

## CHAPTER 10

---

# UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC)

---

JANE BOULDEN

## INTRODUCTION

---

THE Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a vast country, covering territory about the size of Western Europe and including a wide variety of distinct geographic regions.<sup>1</sup> It gained independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960 and almost immediately descended into a state of conflict. This conflict led to the creation of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC—*Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*), which began in July 1960 and ended in June 1964.<sup>2</sup>

Belgium was slow to plan for Congo's independence, only beginning to consider the prospect in the late 1950s and anticipating a long and methodical process. That timeframe was dramatically foreshortened when in 1959 various pressures forced Belgium to consider moving more quickly. The larger process of decolonization in Africa was, by that time, beginning to have an effect inside the Congo where people began to agitate for the kind of freedom from their colonizers that others in the region had achieved. At the same time, the negative decolonization experience of European countries, such as France in Algeria, was weighing on the minds of the Belgian government.<sup>3</sup>

In January 1960, a four-year transitional plan was outlined by Belgian authorities and rejected by Congolese representatives who demanded immediate independence. In response, the Belgian government, apparently anticipating that its role in the country would be little changed but also feeling pressured by mounting unrest in the Congo, announced that independence would be granted on 30 June. As one analyst put it, "This decision was regarded by close observers as an act of panic, if not of irresponsibility."<sup>4</sup> It was, in retrospect, a recipe for disaster: a colonial administration unaware and unprepared for the strength and fervor of the independence movement and a colonial people unaware and unprepared for the responsibilities and implications of government.

The internal situation of the Congo began to seriously deteriorate almost at the instant of independence. Violent clashes began in the Leopoldville and Luluabourg areas, including mutinies by Congolese soldiers against their Belgian officers. The resulting disorder spread to other areas and included attacks on Europeans. Belgian citizens began to panic and to flee the country in large numbers. The Treaty of Friendship, signed by Belgium and Congo at independence, provided for Belgium to continue to station troops at two bases (Kitona and Kamina) until agreements were made to have Congo take them over.<sup>5</sup> On 9 July 1960, Belgian military reinforcements arrived at these locations, an action considered by the Congo government to be a violation of the Treaty. On 10 July, against the wishes of the Congo government, Belgium began using the troops stationed at the two bases to restore order and protect their citizens. Compounding the situation, on 11 July, Moïse Tshombe, the head of the provincial government of Katanga, declared the province independent. Katanga was by far the richest and most economically developed province and had the strongest ties to Belgium. It accounted for 40 to 50 percent of the Congo's revenue and foreign trade and one-third of all domestic production.<sup>6</sup>

It was in this context that on 12 July 1960 Congo's new leaders, President Joseph Kasavubu, and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, made a joint appeal to the UN Secretary-General for assistance. Citing the arrival of "Belgian troops in violation of the Treaty of Friendship," their cable to the Secretary-General requested "urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance." The cable went on to: "accuse the Belgian Government of having carefully prepared the secession of the [*sic*] Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our country. . . . The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace."<sup>7</sup>

Acting under Article 99 of the UN Charter<sup>8</sup> for the first time in the organization's history, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld called for a Security Council meeting to discuss the issue. In doing so, the Secretary-General set in motion the UN involvement in the Congo. That involvement took the form of an operation that, until the 1990s, was the largest peacekeeping venture in the UN's history. At its maximum ONUC involved 19,828 military and civilian personnel.<sup>9</sup>

## MANDATE AND KEY FACTS

*Operation Mandate:* Five UN Security Council resolutions governed ONUC's mission. The main objectives of ONUC were: 1) withdrawal of Belgian troops; 2) withdrawal of "foreign military personnel" (mercenaries); and 3) internal stability, including support for law and order, technical military assistance, and the prevention of civil war.

UNSC Resolution 143 (14 July 1960) calls for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorizes the Secretary-General to "take the necessary steps" to provide the government with "such military assistance as may be necessary" until the national security forces are able "to meet fully their tasks."

UNSC Resolution 145 (22 July 1960) makes a connection between the “complete restoration of law and order” with the maintenance of international peace and security and calls on states to refrain “from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order” and “from any action which might undermine” the Congo’s territorial integrity.

UNSC Resolution 146 (9 August 1960) calls on Belgium to “immediately” withdraw its troops from Katanga, declares that the entry of UN troops into Katanga is “necessary for the full implementation” of the resolution, and reaffirms that ONUC will not in “any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict.”

UNSC Resolution 161 (21 February 1961) urges the UN to take “all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war,” including “the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort,” reiterates the need for the “immediate” withdrawal of Belgian and other “foreign military and paramilitary personnel ... and mercenaries,” decides that “an immediate and impartial investigation” be held into the death of Mr. Lumumba, and urges the convening of Parliament and the reorganization of Congolese armed units “under discipline and control.”

UNSC Resolution 169 (24 November 1961) authorizes the Secretary-General “to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary” to apprehend and/or deport all foreign military and paramilitary personnel as well as political advisers, “deprecates armed action” against UN forces, and demands that secessionist activities in Katanga “shall cease forthwith.”

*Personnel:*<sup>10</sup> Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaya, Federation of Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.

*Duration:* July 1960–June 1964.

*Finance:* US\$400.1 million assessed as a special account.

## COURSE OF THE OPERATION

---

Five UN Security Council resolutions governed ONUC’s mission. Each added to, or elaborated on, the initial mandate. The overall purpose of the UN action can be roughly categorized under three basic objectives: the withdrawal of Belgian military personnel (UNSC Resolutions 143, 145, 146, 161); the withdrawal of foreign military personnel and mercenaries (UNSC Resolutions 161, 169); and a basket of goals associated with internal stability. These were military assistance (UNSC Resolution 143), the restoration of law and order (UNSC Resolutions 145, 161, 169), and the prevention of civil war (UNSC Resolution 169). The evolution of the resolutions also reflects an increase in the intensity of implementation. When the withdrawal of foreign military personnel was not proceeding adequately, the Council authorized the use of force in detaining and deporting them (UNSC Resolution 169). And, similarly, in recognition of the serious possibility of full-scale civil war the Council provided for the use of force “if necessary, in the last resort” to prevent it (UNSC Resolution 161).

In what would now be viewed as a response of remarkable speed, Tunisian troops were on the ground in Congo a day after the first resolution was passed. They were joined by a Swedish force commanded seconded from the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), Major General Carl von Horn, as well as troops from five other African states. Within a few days, therefore, there were 4,000 UN troops on the ground.<sup>11</sup> By early August, only weeks after the first Council resolution and the arrival of ONUC troops, the situation in Congo had stabilized sufficiently for Belgian troops to be withdrawn from everywhere except Katanga.

In early August, in response to an assessment from his Special Representative Ralph Bunche that UN troops would not be able to enter Katanga peacefully, the Secretary-General returned to the Council. As he told them, the situation in Katanga was such that it "would require military initiative from the United Nations Force to which I would not be entitled to resort short of a formal authorization of the Council."<sup>12</sup> The Council again affirmed and made more explicit the goals of the operation, but they did not authorize the use of force in dealing with Katanga (UNSC Resolution 146). Frustrated by the unwillingness of the UN to push forward in Katanga, in late August 1960, Prime Minister Lumumba sent Congolese troops into the province. The internal situation in Congo deteriorated further a few days later when President Kasavubu announced that he was dismissing Prime Minister Lumumba. Lumumba promptly announced it was he who was dismissing the president. The collapse of the government prompted Andrew Cordier, the American Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to order the closure of the airports and directed ONUC troops to take control of the radio station. Cordier took both of these measures to avoid a descent into full-scale civil war and to maintain law and order—objectives established in the Council's mandate. Lumumba's base of support was in the Stanleyville area, while Kasavubu's was primarily in and around the capital city. The closure of the airports and of the radio station, therefore, made it very difficult for Lumumba to activate and consolidate his own base of support. So while ONUC's closure of the airports and its control of the radio station might very well have stopped a slide into outright civil war, Lumumba's supporters, inside and outside the Congo, perceived the actions as supporting Kasavubu's position.<sup>13</sup>

The constitutional crisis and resulting internal power struggle complicated the situation for the UN operation enormously. In addition to tension between ONUC troops and Congolese soldiers created by the Congolese push into Katanga, ONUC was now inside a country with no recognizable government in the midst of a civil war. The collapse of the government raised a whole host of questions for the UN, ranging from whose credentials should be recognized as the formal representative of the country at the UN to what role ONUC could and should play in facilitating a political reconciliation process.

One of the implicit goals of the Secretary-General in taking the Congo situation to the Security Council had been to guard against East-West politics becoming a factor in the newly independent country. This goal now seemed to be slipping out of reach. Even before the collapse of the government, Kasavubu and Lumumba had been gravitating to opposite sides of the East-West conflict with Kasavubu leaning towards the United States and Lumumba increasingly associated with the Soviet Union. Now,

the political vacuum on the ground drew both superpowers to become more involved in the internal politics of the conflict. East–West tensions were now also evident in Council discussions about the next steps. The general agreement among Council members that facilitated the establishment of ONUC was now also out of reach. After extensive and contentious debate, the Security Council was unable to reach an agreement. Instead, the Council passed a procedural resolution (thus not subject to the veto) that called for an emergency session of the General Assembly.<sup>14</sup> At that meeting, the General Assembly passed a resolution reaffirming the Council's initial approach, asking the Secretary-General to continue to take "vigorous action" to implement the resolutions, and calling on member states to refrain from actions that would impede the implementation of the resolutions.<sup>15</sup>

The internal crisis soon took a new turn for the worse. In late November 1960, Lumumba left his home, which had been under Congolese and UN guard to ensure his safety.<sup>16</sup> On 2 December he was arrested in Bulongo by Congolese soldiers.<sup>17</sup> In mid-February the Katangan government announced that Lumumba and two others had been killed while trying to escape. As with many events in the Congo at this time, the exact sequence of events leading to Lumumba's death is difficult to establish. What is known is that in response to concerns on the part of Kasavubu and others that Lumumba's presence in prison in Thysville was increasing his support, on 17 January 1961, Lumumba and two of his associates were flown to Elisabethville in Katanga. Later revelations made evident that Lumumba was most probably killed on 18 January and that the initial reports about his death being the result of an attempt to escape were complete fabrication.<sup>18</sup>

Lumumba's arrest and later death generated strong reactions at the UN. Many states, including, but not exclusively, those such as Ceylon, India, Mali, United Arab Republic (UAR), and Yugoslavia, who had been advocating a more active and forceful use of ONUC, believed that ONUC troops should have intervened, if not to prevent Lumumba's capture then to rescue him afterwards. The reaction to ONUC inaction was so strong that a number of states announced that they would withdraw their national contingents from the ONUC operation, resulting in a net reduction of 5,985 troops from the operation. Guinea, Indonesia, Morocco, Sudan, and the UAR withdrew their contingents over the next few months.<sup>19</sup> In the Congo, the announcement of Lumumba's death prompted further violence. On 21 February 1961, the Council passed Resolution 161, which called for an investigation into the circumstances of Lumumba's death, and added the prevention of civil war to the mission's mandate. While the resolution did not cite Chapter VII of the Charter, it authorized ONUC to use force "if necessary, in the last resort" in pursuit of the prevention of civil war. The second half of the resolution focused on the need to convene Parliament and establish control over Congolese "armed units."

After the passage of Resolution 161, and in the context of the troop withdrawals from ONUC, Katangese gendarmes and the foreign mercenaries leading them took an even more openly hostile attitude towards ONUC soldiers, resulting in several violent incidents between them. Katangese officials also stepped up their propaganda

campaign against ONUC, encouraging demonstrations and harassment of ONUC troops by civilians.<sup>20</sup> Congolese troops took advantage of ONUC's diminished numbers to attack the UN troops as well as remaining Belgian and European nationals. ONUC troops were thus forced simultaneously to protect civilians in danger and to protect themselves at a time of reduced strength. While the withdrawal of troop contributions was a serious setback to ONUC, over the months following Lumumba's death ONUC was gradually reinforced through contributions from other member states such as India, Liberia, and Tunisia.<sup>21</sup>

Two ONUC operations undertaken in pursuit of the mandate to ensure the withdrawal of "other foreign military and para-military personnel" had fateful consequences for the mission and for the Organization. Operation Rumpunch, launched on 28 August 1961, resulted in the arrest of eighty-one foreign military personnel. The operation was suspended when UN officials in the Congo agreed to a request from foreign diplomats that they be allowed to complete the deportations themselves.<sup>22</sup> The consuls reneged on those commitments, prompting ONUC to launch a second operation, known as Operation Morthor, on 13 September. Operation Morthor did not proceed as smoothly as the first operation, resulting in significant fighting between ONUC and Katangese troops.<sup>23</sup>

Operation Morthor began while the Secretary-General was en route to the Congo. On his arrival, he immediately turned his attention to trying to bring an end to the fighting. To that end, on 16 September 1961, Dag Hammarskjöld agreed to meet Tshombe in Ndola, just across the border with Northern Rhodesia (present-day Zambia), to discuss a ceasefire. The next day, en route to the meeting, just before arrival at the Ndola airport, the Secretary-General's aircraft crashed, resulting in the deaths of all on board.<sup>24</sup> A few days later, on 20 September, Mahmood Khiary, head of ONUC civilian operations signed a ceasefire agreement with Tshombe.<sup>25</sup>

In Katanga, the resulting ceasefire agreement was treated as a victory over the UN, encouraging further anti-UN political and military activities in Katanga and elsewhere in the country. In combination with the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, these events contributed to a new determination among UN member states to deal with the Congo situation represented in Resolution 169 in November 1961. The resolution noted that the Council "strongly deprecates" the secessionist activities, deplores all armed action in opposition to the government of the Congo, and authorizes the Secretary-General to take "vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary" to arrest and detain all foreign military and paramilitary personnel.

In spite of Resolution 169, harassment of ONUC personnel and ceasefire violations became stronger and more flagrant, including Katangese sniper attacks, air strikes, and ground assaults.<sup>26</sup> The Katangan military was also establishing roadblocks that inhibited communication and travel among UN positions.<sup>27</sup> By the beginning of December 1961, Katangese activity suggested preparation for a full-scale attack against ONUC forces with the intention of surrounding them in the Elisabethville area.<sup>28</sup> In response, the new Secretary-General, U Thant, told UN officials in Katanga to "act vigorously to establish law and order and protect life and property in Katanga."<sup>29</sup>

At a now reinforced strength, ONUC began taking direct action to deal with the roadblocks and to re-establish its freedom of movement.<sup>30</sup> These actions had the desired effect. As they were getting underway Tshombe agreed to meet with Congo's Prime Minister Adoula, who had been sworn into office in August 1961, to discuss the status of Katanga. The meeting took place on 20 December and the Secretary-General announced that the UN would cease offensive activities while it was taking place. With the military balance shifting in favor of ONUC, on 21 December 1961, Tshombe, under heavy pressure from the UN and the US, signed a statement, known as the Kitona Declaration, formally recognizing the authority of the central government over all of the Congo territory.

During the following year, Tshombe consistently stalled and backtracked on the commitments he made in the Kitona Declaration, and there was increasing evidence that he was using the time to prepare for a new push for independence. Katangan military activity also increased. Harassment of UN personnel began to escalate, involving the abduction of personnel and direct attacks on ONUC troops, such as the shooting down of a UN helicopter.<sup>31</sup> In December 1962, Katangan gendarmes attacked a contingent of Ethiopian ONUC troops and engaged in a four-day military confrontation with them.<sup>32</sup> In response, the Secretary-General ordered a new military operation that began on 28 December 1962. Its purpose was to "restore the security of ONUC troops in the Elisabethville area and their freedom of movement by clearing the gendarmerie road-blocks from which fire had been directed at United Nations troops."<sup>33</sup> The operation was successful and ONUC troops were able to secure areas previously held by the Katangese gendarmerie quite quickly. On 17 January 1963, Tshombe met with ONUC officials and agreed to ONUC's entry into the last areas of Katanga under his control.

With control over Katanga now back in the hands of the Congolese government, and with it an effective end to the threat of civil war, plans for a gradual phasing out ONUC began. At the same time, ONUC continued with the last part of its mandate that was still ongoing, which was the support for law and order. One of the main tasks in this last phase of ONUC activity was to support the process of reintegrating the Katangan gendarmerie with the Congolese military. In September 1963, the Secretary-General reported that the mandate established by the Security Council had been fulfilled and that the phasing out of the operation was continuing.<sup>34</sup> The operation formally ended on 30 June 1964.

This overview of the ONUC operation necessarily leaves out the medium- and long-term outcomes for the Congo after the departure of ONUC. These include the subsequent lengthy authoritarian rule of Mobutu Sese Seko, as well as the country's post-Cold War return to conflict, bringing about another round of UN peacekeeping. The overview also leaves untold many twists and turns in the story both on the ground and at the United Nations itself. Anomalous as an example of Cold War UN peacekeeping, and often overshadowed by the UN's post-Cold War peacekeeping experiences, the ONUC experience remains a source of controversy and myth.

## ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

---

The origins of the ONUC operation lay in the request from the newly installed government of Congo. The collapse of that government only two months later put ONUC in the midst of a political vacuum. First, this meant that there was no longer a governmental authority to give or remove consent for the presence of the operation. A decision to stay or withdraw at that point thus rested solely with the UN Security Council, which faced an unprecedented situation. For some, the collapse of the Congo government provided a window of opportunity for ONUC troops to take firmer more proactive action in the country to bring about the objectives set in the mandate. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld believed, however, that the implementation of the ONUC mandate must remain unchanged even after the collapse of the government, and that any more forceful action by ONUC would constitute interference in the internal affairs of the country.

Without a government in place, in the context of a number of rival groups competing for power, and with Katanga continuing to assert its independence, almost any action ONUC took, even facilitating any kind of political reconciliation process, could be interpreted as favoring one group or the other.

The impartiality of the operation became a defining theme for ONUC that reverberated through every decision-making level, but nowhere more particularly than with the Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld's determination that ONUC would not interfere in the political situation of the Congo was a persistent, even overwhelming concern in his approach to the crisis.

ONUC was the first peacekeeping operation in which the use of force beyond self-defense was authorized by the Council. Well before that authorization to react beyond self-defense came in Resolution 161, ONUC troops were under attack and had engaged in fighting with various armed groups. The constant pressure and use of force against ONUC troops by various armed groups, almost from the outset of the operation, was one of the most persistent and challenging aspects of the ONUC experience on the ground. A total of 135 military personnel lost their lives in the operation due to "malicious acts," a testament to the extent of military engagement ONUC troops experienced in the conflict. This remains the highest military fatality total associated with malicious acts of any peacekeeping operation to date.<sup>35</sup>

## CONCLUSION

---

In focusing on ONUC as an operation, a large part of the story of the broader politics of the UN during the Cold War remains unexplored. For example, after the collapse of the Congolese government, the Soviet Union pushed hard for stronger action by ONUC putting it at odds with the position of the Secretary-General. When the Council, as well



as the General Assembly, supported the Secretary-General's approach, the Soviet Union began a long, bitter, and very personal campaign against the Secretary-General and the ONUC operation. This included the Soviet proposal that the Secretary-General be replaced by a "troika" representing the West, the East, and the developing world. Soviet opposition to the ONUC operation and peacekeeping generally extended to its financing. The Soviet Union argued that peacekeeping operations were not in conformity with the Charter and therefore that member states should not be required to bear the expenses incurred by the operations. Their unwillingness to pay their assessed dues created a serious and long-term financial crisis for the organization.<sup>36</sup>

In many ways, ONUC was very much a peacekeeping operation of its time. The Secretary-General played a very hands-on role in the day-to-day decision-making about the operation and consulted closely with the Security Council, which also followed events closely. Singly and together these actors followed and debated publicly events and their implications for the mandate in ways that are rare in current UN decision-making. The newness of the experience, especially the specific nature of the situation in Congo, lent itself to innovation even while it opened the way to unforeseen events and dilemmas. The ONUC experience foreshadowed many of the challenges experienced by UN operations in the post-Cold War period—the "intra-state" character of the conflict, the changing nature of consent, the use of force by and against UN personnel, and the fast-changing conditions on the ground. All of these factors have challenged and in some cases undermined post-Cold War peacekeeping operations.

Given the nature and extent of the changes in the situation on the ground as well as at the international level, the successful completion of the mandate was a significant achievement. In the context of the divisive and highly charged political climate of the Cold War, both inside and outside the organization, the death of the Secretary-General, and the unpredictable and difficult sequence of events in Congo itself, the ONUC operation fulfilled the mandate established by the Council: it restored law and order in Congo, ensured the country remained a single unit, facilitated a restoration of a functioning government, and oversaw the withdrawal of foreign troops, but there is no doubt it did so at a heavy cost.

## NOTES

1. Portions of this chapter draw on the author's, *Peace Enforcement* (Westport: Praeger, 2001), 21–43.
2. At the time of the UN operation, Congo was the Republic of Congo. It became Zaire in 1971 and then the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997.
3. Colin Legum, *Congo Disaster* (London: Penguin, 1961).
4. Ernest W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1965), 8.
5. *Treaty of Friendship between Belgium and the Congo*, reprinted in Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo*, 199–200.
6. Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo since Independence, January 1960 to December 1961* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 14–19.

7. "Cable dated 12 July 1960 from the President of the Republic of the Congo and Supreme Commander of the National Army and the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations," UN document S/4382, 13 July 1960.
8. Under Article 99 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General "may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."
9. United Nations, Republic of the Congo—ONUC, Facts and Figures available at [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucF.html](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucF.html).
10. United Nations, Republic of the Congo—ONUC, Facts and Figures available at [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucF.html](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucF.html).
11. First Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, Security Council Document S/4389, 18 July 1960, 8. Note that in details provided later in the report (p. 9) the Secretary-General indicates that 3,500 troops are on the ground at the time of the report (18 July) from Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, and Tunisia, and that 700 more were expected that week from Guinea.
12. Security Council document S/PV.884, 8 August 1960.
13. Carl von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace* (London: Cassel, 1966), 194.
14. Security Council Resolution S/RES/157 (1960), 17 September 1960. This action is made possible under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. UN General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V), 3 November 1950.
15. General Assembly Resolution 1474, 20 September 1960.
16. The sequence of events was difficult to piece together at the time. The SRSG's report states that Lumumba left his home on the night of 27–28 November 1960. *Note by the Secretary-General*, Security Council document S/4571, 5 December 1960.
17. Security Council document S/4571.
18. *Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo Regarding Mr. Patrice Lumumba*, Security Council document S/4688, 12 February 1961. Brian Urquhart, *Hammar skjöld* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1994), 501–506.
19. See Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967, Documents and Commentary, Vol. 3, Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 95.
20. *Report to the Secretary-General from his Acting Special Representative in the Congo on the Civil War Situation in Katanga and on United Nations Action in Implementation of the Security Council Resolution of 21 February 1961*, Security Council document S/4791, 15 April 1961.
21. Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967*, 95.
22. Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back, A UN Case History* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1962), 220–221.
23. Brian Urquhart, *Hammar skjöld*, 567–568.
24. The cause of the crash remains in dispute. Most recently, a new commission of inquiry consisting of international jurists reported in September 2013: <[www.hammar skjöld-commission.org](http://www.hammar skjöld-commission.org)>. See also *Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances Resulting in the Tragic Death of Mr. Dag Hammar skjöld and of Members of the Party Accompanying Him*, UN General Assembly document A/5069, 24 April 1962.
25. *Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General Relating to the Implementation of Paragraph A-2 of the Security Council Resolution of 21 February 1961*, Security Council document S/4940, 14 September 1961.

26. *Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General, Relating to the Implementation of Paragraph A-2 of the Security Council Resolution of 21 February 1961*, Security Council document S/4940/Add.16, 6 December 1961.
27. Hoskyns, *Congo since Independence*, 451.
28. Security Council document S/4940/Add.16, para. 28.
29. Kenneth Love, "Thant Threatens Force to Restore Peace in Katanga," *New York Times*, 4 December 1961, 1, 3.
30. *Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General, Relating to the Implementation of Paragraph A-2 of the Security Council Resolution of 21 February 1961*, Security Council document S/4940/Add.18, 20 December 1961, *Report of the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo to the Secretary-General, Relating to the Implementation of Paragraph A-2 of the Security Council Resolution of 21 February 1961*, Security Council document S/4940/Add.19, 22 December 1961.
31. *Report to the Secretary-General from the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo on Developments Relating to the Implementation of the Security Council Resolutions of 21 February and 24 November 1961*, Security Council document S/5053/Add.14, 11 January 1963.
32. Security Council document S/5053/Add.14, 11 January 1963, para. 30–45.
33. Security Council document S/5053/Add.14, para. 14.
34. *Report by the Secretary-General on the Question of Military Disengagement in the Congo*, Security Council document S/5428, 17 September 1963.
35. UN fatality statistics are reported in three categories of incident type: accident, illness, and malicious act. The operation with the highest *total* number of fatalities is the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). ONUC has the highest number of fatalities due to "malicious act." "United Nations peacekeeping, Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type, up to 31 March 2015," [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml). Note that a report by the Secretary-General in 1964 put the number of personnel "killed in action" at 126 of a total 235 ONUC casualties. The other categories of fatalities in that report were natural causes and accidents. Report by the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations Force in the Congo and on Other Aspects of the United Nations Operation There, Security Council document S/5784, 29 June 1964, Annex VII.
36. Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, para. 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, *International Court of Justice Reports* 1962, 151.

