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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Report of the Secretary-General

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 3060th meeting, on 17 March 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 746 (1992) concerning the situation in Somalia. The full text of the resolution reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/23693),

Taking note of the signing of the cease-fire agreements in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992, including agreements for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through a United Nations monitoring mission,

Deeply regretting that the factions have not yet abided by their commitment to implement the cease-fire and thus have still not permitted the unimpeded provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance to the people in need in Somalia,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the factors described in paragraph 76 of the Secretary-General's report (S/23593) must be taken into account,

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the importance which it attaches to the international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under difficult circumstances,

Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General;
2. Urges the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;
3. Urges all the Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Somalia and to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the affected population in Somalia;
5. Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to and to cooperate with these humanitarian relief efforts;
6. Strongly supports the Secretary-General's decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, accompanied by the coordinator, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraphs 73 and 74 of his report (S/23693) and to submit expeditiously a report to the Security Council on this matter;
7. Requests that the technical team also develop a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance;
8. Calls on all parties, movements and factions in Mogadishu in particular, and in Somalia in general, to respect fully the security and safety of the technical team and the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and to guarantee their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

9. Calls upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, his consultations with all Somali parties, movements and factions towards the convening of a conference for national reconciliation and unity in Somalia;

10. Calls upon all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

11. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to the above resolution.

3. Immediately following the adoption of the above resolution, I brought its contents to the attention of the Somali factions as well as to Member States, humanitarian organizations and the Secretaries-General of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

4. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, I appointed, on 20 March 1992, Mr. David Bassiouni as Coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to the affected population in all parts of Somalia in liaison with the other international humanitarian organizations.

5. On 20 March 1992, I also appointed a 15-member Technical Team to visit Somalia, accompanied by the Coordinator, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraphs 73 and 74 of my earlier report to the Security Council. 1/ The Technical Team was led by Mr. Robert Gallagher and included representatives from LAS, OAU, OIC and from a non-governmental organization.

The cease-fire in Mogadishu

6. The cease-fire agreed to by the two factions in Mogadishu came into effect on 3 March 1992. After about a month of relative calm, the cease-fire was violated by the resumption of fighting between some units belonging to the two factions. However, the leaders of the two factions moved quickly to stop the fighting and to re-establish the cease-fire.

7. Since then, there has been little, if any, fighting between the two factions in Mogadishu. However, some sporadic shooting and incidents of apparent banditry by armed elements not under the control of either faction have been reported. The frequency of such incidents themselves has decreased appreciably during the past several weeks.

8. The cease-fire in Mogadishu has created a new and positive political climate which has made it possible for representatives of the two factions in Mogadishu to meet in the context of the agreement and arrangements concluded with them by the joint delegation last March. On 12 April, representatives of the two factions met face to face for the first time at United Nations offices in Mogadishu to discuss the formation of a joint committee for relief assistance, under the chairmanship of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance. Similarly, the chiefs of staff of the two factions have also met in connection with the monitoring of the cease-fire and the agreements reached on ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need in and around Mogadishu.

9. Despite the favourable developments in Mogadishu and its environs, I am very concerned about the increased fighting and the deteriorating security situation in the northern part of the country. The situation in the southern part of the country also continues to be tense and the potential for fighting among the contending factions and groups is also a matter of grave concern. Taking these developments into account, the Security Council may wish to consider calling for a general cease-fire throughout the country. Such action by the Security Council, in addition to helping to bring to an end the fighting in the different parts of the country, would create a situation conducive to the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia.

Activities of the Technical Team

10. The Technical Team assembled in Nairobi on 21 March 1992, and held discussions the following day with representatives of the United Nations agencies and of non-governmental organizations operating in Somalia.

Consultations in Mogadishu

11. The Technical Team arrived in Mogadishu on 23 March and held separate meetings with General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC), and Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed. During these meetings, the Technical Team discussed with the two parties the objectives of its mission pursuant to Security Council resolution 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992. It also drew the attention of the two parties to paragraphs 3 and 8 of the resolution, by which the Security Council urged them to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia and to respect fully the security and safety and guarantee the complete freedom of movement of the Technical Team and the personnel of the humanitarian organizations in Mogadishu.

12. General Aidid stated that USC was observing the cease-fire and reiterated the reservation of his faction to the stationing of a peace-keeping force in Mogadishu or to any identifiable United Nations military presence. He called on the international community to provide humanitarian assistance, especially food for distribution by USC.

13. On his part, Interim President Mohamed emphasized that it was impossible for security and stability to be realized in Mogadishu without a large contingent of a United Nations peace-keeping force. He said that without such a United Nations military presence, the cease-fire would not hold and effective distribution of food and other supplies would not be possible.

14. Following further discussions with the Technical Team, the two leaders signed on 28 and 27 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance in and around Mogadishu (annexes I A and I B). Also attached is a document submitted by Interim President Mohamed (annex I C).

15. Subsequent to the signing of the Agreements, the Technical Team travelled to Hargeisa on 29 March. It met separately with Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland, and a group of Elders led by Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, the Chief of the Constitutional Elders, as well as with a group of Colonels of the army of the Somali National Movement (SNM).

16. Both Mr. Ahmed Ali and the Elders stated that the entire northern region of Somalia was in need of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development. They said that assistance was also needed to facilitate the demobilization of the army of SNM to help establish security and stability in the region (see annexes II A and II B). Attached also is a document submitted by the Minister of Planning and Development of the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland (annex II C).

17. Owing to the deteriorating security situation in Berbera, it was not possible for the Technical Team to visit that city.

18. The Technical Team was also unable to visit Bossaso. However, General Mohamed Abshir Musse, the Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), met the Technical Team in Djibouti on 29 March. The General stated that the north-eastern part of the country was relatively calm but was in need of rehabilitation, development and humanitarian assistance. He raised the question of the need for food assistance to armed elements to help maintain peace and stability in the region. On 29 March 1992, General Abshir Musse signed an Agreement (annex III A). Also annexed is a document submitted by SSDF (annex III B).

19. On 31 March, in Kismayo, the Technical Team met with General Aden Abdillahi Gabieou, Chairman of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and General Mohamed Said Hersi (Morgan), Commander of the Armed Forces of SPM. The Technical Team also met with the Elders of the area. In addition to requesting humanitarian assistance, the Elders called on the United Nations to help in achieving a comprehensive cease-fire throughout Somalia. The agreement signed by General Aden Abdillahi Gabieou is annexed (annex IV A). A separate agreement was signed by the Elders (annex IV B).

20. On the same day, the Technical Team met with a delegation representing former President Siad Barre. The delegation stated that the south-western region of Somalia had been ignored despite the existence of many displaced people and starvation in the area. It urged the United Nations to send a mission to the area.

21. During its stay in Somalia, the Technical Team also met with representatives of non-governmental organizations in the country.

Monitoring of the cease-fire and delivery
of humanitarian assistance

22. The agreements reached in Mogadishu with Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid (annexes I A and I B) require the United Nations:

(a) To deploy United Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire;

(b) To deploy United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities in continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance in and around Mogadishu.

23. I have thought carefully about the type of personnel which would be best equipped to perform these two functions, taking into account the following factors:

(a) The traditions of United Nations observer missions (which are specifically referred to in the Agreements);

(b) The nature of the tasks to be performed;

(c) The security conditions in Mogadishu;

(d) The concerns of the Governments which would be asked to make the necessary personnel available to serve in the United Nations operations in Somalia;

(e) The views expressed to the Technical Team by its interlocutors in Mogadishu.

I have also borne in mind that under the Agreements the United Nations is to consult with the parties before determining the number of security personnel required for the protection function.

24. As regards the monitoring of the cease-fire, there is no doubt, on the basis of the long experience of the United Nations, that this is a function for which military skills are required. Only military officers are trained to assess and interpret the positions and moves of the forces of the two sides, to conduct the necessary investigations when violations of the cease-fire occur and to reach convincing conclusions about where responsibility lies and how future violations can be avoided. Military skills are also required to

enable observers to operate in potential battle zones and take care of their own safety, without unnecessarily impairing their ability to carry out their tasks. I conclude that the cease-fire in Mogadishu should be monitored, in the traditional United Nations manner, by a group of military observers. They would be 50 in number, in accordance with the agreements.

25. These observers would form mobile teams, each consisting of three observers with one vehicle. In the existing conditions in Mogadishu, their ability to undertake mobile patrols would depend on the security situation. Initially, they would all be based in the headquarters of the United Nations mission. Once the security conditions had improved, the observers would be grouped in observation posts located in the vicinity of the headquarters or other offices of the two parties and, in some cases, at United Nations agency or non-governmental organization sites, taking into account the situation on the ground, the security of the military observers and their need for tolerable living conditions.

26. In accordance with the agreements, 25 of the observers would be stationed on one side of Mogadishu and 25 on the other. As is normal in such missions, they would not be armed and would wear their national uniforms with United Nations insignia. It would be the responsibility of the forces of the two sides to ensure their security at all times. Indeed the mission's ability to carry out its mandate would, to a large extent, depend on such cooperation from the two parties. Discussions were also initiated by the technical mission to obtain such cooperation from other groups and the point will be pursued if the Security Council decides to establish the mission recommended in the present report.

27. As regards humanitarian assistance, the security personnel envisaged in the Agreements would be required to provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the port of Mogadishu and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in Mogadishu and its immediate environs. They would also, as necessary, provide security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the airports in Mogadishu. In this case also, I have come to the conclusion that these tasks require military skills and training.

28. The threat to United Nations activities both at the port of Mogadishu and elsewhere in the city comes from a variety of armed elements - many of whom are not under the control of any political authority - and who have been attempting to control food supplies in the capital. The United Nations security personnel will not have any law-and-order responsibilities vis-à-vis these armed elements. Their task will be to provide the United Nations convoys of relief supplies with a sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack and to fire effectively in self-defence if deterrence should not prove effective.

29. The Technical Team recommended accordingly that the security personnel should take the form of infantry organized in the normal manner. They would be based at Mogadishu port and would undertake their patrols in light

vehicles, with a small armoured car element being held in reserve in the port to be used in case of emergencies. The infantry would wear national uniform with United Nations insignia and would be armed. It is estimated that a strength of approximately 500 all ranks would be required but, as noted above, the agreements require that the two parties be consulted about this figure before the plan is finalized.

30. Given the lack of suitable accommodation in Mogadishu at the present time, as well as security considerations, the security personnel would as far as possible be accommodated on a ship which would perform the functions of a base camp, including the provision of logistic support to the mission.

31. The above arrangements represent the requirement for Mogadishu. Should it be decided to undertake similar functions elsewhere in Somalia, additional personnel would be required.

32. In addition to the observers and security personnel, the mission would require the usual civilian administrative support services, headed by a Chief Administrative Officer. Its vehicles would have distinctive United Nations colours and markings. It would require its own telecommunications links for internal and external communications. Under present conditions in Mogadishu it is unlikely that the parties would be able to provide the mission with goods and services required for the implementation of its mandate. They have, however, undertaken to give its personnel full and unrestricted freedom of movement within the areas they control.

33. If the Security Council decides to set up a mission on the lines described above, I would recommend that it be known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. Command of UNOSOM in the field would be entrusted to a Commanding Officer with the rank of Brigadier-General, who would be appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the two parties and with the consent of the Security Council. The Commanding Officer would report to the Secretary-General in the manner recommended in paragraph 64 below. The Secretary-General would report regularly to the Security Council on all matters relating to the scope and efficient functioning of UNOSOM. The military personnel of UNOSOM would be contributed by Governments of Member States at the request of the Secretary-General, after consultation with the parties and with the approval of the Security Council.

Humanitarian assistance

34. Security Council resolution 746 (1992) also requested that the Technical Team develop a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. As a result of this request and after consultations with relevant United Nations agencies, the Technical Team has established mechanisms to implement the Mogadishu portion of an initial 90-day Plan of Action as well as arrangements to facilitate delivery

of humanitarian assistance to other parts of the country. (The Plan is issued as an addendum to the present report.)

35. The need for effective coordination and a commitment to collaboration are of particular importance in the type of crisis prevalent throughout most of Somalia today. It is for that reason that I had instructed the United Nations agencies involved in the delivery of relief assistance to Somalia to work closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations in drawing up the 90-day Plan of Action.

36. The Plan forms the basis for immediate action to deliver food and non-food relief assistance to an estimated 1.5 million people most immediately at risk. In addition, the Plan also targets assistance for a further 3.5 million people who are in need of food, seeds and basic health and water services. This latter group includes many thousands of soldiers and other armed groups who will be assisted through multifaceted disarmament and demobilization programmes so that they can be reintegrated into civilian life. The present crisis facing the people of Somalia also has regional consequences as already evidenced by the flow of refugees from Somalia into Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia and there are grave concerns about the effect such population movements will have on the Horn of Africa.

37. The estimates of populations to be assisted have been included in the Plan. Also built into the Plan is a process of relief programme evaluations as well as inter-agency/non-governmental organization assessments. These will be used to update requirements and to identify new areas of need.

38. Implementation of the Plan, as well as the continuity of expanded humanitarian relief and recovery efforts, require that United Nations agencies expand their presence throughout Somalia, under the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia based in Mogadishu. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) have made great efforts to build up their programmes over the past six months. This new phase of expansion of United Nations activities will require not only the active involvement of the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia in emergency relief and recovery operations, but also the establishment of offices throughout the country where the United Nations will be providing humanitarian assistance. In this connection, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is providing full direct support to the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia in the form of staff, office accommodation, administrative and logistical backstopping, including aircraft. The United Nations Volunteers programme is currently planning to make available up to 50 experts in the field of logistics, communications, health care and agricultural services to support the humanitarian effort in Somalia.

39. Although the present security situation in Mogadishu remains precarious, the needs of almost 700,000 people, 250,000 of whom are displaced and a further 80,000 representing highly vulnerable groups, make the provision of humanitarian assistance of paramount importance. Hence, over the next

90 days, WFP and ICRC will take the lead in shipments of food to the port of Mogadishu, while UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), ICRC and non-governmental organizations will provide increased supplies of non-food assistance. As regards WFP, food assistance will arrive at the port of Mogadishu as soon as arrangements recommended by the Technical Team are in place or conditions in the area of Mogadishu are deemed propitious by the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia for food aid deliveries and distribution. It is anticipated that the WFP/CARE free food distribution programme will also be used by authorities to undertake demobilization activities, and to enhance the security arrangements that will enable continuous and unimpeded supplies of relief assistance. Precise modalities still need to be formulated and agreed. If the security situation in and around Mogadishu is adequate and "corridors" and "zones of peace" are respected, UNICEF, WHO, ICRC and non-governmental organizations will also seek to increase their non-food relief activities.

40. In other areas of the country, United Nations agencies, ICRC and non-governmental organizations will collaborate closely not only on means to provide emergency relief assistance to affected populations, but also to generate, wherever possible, economic recovery and to promote demobilization and disarmament programmes. In this regard, economic recovery must be seen as part of the mechanisms essential to promote stability throughout the country. Without seeds, tools, and livestock revitalization programmes, hundreds of thousands of Somalis will have no recourse than to seek sustenance and security across borders.

41. In the central region, ICRC has expressed its intention to continue to provide assistance to the displaced and other highly vulnerable groups through the coastal ports of Merca, Adale and Obbia, while UNICEF will supply health education materials, as well as materials for health facilities and equipment. In the north-west of Somalia, the Plan includes not only food assistance, but also the establishment by UNDP and UNICEF of basic school facilities; and the creation by WHO of health training programmes. De-mining programmes at present supported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will be supplemented by UNDP in the very near future.

42. UNHCR has pre-positioned food and other supplies in preparation for repatriation programmes for Somali refugees returning from Ethiopia as well as complementing the work of non-governmental organizations and other agencies in the rehabilitation of essential services in the health and water sectors. Revitalization of north-eastern Somalia's livestock trade is essential if affected populations are to escape dependency upon relief, and hence, the Plan will provide through the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and ICRC means to ensure the quality of livestock for export. In the south-east of the country, an increasing number of displaced people require basic relief assistance, and here, United Nations agencies, ICRC and non-governmental organizations intend to cover a range of food and non-food needs.

43. These initiatives will incorporate the needs of those groups, such as 250,000 Bantu people, who have no affiliation with traditional clan structures. Of rapidly growing concern are the estimated 200,000 Somalis who now have gathered in south-western Somalia along the Somali-Kenya border. Assistance through ICRC, UNHCR and non-governmental organizations will be essential to help stop the exacerbation of their plight.

44. There are important basic economic programmes incorporated into the Plan which address the particular needs of Somali youth and women. Throughout the Plan, emphasis is also placed upon providing assistance in part through traditional clan structures. This would require conventional forms of accountability to be reconsidered. On their part, the Somali clan leaders must recognize the responsibility which the international community has placed upon them.

45. The effectiveness of the 90-day Plan of Action and subsequent emergency relief and recovery programmes will be determined by all parties' observance of basic principles of international humanitarian assistance. Therefore, it must be fully recognized that distribution of relief assistance will be based upon equity and need, and in no way bound by political or geographical considerations. Furthermore, it must be accepted that designated "corridors" as well as "zones of peace" must be maintained to ensure the passage and distribution of food and non-food assistance. Thus, the inviolability of United Nations-flagged ships, aircraft and relief convoys and protection of relief workers passing to and through designated corridors to zones of peace is a fundamental prerequisite. These zones include seaports, airports and areas in which United Nations and non-governmental organization activities are under way. Finally, these principles should be understood as incorporating the activities and security of all non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance.

46. It should be noted that the implementation of this Plan will fundamentally depend not only upon adequate security within Somalia, but also upon the provision of sufficient resources by the international community to fund its activities.

Arms embargo

47. In my previous report to the Council, 1/ I provided information on measures being taken to implement a general and complete embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. I reported to the Council that notwithstanding replies received from 68 Governments stating that they were strictly observing the arms embargo, both factions in Mogadishu had claimed that the other side was receiving arms from some of the countries in the region. Since my last report, a further 14 replies have been received from Governments, which have been issued as documents of the Security Council. 2/

48. However, various reports indicate that arms continue to flow into the country. In view of this, the Security Council might wish to consider putting into place the appropriate arrangements for the monitoring of the arms embargo.

49. In addition, there is a pressing need to recover the enormous number of small and medium-sized arms which are already in the hands of the civilian population throughout Somalia, and particularly in Mogadishu. My representatives have twice raised with Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid the possibility of arrangements under which the United Nations could exchange arms for food, i.e., individuals or groups who voluntarily handed in their weapons and ammunition would receive food in exchange. This has always struck me as an imaginative way of tackling the two most acute problems facing the people of Somalia today, namely the threat of famine and an almost total breakdown of law and order. It would, however, have to be managed as an addition to, and not a substitute for, existing programmes for delivery of humanitarian relief to those in need.

50. Programmes for the provision of supplementary humanitarian assistance could be initiated for those armed individuals who agree voluntarily to surrender their weapons. Arrangements could also be made for the subsequent destruction of the weapons. It is my intention to continue the discussions on this subject and I shall keep the Council informed of my efforts.

National reconciliation

51. In addition to my endeavours regarding the cease-fire and the imperative need to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia, I have throughout continued to pursue efforts for national reconciliation in Somalia as called for in paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 746 (1992), and have, to this end, kept in contact with LAS, OAU and OIC.

52. In my last report, I informed the Council that in addition to discussing the matter with the leaders of the two factions in Mogadishu, the joint delegation that visited Somalia in late February and early March had also held consultations on this matter in Kismayo and in Nairobi with representatives of the Somali National Front (SNF), SPM, the United Somali Party (USP), SSMF and the Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) and with several other Somali groups and individuals.

53. Since then, my representatives and I have had further discussions on this matter with the Somali factions, groups and movements. Earlier this month, I also had consultations in New York with Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of OAU, on ways and means of expediting the arrangements for convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia.

54. During the Security Council's consideration of the situation in Somalia on 17 March 1992, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, speaking on behalf of General Ibrahim Babangida, President of Nigeria and current Chairman of OAU, expressed his country's readiness to host the conference in Abuja under the auspices of the United Nations, LAS, OAU and OIC. Subsequently, in a letter dated 19 March 1992 addressed to me, the Foreign Minister stated that his Government was prepared to provide the necessary transportation for the representatives of the Somali factions, groups and movements who would participate in the conference.

55. In order to achieve further progress on this matter, it will be necessary to continue efforts to assist the various parties, movements and factions to agree among themselves on their representation to the conference on national reconciliation. My efforts, and those of my representatives, will continue to give high priority to this aspect as well as to the modalities for the convening of the conference, including its agenda, participation and venue.

Observations

56. The situation in Somalia continues to be of great concern to the international community. There is hardly any governmental infrastructure in the country that could be relied upon. Physical infrastructure, such as transport, water, electricity, telephone communications, is also largely non-existent. Banditry is widespread and there is wide proliferation of weapons. The crisis in Somalia has regional consequences, as is already evidenced by the flow of Somali refugees to neighbouring countries, and there are grave concerns about the destabilizing effects it could have on the Horn of Africa.

57. The cease-fire in Mogadishu arranged between Interim President Mohamed and General Aidid in March is holding, although sporadic shooting and incidents of apparent banditry are putting a strain on it. The port of Mogadishu and the international airport are in the control of groups not under the command of either major faction. Although clans and sub-clans claim to be in control of certain areas, definitive military or paramilitary organizations at the clan or sub-clan level are almost non-existent.

58. As I pointed out in my report of 11 March 1992 to the Security Council, the tragic situation in Somalia, with its extraordinary complexities, has so far eluded conventional solutions. The need to expand ongoing humanitarian assistance calls for the exploration of innovative methods, commensurate with the humanitarian and political situation. In this regard, the Security Council's decision to relate the modalities of a cease-fire to the implementation of humanitarian relief operations is noteworthy.

59. The threat of dramatic food shortages amongst particularly vulnerable groups is becoming increasingly acute. The lack of clean water, primary health care services and control of communicable diseases is exacerbating the crisis. Owing to the persistent efforts of non-governmental organizations, supported in part by United Nations agencies, some basic health, water and disease control services have been provided, but these efforts need to be intensified. Access to the main ports and acceptance of the principle of "corridors" and "zones of peace" would enable the United Nations and non-governmental organizations to provide more humanitarian assistance.

60. Although the difficulties of providing relief assistance are fully recognized, the prevailing crisis in Somalia poses a paradox which must be addressed: without security, relief assistance programmes will continue to be severely constrained; but without relief assistance programmes, the prospects

for security are at best precarious. Therefore, the necessity of providing humanitarian assistance even before the full complement of United Nations security personnel and cease-fire modalities are in place must be emphasized. However, I wish to emphasize to all parties in Somalia that an expanded United Nations relief effort cannot be authorized without assurances from them for the security of United Nations relief workers and supplies. I appeal to all parties to honour agreements made with the Technical Team to facilitate the expanded delivery of humanitarian assistance and ensure the safe passage of all those engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

61. I attach great importance to the Plan submitted by the agencies. I am convinced that with the cooperation of all concerned, the Plan would provide a sound basis for meeting the request of the Security Council for a high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance.

62. After careful consideration of the situation, I recommend to the Security Council to consider establishing a mission along the lines described in paragraphs 22 to 33 above. This will be for an initial period of six months.

63. I shall circulate shortly an addendum to the present report which will contain the preliminary cost estimate for UNOSOM.

64. As regards national reconciliation, keeping in mind the consideration mentioned in paragraphs 51 to 55 above and the need to expedite matters in this regard, I intend to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to assist me in the consultations and arrangements for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia, in close cooperation with the regional organizations. The Special Representative will also provide overall direction to the United Nations activities recommended in this report including those directed at economic recovery and rehabilitation, as well as demobilization and disarmament programmes in Somalia. The Commanding Officer and the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance will carry out their duties under the supervision of the Special Representative and will report through him to the Secretary-General. However, at times when the Special Representative is not present in Somalia, each of them will report direct to Headquarters, while maintaining the closest possible cooperation in the field. Finally, I wish to reiterate my appreciation to the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference for their continued cooperation and support for my efforts to resolve the problem in Somalia, and for agreeing to send representatives to Somalia to work closely with their counterparts from the United Nations.

Notes

1/ S/23693 and Corr.1.

2/ S/23701, S/23707, S/23711, S/23713, S/23718, S/23719, S/23720, S/23725, S/23739, S/23746, S/23747, S/23748, S/23750 and S/23778.

Annex I

A. Letter of 27 March 1992 from General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress, to the United Nations

WHEREAS in March 1992, I, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman, United Somali Congress, by letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations acknowledged receipt of the Security Council resolution on Somalia (746 (1992)) by which the Security Council

"Urges the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;

"Urges all Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);"

WHEREAS in that letter to the Secretary-General, I, General Mohamed Farah Aidid expressed our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in Somalia and their efforts to assist Somalia in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in implementing the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992 and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in Somalia;

I, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, do hereby agree that

A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE SIGNED 3 MARCH 1992, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF

"implementation of the measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism", to

1. The deployment of up to twenty-five (25) observers to each of north and south Mogadishu; and the employment of those observers in accordance with the traditions of United Nations observer missions; that is to say, to monitor without interference the terms of the cease-fire agreement;
2. Ensure the security of all United Nations observers within my area of influence;
3. The maintenance of law and order within my area of influence as it might affect the freedom and movement of the United Nations observers in their assigned area of responsibility;

4. Provide the United Nations observers with any and all assistance in the investigation of any violation of the cease-fire; and

5. The formation of a cease-fire monitoring team comprising nine members equally distributed among the two sides and the United Nations, for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to the cease-fire;

B. "UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH (THE SECURITY COUNCIL) ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES"; to

6. Ensure adequate security in and around the Mogadishu port area and handling facilities and management within the port;

7. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance to areas of Mogadishu under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace;

8. The deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities, the number to be determined by the United Nations in consultation with the parties when the plan is formalized;

9. Entrust the United Nations with the task of equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance based on need;

10. The formation of a joint committee composed of nine members equally divided among the parties and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

C. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

11. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

D. IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF FOOD SUPPLY

12. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes to land at Mogadishu port approximately 12,000 tons of food and non-food assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes

that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of Somalia.

Signed *M. Aidid*

General Mohamed Farah Aidid
Chairman
United Somali Congress

Date *27.3.1992* ... Place *Mogadishu*

Witnessed by: *Robert M. Gallagher*

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to
Somalia including representatives of the
Organization of African Unity, the League
of Arab States and the Organization
of the Islamic Conference

B. Letter of 28 March 1992 from Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Interim President of Somalia, to the United Nations

WHEREAS in March 1992, I, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Interim President of Somalia, by letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations acknowledged receipt of the Security Council resolution on Somalia (746 (1992)) by which the Security Council

"Urges the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992;

"Urges all Somali factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992);"

WHEREAS in that letter to the Secretary-General, I, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, expressed our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in Somalia and their efforts to assist Somalia in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in implementing the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 1992 and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in Somalia;

I, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, do hereby agree that

A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE SIGNED 3 MARCH 1992, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF

"implementation of the measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire by means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism", to

1. The deployment of up to twenty-five (25) observers to each of north and south Mogadishu; and the employment of those observers in accordance with the traditions of United Nations observer missions; that is to say, to monitor without interference the terms of the cease-fire agreement;
2. Ensure the security of all United Nations observers within my area of influence;
3. The maintenance of law and order within my area of influence as it might affect the freedom and movement of the United Nations observers in their assigned area of responsibility;

4. Provide the United Nations observers with any and all assistance in the investigation of any violation of the cease-fire; and

5. The formation of a cease-fire monitoring team comprising nine members equally distributed among the two sides and the United Nations for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to the cease-fire;

B. "UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH (THE SECURITY COUNCIL) ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOMALIA UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES"; to

6. Ensure adequate security in and around the Mogadishu port area and handling facilities and management within the port;

7. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance to areas of Mogadishu under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace;

8. The deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities, the number to be determined by the United Nations in consultation with the parties when the plan is formalized;

9. Entrust the United Nations with the task of equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance based on need;

10. The formation of a joint committee composed of nine members equally divided among the parties and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

C. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

11. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

D. IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF FOOD SUPPLY

12. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes to land at Mogadishu port approximately 12,000 tons of food and non-food assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes

that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of Somalia.

Signed 

Ali Mahdi Mohamed

Interim President of Somalia

Date 20/3/92 Place Mogadishu

Witnessed by: Robert M. Gallagher

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to
Somalia including representatives of the
Organization of African Unity, the League
of Arab States and the Organization
of the Islamic Conference

C. Document submitted by Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed

(1)

SOMALI REPUBLIC

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

25 March 1992

Somalia, from its birth as a nation, has had an historic traditional relationship with the United Nations. Pursuing that remarkable relationship which our people acknowledge, we are still confident that the United Nations will continue assisting Somalia specially today that our people are going through a very critical period. The assistance our people need today is much broader than anything compared to the past history. However, we are hereby extending an appeal to the United Nations and the entire free world to urgently send to Somalia an international contingent in order to save this nation from total destruction. With the help of the United Nations, Somalia needs peace to reign in the whole country and bring back the constitutional order to effectively work.

If, as per our request, the United Nations decides to agree to sending us that contingent, such forces should be from NATO-EEC countries or from the League of Arab States, OAU and OIC. The proposed contingent will be performing their tasks in Mogadishu and surrounding areas at the first stage and then it will be utilized to restore stability in the entire country. We suggest that the contingent must have the below-indicated military equipment:

1. A mechanized infantry brigade (on APC) consisting of 2,500 men with their supporting elements and logistics unit.
2. Two light armoured cavalry regiments of 1,000 men.
3. A tank battalion (54 M60 tanks) with about 250 men.
4. One self-propelled artillery battalion composed of 6 pieces of 155 mm 109 and 12 pieces of 105 mm with 200 men.
5. A small air wing group composed of:
 - (a) 4-6 helicopter gunships,
 - (b) 2-4 small aircraft.

The total number of the forces should be 4,500 men.

(2)

RESPONSIBILITIES AND DIVISION OF THE FORCES

- One mechanized infantry battalion shall occupy Halane Military School and its duty shall be to secure the security and safety of the airport, the Military Aviation Garrison, the fuel depot and the Gezira Power Station.
- A mechanized infantry battalion shall occupy the Military Navy Garrison (inside the old port) and their duty shall be to assure the security of the seaport, Central Bank and the Post and Telecommunication Building.
- A mechanized infantry battalion shall occupy National Police Headquarters and their duty shall be to assure the security of Radio Mogadishu, the State House (Villa Somalia) and the Central Power Station.
- One armoured cavalry regiment will occupy the Military Academy and its duty shall be to ensure the security of the radio transmitter station and the water wells of both Afgoi and Balad.
- One light armoured cavalry regiment with a tank company shall occupy Deganley (28 kilometres north of Mogadishu) and its duty shall be to ensure the security, order and stability of the triangle Mogadishu-Afgoi-Balad and shall constitute to perform the Capital's external defence.
- An artillery group and a tank battalion (less a company) shall be located respectively in the first and second Artillery and Tank Garrisons. This team shall be reserve for the Division Command.
- A small air wing group shall be located in the military aviation garrison and shall also be a reserve team for the Division Command.


ALI MANSI MOHAMED

Interim President of the Somali Republic

Annex II

A. Letter of agreement addressed by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali to the United Nations on 29 March 1992

WHEREAS I, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS I, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:


I, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, do hereby agree to:

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;
2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;
3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;
4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;
5. The formation of a joint committee composed of representatives of all regions, equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;


THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country:

Signed 

Date 27/3/72 Place HARGEISA

Witnessed by 

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to
Somalia including representatives of the
Organization of African Unity, the League of
Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference

B. Letter of agreement addressed by Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, Chief of the Constitutional Elders to the United Nations on 29 March 1992

WHEREAS I, Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS I, Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:

I, Sheik Ibrahim Sheik Yusuf Sheik Madder, Chief of the Constitutional Elders, do hereby agree to:

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;
2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;
3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;
4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;
5. The formation of a joint committee composed of representatives of all regions, equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country:

SIGNED ... *Handwritten* ... SH. IBRAHIM SH. YUSSUF SH. NIADDEF

DATE *29 March 1973* ... *Hargeisa*

WITNESSED BY ... *Robert M. Gallagher*

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to
Somalia including representatives of the
Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab
States and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference

C. Situation report on Somaliland (27 March 1992)

SNM started the fight against the dictatorship in 1981, and continued the struggle until its downfall in 1991.

After the SNM took control of the whole north (referred to here as Somaliland) in February 1991, there have been two very important developments without which the creation of Somaliland would have been stillborn.

1. The clan reconciliation meeting at Berbera

All clan leaders were invited on 27 March 1991 to attend a conference at Berbera, to air their grievances and hopes. This very historic meeting served to give a signal that all clans in Somaliland crave peace after such a long civil strife in which tens of thousands lost their lives and property, and whose traumatic experiences haunt even today all sections of the community, army, civilian, both young and old alike. The elders decided after due deliberation that there should be reconciliation between SNM supporters and non-supporters; that the communities pursue their respective grievance against each other through peaceful process and good-neighborliness. This meeting has shown both the Somali traditional method of governance and the clan elders' role at their best.

2. Elders meeting adjoined with scheduled central committee meeting

After an important clan elders meeting took place in Burao in May 1991, a scheduled central committee conference followed to discuss and approve the clan elders' pivotal resolution:

The rebirth of Somaliland as an independent state

The elders had earlier meticulously sought the advice of their constituents, underlining the political importance of the decision. The elders reported as had been confirmed by mass demonstrations in the main towns, the overwhelming support of the majority of Somaliland people for the rebirth of sovereign Somaliland. The central committee duly approved the measure and officially declared Somaliland as an independent state as of 16 May 1991. Ten days later, 26 May 1991, the central committee voted for the chairman of SNM, Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, as the first President of the newly born state. Mr. Hassan Essa Jama was voted as his first Vice-President; 17 cabinet ministers with portfolios going to all the main clans of Somaliland. There had been grumbles, even then from certain politicians whose aspirations have not been met, which could contribute in due course to the formation of opposition factions. However, the majority of the people of Somaliland were supportive of the government, euphoric with the heady fruits of freedom. A criticism against the policy of the government was seen as a sign of disrespect for Somaliland and was roundly condemned. The government succeeded with the vital help of the public and clan elders, to improve the security and well-being of all persons and their properties. Guns were rarely

seen on the main streets of major cities, and robberies were drastically curtailed. A foreign observer would have noticed the significant and upward swing of the chances of Somaliland as a viable state:

The improvement in security;

The movement of goods and people between the region;

The smooth re-establishment of vital trade in livestock to Gulf States which earned at least six million United States dollars in the first six months after independence;

The freedom of the opposition to air their views in public places, the radio and immediately proliferating local newspapers;

The improved relations with neighbouring countries in the region and the Horn. All boded well for Somaliland.

These achievements, though basic, would be very significant considering the constraints under which Somaliland laboured. The virtual destruction of the country's economy and infrastructure; the almost total lack of government resources, material and manpower; the hundred of thousands of unemployed youth; the substantial reduction of the remittances for most Somaliland families from the Gulf; the slow international humanitarian assistance; the high expectation of the public and promises of largesse after independence, all worked against Somaliland.

Despite all these major obstacles, the people were starting to rebuild their homes, the markets were flourishing and most people were hopeful of a fresh start in their brutally disrupted lives. But even at this early stage, observers warned of the fragility of peace which was pivotal for the survival of Somaliland as a state.

They cited the increasing number of spontaneous returnees cracking on the back of an already overburdened system; the lack of agreement on methods of demobilization and the creation of a small and responsive loyal national army; the signs of a deepening disillusionment among the unpaid government employees, i.e., teachers, doctors, etc.; which manifested itself in the increasing number of absentees as the virtual desertion of some ministries.

Present security situation of Somaliland

The security situation in Somaliland has seriously deteriorated recently after an initial period of relative stability. The first cracks in the stability of the country appeared during the heavy factional fighting in the central major town of Burao in early January 1992, which led to the evacuation of the majority of its population. This incident coincided and in a sense heralded a tense period on the whole bloodless, confrontation between armed clan-based factions at Berbera and elsewhere. These were followed by the

looting of stocks of food, medical supplies, equipment, etc., belonging to United Nations agencies and international NGOs at Berbera port. The lawlessness spread to other parts of the country and was dramatized by the looting of vehicles belonging to NGOs at Hargaisa and in certain cases the breaking into their premises and sacking of their homes. There has been also increasing incidence of harassment of commercial vehicles plying the roads between major towns. So far, however, except for the Burao incident there has been minimal loss of life and private property and commerce is still protected by an unwritten but tribal understanding. Needless to say, if the present anarchy and confrontational, factional politicking continues, as it is all likely to do, there will ensue a lot of bloodshed and human suffering of the greatest magnitude.

Factors that led to the breakdown of security of Somaliland

The present deterioration of security in Somaliland arose out of complex, interacting social, economic and historical reasons which, inter alia, include the following:

- The proliferation of heavily armed clan militia. The youth who are predominant in these militia have been traumatized by years of bloody conflict and the peculiar brutalities of civil war. They have missed their schooling and normal upbringing and now face a bleak future of joblessness and redundancy. Their unrealistically high expectation of the "spoils" of victory have been dashed and as a result they are bitter and determined to settle scores with their guns for material gain, disregarding traditional values such as sanctity of life and property.
- The presence of vast quantities of arms of all sizes and description, the legacy of the dictatorship's policy of stockpiling of arms.
- The clan system is the mainspring of Somali culture and identity. It has been useful in its traditional, pastoral setting and even today it is an instrument of survival during times of deep trouble and provides a safety net for the poorest and most vulnerable. However, it has its negative dark side and is in a sense irreconcilable with a modern, democratic state. Clan politicking is playing havoc with Somaliland security and stability at present.
- The total and almost unprecedented destruction of the economy and infrastructure of an already extremely underdeveloped country (Somaliland), is and shall continue to be a destabilizing factor, specially in combination with other socio-political crisis as is the case at present.

- It has proven difficult to establish a government or central authority in Somaliland. Though the people are committed to peace and the sovereignty of Somaliland and deeply yearn for stability and normality, it has not been possible so far to establish a viable system of government. This has been due to many factors some of them mentioned above and others include the lack of stabilizing institutions. The absolute lack of financial resources and the legacy of the dictatorship which destroyed both traditional values and the people's belief in government as well as the self-respect and morale of the professional cadres.

- The lack of meaningful and massive response from the international community at the time when the devastated country had miraculously though relative stability had been most unfortunate and in a sense contributed to the present crisis, not the least because of the high expectations of the people that had been dashed. Timely intervention then, in strengthening the capacity of the government and the demobilization process could conceivably have averted the present crisis, though admittedly the task was daunting even then.

Recommendations

The most critical problem facing the country at the present is securing the peace, which is a precondition to the tackling of the multitude of socio-economic crises besetting Somali land. Due to the magnitude of destruction that has occurred and the bewildering complexity of socio-economic problems, that mostly originated from the long bloody civil conflict and the excesses of the dictatorship, it is impossible to secure the peace without a massive and determined intervention of the international community. We therefore appeal to the United Nations to help us in the demobilization process in which feeding the Mujahidiin is an integral part.

Specific recommendations

The Government of Somaliland had wholeheartedly tried several times to form a national army, even though all these have not materialized due to the lack of resources, mainly food for those who attend the camps.

The Government hereby requests the following measures of assistance in order to ensure peace and stability:

1. Delivery of food for peace for the security forces and police.

2. Provision of an expert on demobilization to assist the army commanders in the process of demobilization.

Annex III

A. Letter of agreement addressed by General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) to the United Nations on 29 March 1992

WHEREAS I, General Mohamed Abshir Musse am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS I, General Mohamed Abshir Musse express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:

I, General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), do hereby agree to:

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;
2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;
3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;
4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of representatives of all regions, equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country;

Signed *Isidori*

Date *29/3/92* Place *Djibouti*

Witnessed by: *Robert M. Gallagher*

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission to
Somalia including representatives of the
Organization of African Unity, the League of
Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference

B. Letter of 29 March 1992 from SSDF Chairman
Mohamed Abshir Musse

SSDF position on peace and national reconciliation in Somalia

The SOMALI SALVATION DEMOCRATIC FRONT (SSDF) welcomes the current initiatives and mediation efforts of the international community, and particularly the United Nations, OAU, Arab League and OIC. The SSDF urges the United Nations and the three regional organizations to take more positive action including direct intervention in peace-keeping, political mediation and management.

The Somali civil war, one of the most murderous and destructive communal strifes in recent memory, has claimed over 100,000 lives; resulted in more than a million starving internal refugees and about 600,000 external refugees since January 1991; it fragmented the country into unviable rebel "republics" and regions; and it caused the total disintegration of all state institutions, infrastructure and socio-economic life of the Somali people. This disaster was brought about by the 21 years of misrule, corruption and clan promotion of Dictator Mohamed Siyad Barre's regime in Somalia.

The Somali crisis is more complex than the international community seems to appreciate. With all the goodwill and necessary dedications, the Somalis are unlikely to resolve the crisis soon by themselves alone. Many Somali national leaders took the initiative on various occasions in an effort to tackle the conflict or conflicts and to bring about peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

But all their efforts were sabotaged and frustrated by tens of thousands of fully armed bandits, ex-convicts/criminals, street-boys and renegade ex-Siyad Barre soldiers, whose business and livelihood is the gun and, who are for hire to the highest bidder, work as part-time mercenaries, for power-hungry military officers in all the regions of the country.

It is in consideration of the above and because of a deep knowledge of the culture, traditions and politics of the country as well as a realistic assessment of the impact of the civil war on the people and institutions that the SSDF reached the conclusions contained in this and the attached letters which have been submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General and the Secretaries-General of the OAU, Arab League and OIC. Furthermore, we wish to reconfirm the SSDF position on peace, national reconciliation and relief provision in the following summary:

1. On national reconciliation

- SSDF strongly believes in peaceful solution to the crisis through dialogue and reconciliation.

- The SSDF calls for the convening of an all-embracing National Reconciliation Conference at the earliest possible date under the auspices of the United Nations and the three regional organizations as an essential step for the achievement of a lasting peaceful solution to the Somali problem.

- In view of the close similarity of the Somali crisis to that of Cambodia and the United Nations precedent there, we strongly recommend the United Nations to seriously consider the Cambodian solution as one of the most practical options for Somalia. The National Conference would, therefore, discuss, among other issues:

(a) The formation of a National Provisional Council;

(b) The restoration of law and order;

(c) Official request for a United Nations peace-keeping force and United Nations-managed Transitional Authority in the Cambodian model, and consistent with the sovereignty, cultural and religious values of the Somali nation; and

(d) An international appeal for relief and rehabilitation.

2. On peace and stability in Somalia and in the Horn

- SSDF supports the call for immediate cease-fire in Mogadishu and wherever else there is fighting in the country.

- SSDF urges the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Mogadishu and other current and potential trouble spots in the country. We consider such action as indispensable in the effective establishment of peace and stability in all the regions of Somalia by disarming the tribal, factional and renegade armed militias and bandits, and assisting in the formation of a national security police force.

- We believe the peace, stability and economy as well as successful relief activities of the nations of the Horn of Africa are very much interdependent. No one country or region can by itself achieve much progress in isolation of the others. SSDF wishes, therefore, to suggest to the international community to consider the practical benefits of a regional approach along the national, especially now when there is no enmity among the nations in the region.

3. On the fighting in Mogadishu and the national capital

- We are deeply concerned of the bloodshed and misery in the national capital, Mogadishu, resulting from the continued and destructive fighting there and urge the parties to the conflict to maintain the cease-fire and settle their differences through dialogue and in the wider framework of the national reconciliation process.

- However, the international community and the other national parties should bring combined pressure against any defiant and uncompromising party in Mogadishu and be made to bear the serious consequences.

- And if Mogadishu is to remain the national capital of Somalia, it must be accorded new demilitarized and national status free from any clan or tribal claims.

4. On emergency relief

- Following the total disruption, disintegration and massive displacement over all Somalia, millions of people are starving inside and outside refugee camps both inside and outside Somalia. Isolated areas in north-eastern, central and south-western regions suffer even more.

- We, as SSDF, are very concerned at recent worrying statements on relief for Somalia by the United Nations and other members of the international community to the effect that the supply of relief to the Somali people was to be conditional on cessation of hostilities in Mogadishu. This statement was unfortunate and unfair. The antagonists in Mogadishu do not represent all the people and all the regions of Somalia and the whole nation is not responsible for the actions of a couple of warlords.

- We appeal to the United Nations agencies, donor nations, NGOs and the international community as a whole to rush relief supplies for the starving and malnourished millions in Somalia on an emergency basis. We further urge that all future relief supplies BE DISTRIBUTED FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY to all regions of the country, which has not been the case so far. Unbalanced and biased distribution of relief may cause unnecessary clan and regional antagonism and suspicion and could, consequently, complicate the search for peace and stability.

5. On rehabilitation and reconstruction

- In the event peace and order is hopefully restored in the near future, the more daunting task of rebuilding the totally destroyed and destitute nation remains to be tackled. Somalia does not have the necessary resources - financial or know-how - to rebuild.

- SSDF proposes, therefore, that the United Nations appoint an Administrator General, preferably a Muslim, to head a two-three-year Transitional Authority along the lines of Cambodia, to be appointed for Somalia.

- A Transitional Authority could also enhance Somali national unity as it would most likely encourage and save face for the people of "Somaliland" to rescind from their secession stand. They would see a United Nations Administrator General as neutral and impartial, also removing their main fear of "Southern Domination", particularly during the period of transition when emotion and suspicion is still high.

Yours faithfully,

SOMALI SALVATION DEMOCRATIC FRONT


Mohamed Abshir Musse
SSDF CHAIRMAN

ENCLOSURES:

1. Copy of a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General dated 20/01/92.
2. Copy of a letter to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, OAU, Arab League and OIC dated 10/03/92.

Annex IV

A. Letter of agreement addressed by General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu, Chairman of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) to the United Nations on 31 March 1992

WHEREAS I, General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu, am cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in my country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS I, General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu, express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in my country and their efforts to assist my country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in my country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF MY COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:

I, General Aden Abdillahi Gabieu, Chairman SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), do hereby agree to:

1. Commit myself to work for peace and stability in my country;
2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;
3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under my influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;
4. Commit myself to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of all regions equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of my country:

Signed..........

Date....31/3/92.....Place....Kismayo.....

Witnessed by:.....Robert M. Gallagher.....

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission
to Somalia including representatives of
the Organization of African Unity, the
League of Arab States and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference

- B. Letter of agreement addressed by 1. Bashir Omar Samater, Harti Geri-Meheri Representative, 2. Ahmed Mahamud Ato, Lelkase-Awrtable Representative, 3. Jama Sure, Marehan Representative, 4. Mohamud Ali Duh, Absame Representative, 5. Hagi Osman Hasan, Tunni Representative, to the United Nations on 31 March 1992

WHEREAS we, 1. Bashir Omar Samater, 2. Ahmed Mahamud Ato, 3. Jama Sure, 4. Mohamud Ali Duh, 5. Hagi Osman Hasan, are cognizant of the appeal by the United Nations for factions in our country to establish conditions of peace and stability and for all factions to cooperate with the Secretary-General to facilitate the delivery by the United Nations, and its specialized agencies and other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision of the Coordinator;

WHEREAS we, Bashir Omar Samater, Ahmed Mahamud Ato, Jama Sure, Mohamud Ali Duh, Hagi Osman Hasan, express our deep appreciation to the United Nations and regional organizations for their concern about the problems in our country and their efforts to assist our country in order to overcome them;

DESIROUS to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in our country;

UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS ATTACHES TO THE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONTINUING TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRY UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES:

We, Bashir Omar Samater: Harti Geri-Meheri Representative
Ahmed Mahamud Ato: Lelkase-Awrtable Representative
Jama Sure: Marehan Representative
Mohamud Ali Duh: Absame Representative
Hagi Osman Hasan: Tunni Representative do hereby agree to:

1. Commit ourselves to work for peace and stability in our country;
2. Ensure adequate security in and around the seaport area and handling facilities and management within the port;
3. Ensure the efficient equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance to areas under our influence and its environs, and that the seaport, airport, hospitals, non-governmental organizations' locations and necessary routes be considered as zones of peace placed under the protection of the United Nations;

4. Commit ourselves to a fair and equitable distribution of humanitarian assistance based on need in cooperation with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations;

5. The formation of a joint committee composed of all regions equally divided among them and the United Nations, to be chaired by the United Nations and meet at United Nations premises for the purposes of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian aid;

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

6. Regional and intergovernmental organizations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference will assist the United Nations in the implementation of this agreement where possible;

7. Upon signing this agreement, the United Nations undertakes in association with its agencies and other humanitarian organizations to provide unimpeded humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. The United Nations further undertakes that as soon as security is reasonably assured it will encourage its agencies as well as the non-governmental organizations to resume their projects for rehabilitation and development of our country:

Signed... *[Handwritten signatures]*...

Date. *31/03/92*..... Place... *KISMAIYO*.....

Witnessed by: *Robert M. Gallagher*.....

Robert Gallagher
for the United Nations Technical Mission
to Somalia including representatives of
the Organization of African Unity, the
League of Arab States and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference

