

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/5240
4 February 1963
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF 14 JULY 1960, 21 FEBRUARY
AND 24 NOVEMBER 1961

1. The Officer-in-Charge of ONUC, in the course of the past year, has submitted to me, and I have in turn had circulated to the Security Council, a series of fifteen reports on developments relating to the application of the Security Council resolutions of 21 February and 24 November 1961. It will be recalled that in the first of these resolutions it was urged in particular that measures should be taken to prevent civil war in the Congo and to ensure the evacuation of foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, as well as of mercenaries. In the second resolution, which was adopted after armed attacks had been made on United Nations troops by Katangese forces led by foreign mercenaries, the Security Council deprecated secessionist activities against the Republic of the Congo and demanded that such activities in Katanga should cease.

2. The latest report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (S/5053/Add.15) on developments relating to the application of the Security Council resolutions of 21 February and 24 November 1961 (S/4741 and S/5002) affords encouraging information, in the sense that it indicates that an important phase of the Operation has been completed. I feel it appropriate and timely, therefore, for me to report to the Security Council at this stage in order to present an accounting of the extent to which the mandates given to ONUC by the Security Council resolutions have been fulfilled, of the aspects of those mandates that remain to be implemented, and to suggest what a look ahead may indicate as to the tasks to be fulfilled and the resources that will be required for that purpose.

3. At the beginning of 1962, there was hope, following Mr. Tshombe's declaration at Kitona, that the problem of the secession of Katanga might be speedily settled. That hope was quickly dispelled, however, when Mr. Tshombe, in effect, disavowed his promises as soon as he returned to Katanga. A subsequent six months of dilatory "negotiating" by Mr. Tshombe, for half of that time in the talks with Prime Minister Adoula in Leopoldville, served only to waste time and to raise questions of bad faith. During the entire year from December 1961 to December 1962, the Katangese provincial authorities were evasive on the question of the expulsion of foreign mercenaries and on the issue of freedom of movement for ONUC personnel. Indeed, because of its determination to make all possible efforts toward peaceful reconciliation, ONUC, seeking throughout 1962 to avoid doing anything that might impede those efforts, exercised a considerable restraint in pressing the issues of freedom of movement and elimination of mercenaries. During that year, however, Mr. Tshombe and other Katangese provincial authorities repeatedly avowed that no more mercenaries were engaged in Katanga. We now know positively that this was not the case.

4. It was imperative that the problem of attempted Katangese secession, which not only caused impoverishment and instability in the rest of the Congo, but also threatened the peace of the African continent, and imposed on the United Nations itself serious political and financial difficulties, be finally settled. I myself, therefore, following consultations with a number of Governments, proposed in August 1962 the Plan of National Reconciliation. This Plan was promptly accepted by Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe. It was only a proposal which the parties were entirely free to accept or reject.

5. The failure of the Katangese provincial authorities, after more than three months, to take any practical steps to implement this Plan, and their continued lack of co-operation with other activities of the United Nations, led me in December 1962 to advance certain measures designed to bring economic pressure to bear on the Katanga provincial authorities and thereby to lead the Katangese problem to an early and peaceful solution. The Government of Belgium was thus asked to exert every possible influence on the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, a Belgian corporation, which is part of a powerful international financial complex, to induce it to desist from paying to Katanga province the revenues and taxes

due to the Government of the Congo. States which had jurisdiction over territories through which Katangese copper was exported, namely Portugal, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom, were requested to take measures to prohibit the shipment of such copper until the question of the payment of UMHK revenues was settled. Other interested Governments were requested by the Central Government of the Congo, with my support, not to permit the import of copper and cobalt from Katanga into their territories. Developments in Katanga since these letters were written have overtaken the requests in them. I do, however, express my special appreciation to those Governments which had already intimated to me their readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of my appeals.

6. On 12 December 1962, Mr. Tshombe offered to permit the UMHK to transfer to the Monetary Council of the Republic of the Congo all foreign exchange generated by Katangese exports, provided that after deduction of the needs of the UMHK, 50 per cent of such exchange would be returned to Katanga. Despite this gesture, for which I expressed my appreciation, there was long delay on the part of the Katanga provincial authorities in arranging for representatives of the Bank of Katanga and of the UMHK to proceed to Leopoldville for discussions on this matter.

7. Instead of further acts of co-operation by the Katangese provincial authorities, there ensued provocative military action by the Katangese gendarmerie and its mercenary elements, which Mr. Tshombe was unwilling or unable to control. After United Nations troops had been fired at for six days without retaliation, I was obliged, with great reluctance, to authorize the CNUC military actions that began on last December 28th. The successive stages of those actions, culminating in the peaceful entry of CNUC forces into Kolwezi on 21 January 1963, have been detailed in the last report of the Officer-in-Charge (S/5053/Add.15).

8. Full freedom of movement for CNUC personnel throughout Katanga has thus been fully and firmly established. CNUC could never hope to discharge the mandates given to it with regard to law and order, prevention of civil war and the elimination of mercenaries, without freedom of movement. It was with this in mind that freedom of movement for CNUC was provided for in the Plan.

9. It is a matter of very great regret to me that the recent military actions were attended by some loss of life and by some damage to property. Because of the skill and restraint with which these actions were conducted, the casualties

and damage were remarkably light. I wish to pay tribute to the courage, skill, devotion to duty, and the forbearance shown by all of those - in both the civilian and military branches of ONUC - who were connected with these events. This tribute applies equally to those many members of the Secretariat at United Nations Headquarters and in other United Nations Offices throughout the world who have been assisting the Congo Operation as an extra work load. Nor do I forget the countries and Governments providing contingents to the Force. The actions were highly successful. But I would like to emphasize that the United Nations claims no victory in such situations. Nor does it speak of enemies. It is only too happy that the military action forced upon it last December is over; and it is thankful that this came about with comparatively little fighting. For a peace force, even a little fighting is too much and only a few casualties are too many.

10. It was my concern at all times during these events to offer every opportunity to Mr. Tshombe and his provincial ministers to give practical evidence of their readiness to accept and put into effect the Plan of National Reconciliation and thus avoid further needless bloodshed. I also found it necessary to warn Mr. Tshombe very seriously against carrying out the threats of massive destruction which he from time to time announced to the Press.

11. Despite the unnecessary fighting which had occurred since 28 December, it was still my conviction that the only practical course to the reconstruction of a united Congo would be through national reconciliation. Therefore, when on 14 January I received the message of Mr. Tshombe and his ministers indicating that they were ready to proclaim the end of the attempted secession of Katanga, to grant freedom of movement to United Nations troops and to co-operate with the United Nations, I immediately welcomed the statement and commended it to the attention of the President and the Prime Minister of the Congo. It was, indeed, with the Congolese authorities that the final decision rested, since only they could confirm the promise of amnesty which was the one condition which Mr. Tshombe and his ministers attached to their voluntary declaration of a change in course. The replies of Prime Minister Adoula and President Kasa-Vubu confirming that the amnesty proclamation of 26 November 1962 remained valid despite the changed circumstances became available the following day. Their messages, moderate in tone and emphasizing peaceful reconciliation and co-operation in reconstruction, were statesmanlike and encouraging.

12. The unopposed entry of United Nations troops into Kolwezi on 21 January and the subsequent return of Mr. Tshombe and his provincial ministers to Elisabethville after their reiterated assurances of determination to carry out the Plan of National Reconciliation were significant and hopeful notes. The arrival of Mr. Ileo as Minister Resident of the Central Government in Elisabethville on 23 January symbolizes the restoration of the Central Government's authority in South Katanga. This, taken together with the numerous other concrete measures toward reintegration reported in the Officer-in-Charge's last report (S/5053/Add.15), indicated that the authority of the Central Government was being rapidly restored throughout Katanga. As this report is being written, Mr. Tshombe has communicated the list of names of senior officers of the Katangese gendarmerie, who, under the provisions of the Plan, are to be transported by the United Nations to Leopoldville to take the oath of allegiance to President Kasavubu, thus signalling the integration of the Katangese gendarmerie into the Congolese National Army.

13. In the light of these events, it is possible now to reach some conclusions about the fulfilment of the mandates laid down by Security Council resolutions on the Congo. This is a record of achievement under extraordinarily difficult conditions in which the United Nations may take pride. There is also so much still to be done that it may be rightly said that we are just at the beginning of a new phase of the Operation, in which a radical change in emphasis and direction will take place.

14. The policies and purposes of the United Nations with respect to the Republic of the Congo, as set out by the Security Council in its resolutions (see S/5002), are the following:

- (a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;
- (b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order;
- (c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo;
- (d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; and
- (e) To render technical assistance.

These are the mandates governing the actions of the United Nations Operation in the Congo.

15. It may be noted that in the prevention of civil war, the resolution of 21 February 1961 (S/4741) provides for "the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort", while the resolution of 24 November 1961 (S/5002) authorizes "the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary...." in the apprehension of mercenaries. In these respects, as in the use of its arms in simple self-defence, ONUC has acted with utmost prudence and restraint. The Force, although heterogeneous in its composition, is well disciplined, well officered and reliable. It is a thoroughly professional body.

16. The extent to which the above-mentioned mandates have been carried out, under the limitations on action decreed by the Security Council resolutions, may now be briefly reviewed.

(a) Maintenance of territorial integrity and political independence

17. The most serious threat to the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo has been the secessionist activity carried on since 11 July 1960 by the provincial authorities of Katanga. The integrity of the Congo was in a symbolic sense restored by the entry, with the consent of Mr. Tshombe, of United Nations troops into Katanga in August 1960. Despite unceasing efforts by the United Nations Force to prevent civil war and to create secure conditions in which the Katanga provincial authorities might enter into discussions with the Central Government for a peaceful reintegration of Katanga into the Republic, the Katanga provincial authorities persisted in their secessionist intrigues and activities. The recklessness of these activities was underscored by the unprovoked attacks of mercenary-led elements of the Katangese gendarmerie on United Nations troops in Elisabethville in September and December 1961 and in December 1962.

18. It is significant that since its free and peaceful entry into Katanga province in early August 1960, the United Nations Force there has enjoyed, almost without exception, good and friendly relations with the African people of Katanga. In recent months this has been increasingly true also of the non-African populations in Albertville, Elisabethville, Kipushi, Jadotville, Baudoinville and Kolwezi. Moreover, armed clashes between ONUC troops and the gendarmerie have occurred in general only when elements of the gendarmerie have been led by European mercenary officers. Despite frequent statements by Mr. Tshombe that he accepted reintegration, no real progress in that direction was achieved until after the recent military operations in Katanga.

19. In view of the subsequent public renunciation of secession by Mr. Tshombe and his ministers at Kolwezi; their declaration that they would henceforth co-operate with the United Nations in the full implementation of the Plan of National Reconciliation; the complete freedom of movement achieved by ONUC throughout Katanga; the neutralizing and disarming of the Katanga gendarmerie; the elimination of the Katanga airforce; the flight of the mercenaries; and the new situation as regards Union Minière revenues, it may be reasonably concluded that the attempted secession of Katanga is at an end. Given an absence of alertness or a too rapid withdrawal of the ONUC troops, it is conceivable that it could be revived. There are interests and elements in the Katanga scene which would always favour and flirt with it. There could be a regrouping and rearming of the gendarmerie or parts of it as a new secessionist force. But Katanga secession has never had a firm mass base among the people and it now appears that with most of them its demise has passed virtually unnoticed. Indeed, most of the people of North Katanga have at all times strongly opposed secession and given their full support to the Central Government.

20. There have been other separatist attempts in the Congo, of course, but none of these has had the importance or financial support of the Katanga pretensions, and they are now more or less quiescent. Happily, there appears to be no direct threat to the independence of the Congo from external sources. Thus it can be asserted that the territorial integrity and political independence mandate of the United Nations Operation has been largely fulfilled, except for a caretaker role.

(b) Assistance in the restoration and maintenance of law and order

21. It was the inability of the national security forces of the Congo, because of their mutiny one week after independence, to carry out their task of maintaining law and order that led indirectly to the decision by the Security Council to launch the United Nations Operation in the Congo. There was a breakdown of administration and of economic life; there were political disputes verging on civil war and inter-tribal differences which often took violent form. For a considerable period, the results of ONUC efforts could at best be palliative, seeking desperately in some areas only to prevent a complete breakdown of law and order. When the new Central Government came into power in August 1961, ONUC was able to co-ordinate its efforts in a much more effective way with those of the Congolese authorities,

and from that time on the situation has shown in general a steady improvement. In the former Equateur province, for example, it has not been found necessary to post United Nations troops for a considerable period. In Leopoldville, for quite some time, and more recently in such areas as Stanleyville, Bukavu and Albertville, conditions have become much more settled and secure, and this is reflected in some resumption of economic activity and a return of many foreign nationals.

22. In Katanga, the continuing pursuit of secessionist policies by the provincial authorities has kept conditions constantly disturbed until very recently. It now appears, however, that law and order have been firmly restored in the main centres of Katanga, and it is expected that ONUC presence will have the same effect in rural areas where fighting has occurred between ANC troops and Katangese gendarmes. In any case, during the transitional period of reintegration of Katanga into the rest of the Republic, the problem of law and order there will be a delicate one. This is recognized by the Central Government, which has tentatively agreed for the present to place its own security forces in South Katanga under United Nations command and has accepted, at least in principle, that the introduction of its armed units into South Katanga should be spread out over a period of time. The transitional period during which the full authority of the Central Government is to be installed in Katanga unavoidably embodies many problems, some of which impose no little strain on the relations between the Central Government and ONUC. As regards the introduction of the ANC into South Katanga, the issues are essentially those of pace and method. The United Nations Operation, in the interest of order, security and public tranquillity, prefers a gradual introduction, based on an orderly plan, and insists for the time being on a single command, to avoid confusion and conflict.

23. Unfortunately, it appears that inter-tribal differences in the former province of Kasai seem to have been accentuated by the division of that province into smaller provinces more or less along tribal lines. Serious clashes continue to occur between ANC troops and "jeunesse" elements in the province of South Kasai, as well as between tribal elements. An intensified presence of United Nations troops in this area seems to be called for very soon.

24. The Officer-in-Charge and the Commander of the Force have been asked to consult with Congolese authorities about the extent and approximate length

of time of continuing need of the Congolese Government for United Nations military assistance in the maintenance of law and order. It is perhaps an easy and safe guess to make that some United Nations armed troops will be required and will still be in the Congo a year from now. Circumstances, however, could change that picture. The reduction from present strength can and will be very substantial, but there will be much still to be done by ONUC under its law and order mandate, and for some time to come.

(c) Prevention of the occurrence of civil war in the Congo

25. This mandate of ONUC was adopted in February 1961 at a time when there were two sets of competing governmental authorities, one in Leopoldville and one in Stanleyville, each claiming to be the legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo and each with elements of the ANC under its control. In addition, there were two other administrations, in South Kasai and Katanga, seeking to secede from the Government and the territory of the Congo.

26. This desperate situation was ameliorated as a result of the formation in August 1961 of a Government of National Unity acceptable to all parties concerned, other than the secessionist authorities of Katanga province.

27. Clashes occurred subsequently between elements of the ANC and Katanga gendarmerie, the latter supported by mercenaries. While endeavouring to limit these hostilities, in particular by pressing for a peaceful solution, ONUC obviously could not, consistently with decisions of the Security Council calling for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Congo and for an immediate end to the secessionist activities in Katanga, regard and deal with such hostilities as "civil war" actions under the terms of its mandate. Now, however, these hostilities, which ONUC always sought to halt but not always successfully, have come finally to an end following the decision by the Katangese provincial authorities to terminate their secessionist activities and the seeming distaste of both mercenaries and gendarmerie for any more fighting.

28. It may therefore be considered that the mandate of ONUC relating to civil war has been fulfilled in major degree, although an alert and effective watch over the situation will be indispensable for some time.

(d) The removal of military and paramilitary and advisory personnel and mercenaries

29. This aspect of ONUC's mandate was brought into effect by the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 at a time when the intervention of such personnel in Congolese affairs and, in particular, the military support given by these hired gunmen to the secessionist efforts of the Katangese provincial authorities, were flagrant and intolerable. A number of mercenaries were apprehended and expelled from the Congo in April 1961 and a further number of political and military advisers of the Katangese authorities were expelled in the succeeding months. However, the co-operation of the Katangese provincial authorities in this matter was altogether ineffective and unreliable, and on 28 August 1961 ONUC undertook action of its own to round up foreign military personnel in Katanga. A considerable number of personnel, particularly those loaned by the Belgian Government to the Katangese provincial authorities, left Katanga in the next few days, but many mercenaries succeeded in escaping and a renewed attempt to proceed with this operation led to the hostilities which began on 13 September 1961. Mercenary elements played a leading role in those hostilities and also in those of December 1961. Following this latter clash, Mr. Tshombe agreed to the evacuation of mercenaries but remained evasive on this point throughout the year 1962. Consequently, there were an estimated 400 mercenaries still in the Katangese gendarmerie at the beginning of the operations of December 1962 - January 1963. The successful conclusion of these operations has resulted, it appears, in the flight of most if not all remaining mercenaries from Katanga via Angola, with the exception of a small number now in United Nations custody.

30. It may, therefore, be concluded that for all practical purposes the mandate relating to mercenaries has been fulfilled. It is, however, open to question whether there may not still be amongst the technicians who serve the Katangese provincial authorities, or amongst the non-Congolese residents of South Katanga, a number of persons who overstepped the limits of legitimate activity and acted as political and possibly military advisers or as mercenaries. The possibility of a number of expulsions on this ground cannot, therefore, be excluded.

(e) Civilian operations and technical assistance

31. The breakdown of law and order and the mass exodus of foreign technicians after the mutiny threatened a collapse in public administration, public services and in the economy which gave to the technical assistance operations of the United Nations in the Congo a scope and magnitude surpassing by far that ever before considered. ONUC civilian operations, involving an impressive collaboration between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, for much of the time under emergency conditions, helped to provide essential public services which the organizations, in large measure, financed. Since the re-establishment of a constitutional government, the emphasis has been increasingly on advisory rather than operative staff. Moreover, the assistance given is limited by the funds available, which consist of voluntary contributions of Governments.

32. There will continue to be a need for assistance on a massive scale during the ensuing period of reconstruction, following which the programme of technical assistance to the country could eventually assume a more normal character.

33. The Prime Minister of the Congo Republic wrote to me on 20 December 1962, requesting assistance in a number of ways in seeking the modernization and training of the Congolese armed forces. I have responded favourably to this appeal and consultations in Leopoldville between the Prime Minister and the Officer-in-Charge on the procedures to be followed are now under way. The texts of the two letters in question are appended in annexes I and II.

34. I have opened consultations with the Government of the Congo on the question of the channelling of future aid to the Congo. There will be, of course, a continuation of multilateral or United Nations aid. The question is the extent to which it may now have become advisable and desirable to envisage also an increase in bilateral aid. Although heretofore, the United Nations has been inclined to seek to have all aid to the Congo channelled or at least cleared through the United Nations, it is apparent that the United Nations alone will not have the resources to meet the vast needs of the Congo. The attitude of the Central Government will, of course, be decisive in determining how the aid should be given, and although that attitude is being sought, it is not yet ascertained. Obviously, it will be essential to try to avoid by some means, subjecting the Congo to the dangers of a politically motivated assistance competition among States.

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35. A decisive phase in the United Nations Congo experience has been concluded. That is the phase of active military involvement by United Nations troops. This does not, however, automatically indicate an immediate military disengagement in the Congo by the United Nations. To do that could result in quickly undoing almost everything that has been achieved by the United Nations operation in more than two and one half painful and costly years. It may be that a smaller United Nations armed force in the Congo will be needed for some time, owing to the still inadequate military and police resources of the Central Government in coping with endemic problems of tribal warfare and maintenance of law and order. There will be, however, a progressive reduction in the strength of the Force, and an early disengagement cannot be ruled out. A phasing out schedule is now in process of formulation, in consultation with the Officer-in-Charge and the Commander of the Force, taking into account tasks to be performed, contingent withdrawals and rotation schedules. The first stage of the phasing out will be reached about the end of February and the process will be gradual but steady thereafter. This reduction process, naturally, will find a prompt reflection in substantially reducing the costs of the Operation. This, in turn, will lighten but not eliminate the severe financial strain which the United Nations has been experiencing largely because of its heavy expenditures in the Congo.

36. It is perhaps still too early to draw any final conclusions from the operation in the Congo. The lines of certain lessons that may be learned from this extensive and intensive experience begin to become apparent, however.

37. Merely to maintain a huge operation, involving political and military, as well as economic activities, within the territory of a sovereign, independent State is a task of very great complexity and delicacy. There are unavoidable problems in the daily relations with the national government. There are at Headquarters the inevitable problems that spring from the differing attitudes of Member Governments toward the issue and approaches to it. There are the external as well as internal influences at work. To keep the Operation going and on an even keel demands very much, both from United Nations Headquarters and in the field, in the way of patience, endurance, forbearance, tact and firmness. The key, no doubt, is to have a clear definition of the basic principles on which the Operation is to rest and to adhere strictly to them. For the Congo Operation, these principles were defined

clearly enough by the Security Council resolutions, although inevitably there were differences of viewpoint amongst the Members as to how the principles should be interpreted and applied. There has been, for example, the principle of non-interference in the internal political affairs of the Congo. This principle has been observed and the United Nations has scrupulously avoided any support for or opposition to any Congolese official or candidate, whether in the national or provincial governments. The United Nations has avoided any intervention in the internal politics of the country beyond the opposition to secession in general required by the Security Council resolutions and the constitutional suggestions embodied in the Plan for National Reconciliation which, after all, was only a proposal which each party was free to accept or reject.

38. The United Nations operation in the Congo has also adhered to the principle of avoiding the use of force for political purposes, although it is true that the very presence and activity of the United Nations Force in the Congo has been an important factor in giving effective weight to United Nations opposition to secession, whether in Katanga, Kasai or elsewhere in the country. It is in the Congo, of course, for this and other purposes, at the specific request of the Government of the country. But the United Nations has never used the arms at its disposal to further the political aims of any group or individual in the country, or to interfere with its political processes. Even with regard to secession, civil war and the elimination of mercenaries, the employment of the Force has been in the most limited manner, with limited objectives, without the Force itself taking any military initiatives, and only then as a last resort.

39. There are some who have been critical of the policy governing the United Nations Operation in the Congo, either because on the one hand it has used the Force under its command too sparingly and too cautiously, or on the other because of the mere presence of the Force, let alone its use. I am convinced of the wisdom of the course originally ordered by the Security Council resolutions. Quite apart from the profound and possibly shattering implications which would flow from a United Nations policy decision to employ force to regulate the internal political affairs of a country, even at the request of or with the acquiescence of its Government, to have done so in the Congo would have created a most adverse impact on both Congolese and international public opinion, besides inevitably creating some

unmeritorious and troublesome martyrs. It seems to me, on the basis of the Congo experience, that the only sound way to inject an international armed force into a situation of that kind is to ensure that it is for clearly defined and restricted purposes, is fully under control of the Organization and always maintains its primary posture of arms for defence.

40. Quite possibly no activity ever engaged in by the United Nations has suffered so much as the Congo Operation from public misunderstanding of its purposes and activities. Much of this misunderstanding, of course, has been due to the deliberate campaign of the well-financed Katanga propaganda machine, which in some countries has been not inconsiderably aided and abetted by organized special interests with ulterior motives, such as hostility to the United Nations or interests, financial or other, in Katanga. The United Nations, through its Public Information services, has striven valiantly to counteract this propaganda, but has enjoyed only partial success. It is by no means clear how the United Nations, which must always seek to adhere to fact and truth, can fend off the insidious attacks or unscrupulous propaganda. This vital problem will require very careful attention in connexion with any future operation of a kind similar to that undertaken in the Congo.

41. Finally, the experience of the Congo Operation demonstrates the great practical utility of an advisory committee arrangement in the conduct of such highly complex and politically sensitive activity. The Congo Advisory Committee has been invaluable to me, as it was to my predecessor, in providing an indispensable means of testing proposed lines of action, exchanging viewpoints and obtaining sound guidance.

ANNEX I

Letter dated 20 December 1962 from the Prime Minister of the
Republic of the Congo to the Secretary-General

The Government of the Republic of the Congo, in the exercise of its full sovereignty, wishes to create a single unified military structure in accordance with the plan entitled "Proposal for the modernization and training of the armed forces of the Republic of the Congo".

The Government of the Republic of the Congo, while reserving its right to reconsider the question of the possible size of its armed forces and the questions of which organization that could affect, accepts the general idea of the modernization and training of the armed forces as a whole which is put forward in this document. Furthermore, the Government of the Republic of the Congo requests friendly countries to furnish the requisite advice and technical assistance with the co-operation and co-ordination of the United Nations. In particular, the Government of the Republic of the Congo requests the United Nations to:

1. Assist in the organization of a general programme for the modernization and training of the Congolese armed forces in accordance with the project prepared by the Congolese Government. The role of the United Nations could consist essentially in co-ordinating the arrangements made with the Governments of the nations participating in the programme.
2. Assist in the organization of a small international technical assistance mission consisting mainly of representatives of the nations participating in the military assistance programme. This mission will advise and assist the Commander-in-Chief of the Congolese National Army in the supervision and co-ordination of the various programmes for the supply of equipment, training and technical assistance.
3. Provide or help to secure immediately six (6) French-speaking aviation advisers to help in the development of the Congolese air force in the spheres of organization, air operations, maintenance of aircraft, equipment, electronic air matters, education and training. The first efforts of these experts should be directed towards:

- (a) Creating a basic air force organization covering operations, aircraft maintenance, equipment, air communications and training.
- (b) Investigating the competence of personnel and determining their aptitude for taking piloting and technical training courses.
- (c) Helping in the selection of approximately twenty-five (25) pupil pilots and sixty (60) candidates for various forms of technical training outside the Congo.
- (d) Preparing a plan for the reorganization of the Ndola base, a plan which might serve as a guide and give a sense of discipline to the personnel of the Congolese air force.
- (e) Preparing a list of the equipment and supplies necessary.

4. Help in the implementation of the proposed programme for the air force with possible modifications based on the experience of the aviation advisers when a sufficient number of trained Congolese personnel is available to assume organizational functions.

5. Provide the services of a French-speaking civilian educator as a temporary adviser to General Headquarters to help in preparing educational programmes on the subjects of the history of the Congo, government, civics and the duties of citizens, both for officers and for men. This adviser should also help in drawing up a programme to prepare personnel leaving the armed forces for orderly re-integration into the civilian economy.

6. Urge the Belgian Government to continue its present aid in equipment, instruction and advisers and to extend its programme by supplying the fifteen (15) additional advisers requested by the Republic of the Congo in May 1962 and such other advisers as the Belgian and Congolese Governments consider necessary to assist in the improvement of the administration and control of the units of the army and the gendarmerie.

7. Provide or help to obtain French-speaking advisers to assist in the establishment of a Congolese military academy.

8. Draw up as soon as possible a programme for the study of the English language in the Congo for selected Congolese military personnel, and especially the study of technical, military and aviation terms.

9. Provide or help to obtain French-speaking advisers to assist in the organization, equipment and training of a Congolese naval element.

10. Provide or help to obtain six (6) civilian and/or military doctors, together with military technicians who are experts in pharmaceuticals and supplies, to help reorganize the Congolese military medical services and to extend these services, so far as possible, to meet the needs of the Congolese civilian population.

(Signed) Cyrille ADOULA
Prime Minister.

ANNEX II

Letter dated 27 December, 1962 from the Secretary-General to the
Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo

Mr. Prime Minister,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 5243/62 of 20 December 1962 concerning the implementation of the proposal for modernization and training of the armed forces of the Republic of the Congo.

The requests for assistance which your Government has addressed to the United Nations have been thoroughly examined. I may now inform you that I consider these requests to be fully in accord with the provisions of the resolutions concerning the Congo adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, and in particular, with paragraph 2 of the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960. The United Nations, therefore, will accept the responsibility resulting from your requests and will do everything possible to implement them with expedition.

Accept, Sir,

U THANT
Secretary-General

