CHAPTER 30

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR—BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA)

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INTRODUCTION

THE UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) was established in Bosnia in June 1992 as an extension of the UNPROFOR created in Croatia in February 1992 (see chapter 29). Its mandate was primarily to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Bosnian population. As of the spring 1995 it became part of the UN Peace Forces deployed in the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia, before it was terminated soon after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in November 1995.

The demise of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1991 and the war in Croatia[1] that followed produced a spill-over effect that shook Bosnia in the spring of 1992. Bosnia was the most multi-ethnic republic of the Yugoslav Federation. It was composed of three main ethnic groups: the Muslims[2] (44 percent according to the 1991 census), the Serbs (31 percent) and the Croats (17 percent). The secession of Slovenia and Croatia left the Bosnian republic in a difficult situation vis-à-vis Serbia within what remained of the Yugoslav Federation. Bosnia held a referendum on self-determination on 29 February–1 March 1992 and subsequently proclaimed its independence from Yugoslavia. Alija Izetbegovic, head of the Party of Democratic Action, subsequently became its first president. Bosnia's independence was recognized by the European Community and the United States on 6 and 7 April but it was rejected by Belgrade. Clashes soon occurred in Sarajevo between the Muslim and Serb communities. In the meantime, Bosnia's Serbs declared their own Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Republika Srpska*) with Radovan Karadzic as its head. This prompted the siege of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs under the command of Ratko Mladic. From this moment on, while the conflict spread throughout the

Bosnian territory, the fighting concentrated on some key contested areas and around cities that were under siege. Initially, the Croats and the Muslims established an alliance but this was undermined when the Croats and the Serbs cut tactical deals at the expense of the Muslims. Eventually, in March 1994, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats created a Croat-Bosniac Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[3] Over the summer of 1992, the Serbs took control of a large portion of Bosnian territory. This was when the first signs of ethnic cleansing were evidenced, notably with the media coverage of the Serb-held prisoners' camps and mass deportation of Muslim populations.

The conflict in Bosnia epitomized the so-called "new wars" of the post-Cold War era that were characterized by news forms of actors, motivations and objectives, and fighting methods.[4] More specifically, the Bosnian war witnessed the perpetration in Europe of massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL),[5] the most tragic example being the slaughter of more than 7,000 Muslim civilians[6] by Bosnian Serb forces in what the UN had designated the "safe area" of Srebrenica in July 1995.

MANDATE AND KEY FACTS

Operation Mandate: Security Council Resolution 758, 8 June 1992, extended Croatia's UNPROFOR mandate to include the security of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo.

UNSC Resolution 770, 13 August 1992, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, "calls upon states to take all measures necessary to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

UNSC Resolution 776, 14 September 1992, extended UNPROFOR's mandate and strength to "support UNHCR's efforts to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary."

UNSC Resolutions 819, 16 April 1993, and 824, 6 May 1993, established six "safe areas" in the cities of Srebrenica, Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zepa.

UNSC Resolution 836, 4 June 1993, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized UNPROFOR, "acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas," and authorized member states, "acting nationally or through regional organizations" (NATO) to take "all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate."

With UNSC Resolution 982, 31 March 1995, UNPROFOR in Former Yugoslavia was split into three separate operations; mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia was unchanged.

Duration: June 1992–December 1995

Strength: Initial authorized strength: September 1992: approx. 10,000 uniformed personnel

Deployed strength: 31 May 1995: 22,895

Personnel: as of 31 May 1995:[7] France (3,842), United Kingdom (3,584), Pakistan (2,994), Netherlands (1,579), Malaysia (1,561), Turkey (1,478), Spain (1,471), Bangladesh (1,263), Sweden (1,026), Canada (848), Norway (732), Ukraine (617), Russia (524), Egypt (443), Denmark (310), New Zealand (258), Jordan (125), Belgium (111).

Finance: from January 1992 to March 1996 (including UNPROFOR in Croatia, UNCRO, UNPROFOR in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR in Macedonia and UNPREDEP): US$4,617 million.[8]

Course of the operation

War broke out in Bosnia at a time when the UN was struggling to deploy UNPROFOR in Croatia.[9] The Security Council had not initially considered deploying an operation to Bosnia. In two consecutive reports, the UN Secretary-General ruled out this idea on the grounds that "the present conditions [of widespread violence] in Bosnia-Herzegovina make it impossible to define a workable concept for a UN peacekeeping operation."[10] Yet in mid-May 1992 the deterioration of the situation and the difficulties of delivering humanitarian aid led the Security Council to request the Secretary-General to "review the feasibility of protecting international humanitarian relief programmes," as well as "to keep under review the possibility of deploying a peacekeeping mission" in Bosnia under the auspices of the United Nations (UNSC Resolution 752, 15 May 1992). From these two options the humanitarian one prevailed over the peacekeeping track. The idea of peacekeeping was progressively abandoned as the fighting continued and the European Community-held diplomatic talks on future constitutional arrangements for Bosnia failed to produce an effective agreement.

Contrary to most other peacekeeping operations, UNPROFOR in Bosnia was established incrementally with a series of mandate expansions. Furthermore, it started as an extension of another operation, UNPROFOR in Croatia. Following an agreement on the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purpose (5 June 1992), the Security Council decided to enlarge the mandate of UNPROFOR so as to allow for the protection of the delivery of humanitarian aid at Sarajevo airport (UNSC Resolution 758, 8 June 1992).

The first elements of UNPROFOR in Bosnia arrived in Sarajevo in July 1992 and became operational in August. However, the situation did not improve as a result but instead further deteriorated. In early August, media reports on detention centers, mass deportation of civilians and other violations of human rights and IHL further increased the pressure on the Security Council to react. After a brief debate on a possible military intervention to enforce the delivery of humanitarian aid, the international response was dual-tracked: the diplomatic track involved the establishment at the end of August 1992 of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia co-chaired by the European Community and the United Nations (that took over the European Community's Conference); on the military track UNPROFOR was extended to the broader Bosnian territory through UNSC Resolution 776 (14 September 1992). This tasked UNPROFOR to "support UNHCR's efforts to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary."[11] The authorized deployment was 6,500 troops plus approximately 2,000 support staff.

The June and September extensions of UNPROFOR were illustrative of the nature of the international response to the Bosnian war. While Western states were eager to respond to the unfolding conflict and the related IHL violations, none were eager to engage in any activity that could have led to military confrontation with any of the

conflict parties. If abstention was not possible given the geopolitical context—the end of the Cold War and a war in Europe—military confrontation was not seen as a feasible option either. Faced with a no "peace to keep" situation, the mission concentrated on protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

This approach was revisited with the establishment of a no-fly zone over Bosnia in October 1992 that was to be enforced by NATO airplanes following a concomitant order by UN and NATO representatives ("dual-key" system), most importantly with the creation of the so-called "safe areas," first in Srebrenica and then in the cities of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac. According to UN Security Council's Resolutions 819 (16 April 1993) and 824 (6 May 1993)), these safe areas were to be "free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act," while UNPROFOR was authorized, "acting in self-defense, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas ... or to armed incursion into them." (Resolution 836, 4 June 1993, para. 9) In addition, member states and NATO[12] were authorized to take "all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas ... to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate." Theoretically, these resolutions signified an important shift from a protection of humanitarian assistance approach to a protection of civilians focus, through coercion and the use of force if need be.

Another 7,600 troops were authorized to implement the new mission (versus some 34,000 required by the Secretary-General). At this stage though, the credibility of UNPROFOR was already largely weakened. Peacekeepers faced constant humiliations at the hands of the conflict parties, including being stopped at checkpoints or denied access to key areas, without much reacting. Skepticism about the UN's ability to protect the "safe areas" was then reinforced as resolutions went unimplemented and the siege of Sarajevo continued unabated. This led to recurrent debates among member states—in particular, France and Britain on one side and the United States on the other side—on a possible withdrawal of the mission or air strikes (which was US-backed), or both at the same time, especially as diplomatic talks on a peace plan were leading nowhere.

It was in this context that, on 9 February 1994, following a mortar shell on a market in Sarajevo killing 68 people, NATO issued an ultimatum against the Bosnian Serbs demanding they lift the siege and remove heavy weapons from a 20 km exclusion zone around Sarajevo. The Serbs eventually gave in, which temporarily restored the credibility of external actors. Yet the UN force did not take advantage of this as the siege was never totally lifted and the Serbs retook control of heavy weapons in the context of the 1995 blue helmets hostage crisis (see below). In the meantime, a Contact Group bringing together the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany replaced the UN-EU International Conference, with the effect of marginalizing the United Nations (and international organizations in general) at the diplomatic level. The peace plan that came out of this new forum was never accepted by the Bosnian Serbs, despite apparent pressure from Serbian president Milosevic. At this stage, domestic debates in some UNPROFOR contributing states such as France and the United Kingdom focused more on the protection of their own soldiers, on the pertinence of their presence in

Bosnia, and on their possible withdrawal than on how to make the UN mission more effective. A sentiment of impotence was widely shared within the UN Secretariat itself.[13]

On 31 December 1994, a four-month truce negotiated by former US President Carter was accepted by all parties. In the meantime, after Croatia's President Tudjman had eventually accepted the continued presence of UNPROFOR, the Security Council renewed its mandate on 31 March 1995 but divided it into three "distinct but interdependent" operations (in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia),[14] albeit still under a joint command in Zagreb. The name and mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia remained unchanged, and the three operations were referred to as UN Peace Forces (UNPF). On the ground, however, the spring and summer of 1995 marked a strong deterioration of the situation and the culmination of UNPROFOR's powerlessness. The four-month truce did not last and fighting resumed in March and April 1995. In response, in May 1995, the UNPF Force Commander Bernard Janvier proposed to the Security Council that UNPROFOR concentrate its forces in central Bosnia to the detriment of the three eastern Bosnia's safe areas of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.[15] Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali shared Janvier's view that UNPROFOR's mandate was unrealistic and air strikes could be counterproductive as they would, among other risks, expose the blue helmets to retaliation and hostage taking. Janvier's option was opposed by the United States.

It was against this background that on 24 May 1995, Bosnia's Force Commander General Rupert Smith issued an ultimatum to the Serbian forces demanding that the fighting stop and that the weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo be respected. The following day, NATO air strikes were launched on Serbian positions near Sarajevo. In retaliation, Serbian forces shelled other safe areas (killing 76 people in Tuzla) and took some 200 blue helmets hostage. This crisis marked a shift in Western policies towards Bosnia. On 16 June, the Security Council authorized the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) composed of 4,000 troops (out of an authorized strength of 12,500) from France, Britain, and the Netherlands that were mandated to support UNPROFOR in the implementation of its mandate (UNSC Resolution 998, 16 June 1995). Operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the RRF was formally part of UNPROFOR yet it operated under national control and in national uniforms. Though it aimed at increasing the "tactical operational flexibility" of UNPROFOR and was supposed to be more robust, it did "not change the United Nations role to peace-enforcement."[16]

On the ground, the RRF deployed with difficulties and its role was de facto altered by the strategic evolution of the situation in both Croatia and Bosnia, with the Croatian takeover of Western Slavonia and the Krajina (in Croatia) and the Croatian–Bosnian offensives in Western Bosnia over the summer of 1995. Most importantly, the fall of Srebrenica to the Serbs on 11 July 1995, followed by Zepa on 25 July, revealed the limits of the Western preparedness to protect Bosnian civilians. In Srebrenica, although the city was theoretically under the protection of both the UN and NATO, the Bosnian-Serb forces entered the enclave and slaughtered more than 7,000 men with neither intervention from the Dutch blue helmets nor air strikes from NATO. For UNPROFOR, this ended any prospect of implementing its mandate. In the following month, a mortar

shell which landed on a Sarajevo market led NATO to launch sustained air strikes against Serbian positions on 30 August 1995—Operation Deliberate Force. The air strikes stopped in mid-September with the Serbs agreeing to remove their weapons from a 20 km exclusion zone around Sarajevo. From this moment on the UN force remained passive and was eventually terminated after the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement (21 November 1995) and the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to the NATO-led Implementation Force (UNSC Resolution 1031, 15 December 1995) and the establishment of the civilian UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH, see chapter 42).

Achievements and limitations

UNPROFOR in Bosnia was the largest UN operation of the immediate post-Cold War period. It is also considered to be one of the most tragic failures among UN peacekeeping operations.[17] Various methodologies to assess the degree of success of peacekeeping operations—that look at mandate implementation, limitation of armed conflict or reduction of human suffering, or contribution to conflict resolution—all come to the conclusion that UNPROFOR was an overall failure.

First, UNPROFOR was faced with huge difficulties in implementing the various dimensions of its mandate throughout the three and a half years of its deployment. To its credit, the UN force enabled humanitarian assistance to be delivered more efficiently than it would have been in UNPROFOR's absence. The blue helmets managed to get delivery routes reopened, and contributed to the restoration of basic public services in different parts of Bosnia. Between July 1992 and the end of 1995, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) delivered some 950,000 tonnes of humanitarian relief supplies in Bosnia, which included 160,000 tonnes of food, medicines, and other goods delivered to Sarajevo in over 12,000 flights.[18] As a lead agency, UNHCR coordinated the various institutions of the UN system and provided support to 3,000 humanitarian personnel from over 250 organizations (carrying UNHCR identification cards). This level of aid was largely facilitated by UNPROFOR which was specifically mandated to provide security and support to the broader humanitarian effort. The airlift to Sarajevo—presented by the UNHCR as the "longest-running humanitarian airlift in history, surpassing the 1948–49 Berlin airlift"[19]—was made possible thanks to UNPROFOR's presence at the airport. It is therefore possible to conclude that UNPROFOR contributed to the reduction of human suffering.

Nevertheless, the UN force did little to address the recurrent humanitarian access denials and consistently resisted any interpretation of its mandate that could have led it to enforce the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Also, despite the Chapter VII mandated tasks of protecting the safe areas, none of them were provided with security and two fell without reaction from the UN. The mere scope of ethnic cleansing and

other IHL violations in areas where blue helmets were deployed or mandated by the UN Security Council to prevent such crimes—in Sarajevo and Srebrenica among other places—overshadows UNPROFOR's record in facilitating humanitarian assistance. The fact that the execution of UNPROFOR's mandate had become secondary to the security of the blue helmets undermined the operation's ability to implement its mandate. Even in this minimal self-protection task, UNPROFOR was dysfunctional as illustrated by the various hostage-taking episodes.

In the same vein, any sustained positive impact of UNPROFOR's presence on the limitation of the conflict is hard to identify. Throughout the war, the deployment of blue helmets in contested areas may have prevented or delayed military offensives or IHL violations. Sarajevo would probably have been under even greater threat in the absence of the UN. However, it did not seem that the parties' main war aims were significantly altered by the blue helmets: be it the Serb offensives of 1992, the Croatian siege of Mostar, the Serbian takeover of Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 or, more generally, their ethnic cleansing policy, or the Bosnian–Croatian offensives in Western Bosnia over the summer of 1995. In all these cases the UN presence and mandate did not appear to play the deterrent role that could have contained the conflict. Two related issues need to be factored in here. One is the fact that the arms embargo against Bosnia was seen by the Bosniacs and some external figures as limiting the conflict at a high cost for the Bosniacs who benefited the least from external support. By contrast, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were able to draw respectively on support from Serbia and Croatia. Second, the presence of the UN force was often invoked as the reason why air strikes could not be launched (for fear of reprisals against the blue helmets). Without subscribing to the thesis of UNPROFOR prolonging the conflict,[20] the question is raised whether the operation indeed contributed to limiting the conflict or simply delayed its outcome.

The role of UNPROFOR in conflict resolution was also peripheral. The operation was not mandated to play any direct role in this field and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Yasushi Akashi, failed to give any political weight to his mediation function. Interestingly, none of the peace plans elaborated by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, jointly chaired by the UN and the EU, were accepted by all parties, and the UN was eventually sidelined both in the Contact Group created in April 1994, and eventually in the US-led Dayton peace negotiations. In the same vein, UNPROFOR was marginalized in the conclusion of the Bosnian conflict, as it was NATO that played the decisive role in putting an end to the war with Operation Deliberate Force in September 1995. The Rapid Reaction Force contributed to the operation yet its share remained marginal compared with the magnitude of the NATO mission. At these various levels some key member states took precedence over the UN in the conflict resolution phase, in a move away from institutional channels and towards renationalization of their foreign policies.

In this context, at least three sets of factors can explain the overall failure of UNPROFOR. They relate to member states policies, UN dysfunction and institutional culture, and the local environment. The degree of support of key stakeholders to a peace

operation is one of the key dimensions of success.[21] Yet in the case of UNPROFOR in Bosnia member states' policies were characterized by the ambiguity of their commitment and a mismatch between the needs of conflict management and the nature of the international response. From the outset, UNPROFOR came as an intermediary or default option lying between decisive intervention which was never seriously contemplated before 1995 and abstention which was impossible given the geopolitical context. Such characteristics inherently led to a series of ambiguities and half-hearted measures. In particular, the key member states involved—mainly the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—never developed a coherent strategy for Bosnia in which UNPROFOR would be one dimension.[22] On the one hand, they were motivated by the necessity to respond to a major war and mass IHL violations taking place in Europe, and agreed, together with China and Russia, to pass more than forty UNSC resolutions on Bosnia and bear the financial implications. On the other hand, their response was constrained by political factors that prevented them from acting decisively. The United States never saw UNPROFOR as an appropriate conflict management tool—pleading instead for a lifting of the arms embargo and conducting air strikes on several occasions—yet never acted against its presence. The creation and fate of the safe areas were illustrative of these ambiguities. Western states defined an ambitious mandate with the protection of safe areas, but diverged on what protection meant and how it should be implemented. In addition, the required resources were never fully provided, rendering the promise to create genuine sanctuaries unrealistic.[23] The same ambiguities were observed in relation to the use of force. While a few UN resolutions allowed for the use of force, none of the troop contributors were ever willing to embark on any form of sustained peace enforcement, and assume the consequences of it. Instead, impartiality and a risk-averse policy prevailed in the interpretation of the UNPROFOR mandate. As noted above, force protection quickly took precedence over mandate implementation, to the extent that France and the United Kingdom were reluctant to resort to air strikes for fear of retaliation against their own forces on the ground, while the United States, which had no troops on the ground, pushed for a more coercive approach.

Second, the UN as an institution proved to be dysfunctional on several fronts. Within the UN Secretariat, the newly created (February 1992) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was neither equipped nor staffed with the level of expertise and support that these types of complex operations required, especially as UN peacekeeping operations were going through an unprecedented quantitative and qualitative evolution.[24] Issues such as UN *versus* national command and control structures, headquarters–field communication, coordination with NATO in particular in the activation of close air support or air strikes according to the dual-key system (as illustrated in Srebrenica),[25] and the relevance of rules of engagement, all hindered UNPROFOR's ability to fulfill its mandate. In the field, what was particularly problematic was the combination within the same mandate of consent-based tasks, such as the protection of the delivery of humanitarian aid, and potentially coercive activities such as the protection of the safe areas. Explicitly referring to the Bosnian context, the 1995 *Supplement to*

An Agenda for Peace noted that "additional mandates" given to peace operations "that required the use of force … could not be combined with existing mandates requiring the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force." "To blur the distinction" between the logic of peacekeeping and the dynamics of peace enforcement "can undermine the viability of the peacekeeping operation and endanger its personnel" (para. 35). Such rapprochement was all the more risky as the operation did not receive the necessary additional capabilities. This was a mandate design problem that also raised the issue of the ability of the UN to conceptualize, plan and run complex and coercive operations. Beyond conceptual and operational difficulties, there was also an institutional culture issue. Past practices and principles of peacekeeping had established a culture of consent and non-coercion within the UN Secretariat, which could not be easily accommodated with some aspects of UNPROFOR's mandate. This is what the former UN Secretary-General called in his report on the fall of Srebrenica the "pervasive ambivalence within the UN regarding the role of force in the pursuit of peace," or an "institutional ideology of impartiality."[26]

Finally, mandate implementation was undermined by the continuing conflict and the parties' obstruction of UNPROFOR's activities. Contrary to the situation in Croatia, ceasefires in Bosnia never lasted for more than a few weeks. As a result of this "no peace to keep" situation, blue helmets were regularly confronted with obstacles that they were ill-prepared to tackle and which required a posture that they were not ready to adopt. The war situation also entailed a relatively high level of casualties that publics back home had difficulty accepting, especially as blue helmets were targeted and therefore treated as a party to the conflict. For the Serbs in particular, UNPROFOR was never perceived as an impartial force but rather as an obstacle to their war aims. It is for these reasons that the Secretary-General was in 1992 opposed to the deployment of an operation, which in the end hardly qualified as a *peacekeeping* mission. Yet it operated under the traditional peacekeeping principles. As a result, troop contributors found themselves in a war that was not theirs, and overall proved reluctant to take action that could alter the posture of the operation. In the meantime, UNPROFOR was never perceived by the parties as an instrument that could help in negotiations or conflict resolution, but rather as an obstacle to the pursuit of their own objectives.

Conclusion

UNPROFOR in Bosnia was established the same month as the release of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*—a time when many hopes were being placed in the United Nations.[27] Yet it is also, together with the UN mission in Somalia, an operation that illustrated the UN's inability to deal with ongoing conflicts and the so-called "new wars." Twenty years after the operation was deployed, UNPROFOR is still considered by many as *the* example of what the UN should not do, be it the mismatch between the mandate and the capacities provided, the deployment in an

ongoing conflict, or the ill-defined combination of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping with the related conflation of Chapter VI and Chapter VII tasks. In particular the fall of Srebrenica has remained the most tragic denouement of these ambiguities and half-hearted measures.

In this context, one notable innovation was the establishment by the Security Council in 1993 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), tasked to prosecute those suspected of war crimes during the 1990s Yugoslav conflicts.

Beyond the Yugoslav context, the UN as a conflict management institution was largely discredited as a consequence of the Bosnian failure. At a national level, many Western countries that contributed to UNPROFOR have subsequently distanced themselves from UN-led operations and expressed a sentiment of distrust vis-à-vis the institution.

In 1999, the Kofi Annan report on the fall of Srebrenica provided a thorough and uncompromising analysis of UN operations in Bosnia, which then fed various lessons learnt exercises, most notably the Brahimi report process[28] and the drafting of the "Principles and Guidelines" by DPKO/Department of Field Support.[29] The necessity for contemporary peace operations to be deployed once a ceasefire has been achieved derives directly from the experience of the Bosnian war. The fall of Srebrenica was also central in the subsequent work on issues such as the protection of civilians in peace operations or the concept of "robust peacekeeping," while ethnic cleansing has become one of the four threshold crimes triggering the Responsibility to Protect. Overall, even if some contemporary operations seem to be confronted with similar challenges as the ones UNPROFOR faced, the way UN operations are mandated, planned, and run in the twenty-first century draws to an extent on lessons learned from UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Notes

1. For background information on the Croatian secession and subsequent war, see chapter 29 in this volume.
2. The Muslims became one of the six nationalities of the Yugoslav Federation with the 1974 Constitution. For historical background on the Yugoslav wars, see John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a Country*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
3. For detailed accounts of the conflict, see Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995); Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia. The Third Balkan War*, 3rd edn. (London: Penguin Books, 1996); Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999).
4. See Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
5. On IHL violations, see the reports by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9 (28 August 1992), E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10 (27 October 1992), E/CN.4/1993/50 (10 February 1993); see also the report to the UN General Assembly, A/47/666-S/24809 (17 November 1992).

6. See Helge Brunborg and Henrik Urdal, *Report on the Number of Missing and Dead from Srebrenica* (The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, February 2000).
7. Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peace-Keeping Operations as of 31 May 1995, accessed at <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml>
8. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 3rd edn. (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996), 748.
9. For an official narrative of UNPROFOR's activities, see *The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, Third Edition (New York: United Nations/DPI, 1996), 513–541 and 556–563.
10. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 749 (1992), UN Security Council Document S/23836, 24 April 1992, para. 27, and a Further Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 749 (1992), UN Security Council Document S/23900, 12 May 1992.
11. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Security Council Document S/24540, 10 September 1992, para. 3.
12. Alongside operations aimed at enforcing the implementation of arms and economic embargoes as well as the no-fly zone over Bosnia, NATO was acting in support of UNPROFOR through close air support and air strikes.
13. See Internal Memo, DPKO, quoted in Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica. Record of a War Crime* (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 150.
14. See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to UNSC Resolution 947 (1994), S/1995/222, 22 March 1995.
15. See Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished. A US–UN Saga* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 233–234.
16. Letter dated 9 June 1995 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1995/470, 9 June 1995, Annex, para. (g).
17. See William Durch and James Schear, "Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," in William Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 193–274; Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, "Former Yugoslavia," in Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (eds.), *United Nations Interventionism. 1991–2004* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 65–107; Kofi Annan, *The fall of Srebrenica*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution A/RES/53/35, 15 November 1999.
18. "Looking Back at the Siege of Sarajevo—20 Years After," Briefing Notes (Geneva: UNHCR, 3 April 2012).
19. "Looking Back at the Siege."
20. See Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs* 18, no. 4 (July/August 1999), 36–44.
21. See "UN Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines," DPKO/DFS (New York: United Nations, 2008), 50–51.
22. See Mats Berdal, "Bosnia," in David Malone (ed.), *The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 451–466; and Lise Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 45–47.
23. The Force Commander had recommended a deployment of 34,000 troops to secure the safe areas yet the Security Council authorized 7,600 and the member states eventually deployed approximately 5,000; see Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), UN Security Council Document S/1994/300, 16 March 1993.

24. See UN Secretary-General, Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, UN Security Council Document S/1995/1, 25 January 1995, paras. 33–46.
25. Annan, *The Fall of Srebrenica*, paras. 297–317.
26. Annan, *The Fall of Srebrenica*, para. 505.
27. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping," A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992.
28. Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, UN Security Council Document S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
29. "UN Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines."