EU members in the new millennium). Moreover, European institutions also stressed the existence of important asymmetries in the development of EU countries regarding migration flows: the lack of solidarity among EU countries and the holding on to different national policies concerning migrants (as the EU immigration policy continues to seem a "phantom" or a "fantasy") provoked the transfers of migrants towards to the countries having "lighter" laws or showing more difficulties in their real application. So only a part of migrants went to the countries with an economy which could better support migrants' needs: so some migrants sometimes remained in a no-land where they could receive some subsidies to survive, but not a job for improving their future (Philip, 1994; Brochmann, 1994; Guild, 1998;Guiraudon 2000a and 2000b; Givens and Luedtke, 2004 and 2005; Geddes, 2005, Bendel, 2007; Schain, 2009).

Furthermore, even if some relevant changes were established in the Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties, the new world crises which set in after the birth of Euro currency implied a strong return of employment-related migration, as well as a preference for skilled workers and for temporary migration. At the same time, the number of non skilled migrants increased (in particular the clandestine ones). The EU tried to consolidate new integration measures in a difficult dialogue with national policy preferences: in any case, unemployment rates affected more foreign workers than native workers, despite manipulative discourses in a different direction and the public opinion asking for new laws consolidating the "fortress Europe" and strongly reducing migration flows toward the EU countries (Geddes, 2000; Caviedes, 2004; Bendel, 2005; Korf, 2008; Triandafyllidou, 2010). Finally the new nature of intra-European migration posed new challenges but it also offered the opportunity to increase European integration and to adopt the best measures for improving the economic trend and the European citizens' life conditions, migrants included: the alternative was obviously a policy preserving and reinforcing the walls of the "fortress Europe".

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ENDNOTES

[1] Even if this paper is the result of common researches, analysis and reflexions by the authors, the paragraphs 3 and 4 have to be attributed to Cristina Blanco Sío-López (CVCE) and the remaining text to Paolo Tedeschi (University of Milan-Bicocca DEMS).

[2] See in particular the records concerning the High Authority of the ECSC and the European Social Fund in the European Commission Historical Archives: CEAB 1, 1649-73, CEAB 7, 1316, 1484, 1863 (free circulation of workforce, 1953-63), CEAB 1, 1680 (Italian workers in Belgian mines, 1955-56), CEAB 4, 634, 720, 948-949, 1166, 1168, CEAB 7, 1402, 1485, 1607-1608 (social security for migrant workers, 1953-68), CEAB 1, 669, 1790, 1816-1832, 1834-52 (ECSC financial helps for building houses for workers, 1952-68), CEAB 1, 134-136, 656, 1718-1722, CEAB 4, 385-388, 1127-1128, CEAB 7 n. 1651, 1634-48 (ECSC policy for vocational trainings and "réadaptation", 1953-68). See also EEC, BAC 1/1962, BAC 1/1968, BAC 26/1969, BAC 30/1969 (European Social Fund and European social policies). Besides see HAEU: BAC-042/1991 (27, 29), CENYC (83); CES (7208-7209); CPPE (1448); GJLA (246, 280); PE0 (2445, 2711, 12921, 18080); OEEC (27.037, 261); WEU (106.016). Finally see DG Enlargement, EC, (doc 7688/94, 7955/97, 11329/94), and Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Spain), MAE, Leg. 12557, Exp. 60(E)77-1, CEE 1977.

[3] About the birth of PICMME and its members see the contribute of Francesca Fauri in this volume.

[4] For an example concerning the integration between EEC rules and EEC members national laws about the welfare for migrants and their families see Mongé, R., *Le travailleur espagnol et la famille espagnole en France*, and *Le travailleur portugais et la famille portugaise en France*, and *Le travailleur italien et la famille italienne en France*, published in 1966 by the Service Social d'Aide aux Émigrants.

[5] See the EC resolution 69/8 and 69/9 in *Ici l'Europe* (the Bulletin edited by the EC), 1969, n. 2, p.24. During the 1950s and 1960s all west European countries gave their adhesion at the EC which was born 1969: Denmark, Eire, UK, Sweden, Norway were between the founders. The Switzerland acceded in 1963 and it was the European country having the highest share of migrants after the Luxembourg (285,000 and more than 6% of the total population in the early 1950s and 1,080,000 and more than 17% of the total population in the early 1970s). See the special issue for the 20th anniversary of the EC birth in *Ibid.*, p.I-XV.
[6] From its birth to the Spring 1969 the fund invested more than 57,000,000 US dollars for financing almost 50 projects. See *Ibid.*, 1969, n. 2, p.VI.
[7] The number of the returns progressively increased during the 1960s and in the Spring 1969 the Committee of Ministers of the EC recommended new measures for facilitating these returns as the creation of a special office for their placement and also the organization of courses for the children to allow them to know the history, the geography and the language of their parents' countries. See the resolution 69/7 in *Ibid.*, p.23.
[8] Please note that until the 1970s there were also some problems concerning the rules for giving the nationality to migrants' sons and daughters (laws privileged the *jus sanguinis*) and for the wives (most of countries attributed to them the nationality of their husbands and moreover wives did not receive the reversion pension if their husband died). See *Ibid.*, 1973, n. 1, p.13-14.
[9] See the resolution 69/9 in *Ibid.*, 1969, n. 2, p.24. The Committee of EC Ministers also suggested to establish some different holidays period for people working in different industrial sectors and in the public offices: this allowed to reduce the jobless time in the tourism. However the suggestion had no relevant applications.
[10] See *Ibid.*, 1969, n. 4, p. 60-62. Please note that the debate about the Statute continued for a lot of time and in 1971 the Commission of Population and Refugees proposed that the rights concerned all migrants arriving in Western Europe even if their native country did not subscribe the statute. See *Ibid.*, 1971, n.1, p.8. Finally, note that in 1972 EC refused to finance the Greek refugees: see *Ibid.*, 1972, n. 1, p.19.
[11] In Italy from 1951 to 1971 more than 10,000,000 of inhabitants were involved in regional migrations and more than 4,200,000 left the Mezzogiorno (that is more than 23% of the total population). Other data about Italian emigration in this period are in the contributes of Francesca Fauri and Sandro Rinauro in this volume.
[12] See *Ici l'Europe*, 1972, n. 4, p.74-75; *Ibid.*, 1973, n. 3, p.51-52.
[13] Please note that data about real migrant flows in EEC countries change depending on the used sources, so the figures are indicative only. For example the data in the text concerning the number of foreigner workers in West Germany (Kaelble, 2007, p.185) are not compatible with another data which put in evidence an increasing from 280,000 in 1960 to 2,600,000 in 1973 (Romero 1991, p.91).
[14] See "European Parliament resolution on the Schengen Agreement and political asylum", 6 April 1995; "Treaty of Amsterdam", 2 October 1997.
[15] In comparative terms, the effect of this migration wave is bigger in Spain than in Italy, as the size of the native population is much smaller. All in all, Spain received more than 5 million new migrants (i.e. net migration) during the 2000s, over a population of 40 million at the beginning of the period in a process of unknown intensity in Europe. From 0.5% of the population in 1985, the number of immigrants amounted to 14% in 2010.