

CHAPTER 29

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR—CROATIA)

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INTRODUCTION

THE United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia was created in February 1992 following the end of a six-month internal conflict opposing the newly created state of Croatia to the Serb minority. In accordance with the November 1991 Vance plan, UNPROFOR was conceived as an interim arrangement to “create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis”;¹ it deployed in the spring of 1992 in the so-called UN protected areas (UNPAs) of Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and the Krajina that were de facto taken away from Croatian sovereignty as a result of the war. UNPROFOR was mandated to ensure that the UNPAs would remain demilitarized; it also performed human rights and police monitoring and tried to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. As of the summer of 1992, UNPROFOR in Croatia operated alongside UNPROFOR in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina (see chapter 30), and then also UNPROFOR in Macedonia (chapter 41) at the end of 1992.

In 1995, these three operations were reformatted and UNPROFOR in Croatia was transformed into the UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), which became part of the UN Peace Forces. The UNCRO was reduced in size but its mandate was not substantially modified. In any case, the relapse into conflict in May and then August 1995 with the Croatian offensives against Western Slavonia and the Krajina respectively prevented the new operation from producing any significant result.

Overall, UNPROFOR's mandate was assessed negatively. Blue Helmets played an observation role and contributed to the negotiation of ceasefires, yet they remained rather passive throughout their presence and in the end failed to prevent the 1995 Croatian attacks on the Serb-held territories and human right violations that followed. At the end of 1995, together with the Croatian offensives the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement consolidated Croatia as a state, at the expense of the Serbian population and its claims over the contested territories. The United Nations remained though in Eastern Slavonia (see chapter 43 on the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium—UNTAES) until 1998 and in the Prevlaka Peninsula (see chapter 44 on the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka—UNMOP) until 2002.

The United Nations provided the main institutional response to the conflicts that took place between June 1991 and December 1995 in former Yugoslavia.² The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was established in 1945 as a federation composed of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. While six nationalities were recognized by the Constitution, these national groups did not fully match the corresponding republics, and ethnic diversity was important in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Macedonia.³ The Serb minority in Croatia, for instance, constituted 12 percent of the population.

With the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia's political and territorial integrity—already under stress following Marshal Tito's death in 1980—became increasingly volatile. At the core of instability was a combination of growing aspirations for independence—expressed in particular in Slovenia and Croatia—and strong nationalist narratives, notably on the part of Serbian leaders, who dominated the federal institutions and opposed the centrifugal forces. The position of Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic was of particular importance in the development of the nationalist discourse and the political instrumentalization of Yugoslavia's ethnic diversity.⁴

In 1990, Slovenia and Croatia held elections that reinforced the respective secessionist inclinations. Slovenia organized a referendum on independence in December 1990 and declared its secession from Yugoslavia and its own independence on 25 June 1991. The situation was slightly different in Croatia where the Serb minority feared the consequences of an independent Croatia for its own rights and declared the autonomy of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in September 1990. In late 1990, clashes between Croats and Serbs took place around the city of Knin in the Krajina. In an increasingly tense context, Croatia held a referendum on independence in May 1991, and subsequently proclaimed its independence the same day as Slovenia.

Yet, both the Federation and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) rejected the declarations of independence. Two armed conflicts followed. In Slovenia, the conflict led to clashes between the Slovenian forces and the JNA for less than two weeks, and ended

with the European Community-mediated Brioni Agreement, signed on 7 July 1991. The war that unfolded in Croatia was more protracted and violent. Military confrontation between the nascent Croatian forces on the one hand, the Croat Serbs and the JNA on the other hand, was particularly violent in the ethnically mixed areas, with massive international humanitarian law violations and expulsions of Croats from the Serb-held territories. Most notably, Croats of the cities of Osijek and Vukovar in Eastern Slavonia, under siege by the JNA and Serb paramilitary forces throughout the second half of 1991, were among the first victims of “ethnic cleansing,” understood as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.”⁵ The Croatian war was temporarily brought to an end in January 1992 with the signing of a UN-mediated ceasefire. This froze the situation on the ground, endorsed the de facto occupation of the contested areas by the Serbs, and allowed for the creation and deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

MANDATE AND KEY FACTS

Operation Mandate: UNPROFOR in Croatia was established by UNSC Resolution 743, 21 February 1992 that referred to the November 1991 “Vance plan.”⁶

UNSC Resolution 743, 21 February 1992 (Vance plan, para. 7) mandated UNPROFOR to

- ensure that the three UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia (Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and Krajina) remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack;
- ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality or abusing anyone’s human rights;
- assist the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations in the return of all displaced persons who so desire to their homes in the UNPAs.

UNSC Resolution 762, 30 June 1992, further mandated UNPROFOR to

- monitor the reintroduction of Croatian government authority in areas controlled by Serb forces and with substantial Serb populations (so-called “pink zones” which are contiguous to but lying outside the UNPAs);
and authorized
- the strengthening of the Force by the addition of up to sixty military observers and one hundred and twenty civilian police.

UNSC Resolution 769, 7 August 1992 mandated UNPROFOR to

- control Croatian borders with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Protected Areas and “pink zones.”

UNSC Resolution 779, 7 October 1992 mandated UNPROFOR to

- supervise the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula near the city of Dubrovnik.

Duration: February 1992–March 1995

Strength: initial authorized deployment: 14,389 personnel⁷

Actual deployment as of 19 May 1992: 9,709 personnel⁸

Actual deployment as of 15 March 1994: 14,594 personnel⁹

Personnel: (more than 100) as of 19 May 1992:¹⁰ France (2,055), Canada (1,135), Russia (905), Poland (899), Argentina (884), Denmark (884), Jordan (860), Belgium (513), Czechoslovakia (500), Netherlands (324), Finland (300), Norway (163), Sweden (106).

Finance: from January 1992 to March 1996 (including UNPROFOR in Croatia, UNCRO, UNPROFOR in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR in Macedonia and UNPREDEP): US\$4,617 million.¹¹

UNCRO

UNSC Resolution 981, 31 March 1995

UNPROFOR was split into three separate operations: UNPROFOR in Croatia became the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO). UNCRO's size was reduced significantly. Its mandate remained largely unchanged but became de facto obsolete after the May and August 1995 Croatian offensives in Western Slavonia and the Krajina.

Duration: April 1995–December 1995

Strength: 8,750 personnel¹²

Actual deployment as of 31 October 1995: 7,245 personnel¹³

Main contributors (more than 100) as of 31 October 1995: Russia (933), France (718), Belgium (704), Czech Republic (630), Slovak Republic (590), Poland (498), Germany (475), Canada (435), United States (361), Indonesia (255), Ukraine (253), Jordan (233), Nepal (164), Norway (150), Denmark (147), Netherlands (132), Sweden (121).

Finance: see above.

COURSE OF THE OPERATION

The idea of a UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia was discussed within the UN almost as soon as the organization was seized by the Yugoslav issue in September 1991.¹⁴ This came as a natural follow-up to the Western European Union's failure to deploy an effective operation in Croatia. The operation contemplated by the United Nations required the existence of a ceasefire and the consent of the parties to its deployment. Both were obtained

in Geneva on 23 November 1991, when the President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman, the President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic, and the representative of SFRY, General Veljko Kadijevic formalized their consent to the deployment of a UN force and signed a ceasefire agreement under the aegis of Cyrus Vance, Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Yugoslavia, and Lord Carrington, President of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia. The Croatian Serbs followed suit and accepted the ceasefire on 2 January 1992, opening the door for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation, formally created by UNSC Resolution 743 adopted on 21 February 1992.

The mandate of UNPROFOR was outlined in the so-called Vance plan.¹⁵ According to this plan, the UN mission was to be “an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis [which] would not prejudice the outcome of such negotiations.”¹⁶

UNPROFOR deployed in three UNPAs in Eastern Slavonia (Sector East), Western Slavonia (Sector West), and the Krajina (Sectors North and South). The UNPAs were areas where the Serbs constituted the majority and that had become de facto removed from Croatian authority as a result of the war. UNPROFOR was mandated inter alia to ensure that the UNPAs “remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack,” to ensure that no discrimination or human rights abuses were perpetrated by the local police and to assist the UN humanitarian agencies in the return of all displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs.¹⁷

In contrast to the majority of post-Cold War UN operations, UNPROFOR in Croatia was similar to traditional peacekeeping missions, in the sense that it was a Chapter VI operation aimed at supervising a ceasefire, thus “freezing a situation on the ground” while a diplomatic process was supposed to address the problem at the political level.

Placed under the military command of an Indian officer, General Satish Nambiar, UNPROFOR started its deployment in March 1992 for an initial period of twelve months. It was composed of approximately 14,000 troops from 27 countries. The twelve infantry battalions were lightly equipped and authorized to use force in self-defense only, in accordance with the traditional peacekeeping principles. The UNPROFOR Headquarters had initially been established in Sarajevo, before it was moved to Belgrade when the war started in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but was later moved again to Zagreb.

Soon after its deployment in the three protected areas, the UN force extended its mandate to the so-called “pink zones”; these were Serb-dominated areas controlled by the JNA and contiguous to the UNPAs (see UNSC Resolution 762, 30 June 1992). Sixty military observers and 120 civilian police officers were deployed in the “pink zones” to monitor the withdrawal of the JNA. In October 1992, Resolution 779 further extended the UNPROFOR mandate to include the supervision of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula near the city of Dubrovnik.

UNPROFOR was challenged by both parties from the beginning of its presence. On 22 January 1993 (i.e. less than a year after the deployment of the Force), the Croatian army launched an attack in the Krajina (Sector South of the UNPROFOR deployment) and in the neighboring “pink zones” in violation of the ceasefire agreement and the provisions of the Vance plan. According to the Croatian government, the attack

had become inevitable due to the slow implementation of some of the provisions of the Vance plan. In response, the Serbs seized weapons that were placed under UNPROFOR control. The UN Security Council condemned the Croatian attacks and "demand[ed] that the heavy weapons seized from the UNPROFOR-controlled storage areas be returned immediately."¹⁸ In the end, the two parties accepted a deal brokered by representatives of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) by which the Croats withdrew from the occupied areas and the Serbs returned the seized weapons.¹⁹ Subsequently, the ceasefire was regularly violated by both sides and little progress was achieved on the diplomatic front. However, on 29 March 1994 a new ceasefire agreement was signed by the government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the UNPAs. The initial partial implementation of the agreement gave hope that diplomatic and economic negotiations between the two parties would be relaunched, but this did not happen. Incidents in the UNPAs again raised the tension and UNPROFOR's ability to implement its mandate was increasingly disrupted.²⁰ In the meantime, public statements by Croatian leaders on the possibility of reintegrating the UNPAs by force in case negotiations failed fueled Serb anxiety and weakened the diplomatic process.

The first three months of 1995 saw renewed tensions between the parties that led to an escalation of military activities and breaches of the ceasefire. This resulted from the Croatian government's announcement (12 January 1995) that it would withdraw its consent to the deployment of UNPROFOR once the mandate expired (at the end of March 1995). The Serbs responded by declaring a state of "immediate war alert." In parallel, both sides redeployed their forces in anticipation of UNPROFOR's possible withdrawal. After intense US diplomatic pressure, Croatian President Tudjman eventually accepted a reduced force with a new mandate. On 31 March 1995, UNPROFOR was therefore split into three separate operations: UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) in Croatia, UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia. The three operations were then called UN Peace Forces.²¹ The UNCRO mandate was amended to include the supervision of the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994, facilitating the implementation of the Economic agreement of 2 December 1994 and implementing other elements of the existing UN plan that were accepted by all parties.²²

However, the new operation did not produce a more stable environment. On 1 May 1995, the Croatian army launched an offensive (Operation Flash) in Western Slavonia (Sector West of the UNPAs) in violation of the 29 March 1994 ceasefire. The operation was completed by 4 May and resulted in the Croatian takeover of the territory from the Serbs, without any reaction from UNCRO, which was denied access to the area of the operation by the Croatian army. Most of the Serb population fled Western Slavonia as a result of the operation amidst reports of human rights violations committed by the Croatian army.²³ From 4 to 8 August 1995, a similar operation (Operation Storm) was conducted in the Krajina (Sectors North and South of the UNPAs), where the Croatian army moved in conjunction with a Bosnian army offensive run from Bosnia. The military takeover of Krajina led to a massive exodus of Serbs.²⁴ Numerous crimes were committed by the Croatian military forces and the Special Police against the Serb population.²⁵ UN peacekeepers were also used as human shields by the Croatian army,

resulting in the death of four blue helmets. These two offensives effectively put an end to the mandate of UNCRO, which only remained in Eastern Slavonia and in the Prevlaka Peninsula before it was transformed in early 1996 into UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia, see chapter 43) and UNMOP (Prevlaka, see chapter 44) respectively.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

Measured against the mandate outlined in the UN Security Council resolutions and the Vance plan, the degree of success of UNPROFOR/UNCRO in Croatia was not positive in the sense that many of the mandate's provisions were not implemented and the operation eventually became obsolete as a result of military offensives. Despite this overall poor assessment, UNPROFOR did have a limited stabilizing effect in some respects.

UNPROFOR's stabilizing effect

To its credit, the UN force brought some stability to the three UNPAs for a period of three years, thereby creating space for a parallel political process. Throughout its deployment, the operation monitored the implementation of, and to an extent strengthened compliance with, the various ceasefire agreements. In doing so it created and sustained an environment conducive to the peace talks held under the auspices of the ICFY, and to the signature of the various ceasefire and economic agreements. Had the political process been successful, the assessment of the UN Force would be far more positive. In the same vein, UNPROFOR acted as a mediator whenever tensions arose between the two parties. When the Croatian army launched an attack in the Krajina in January 1993, leading the Serbs to seize heavy weapons stored in the UNPAs, UN-led mediation facilitated an agreement between the two parties by which they would revert to the positions *ante*. Similarly, the UN was instrumental in the negotiation of the 29 March 1994 ceasefire. Partial withdrawal of the JNA from the UNPAs was also made possible, due to the presence of UNPROFOR.

Second, UNPROFOR presumably played a role in preventing the resumption of fighting. Ceasefires were often violated by both sides, yet the assumption was that a withdrawal of UNPROFOR would almost certainly lead to an even more violent confrontation. For instance, there was little doubt that combat would start again if UNPROFOR had withdrawn at the end of March 1995, and its continued presence through UNCRO was seen by some as the only alternative to "the resumption of war."²⁶ Similar observations were made in relation to the Prevlaka peninsula that was demilitarized under UNPROFOR supervision and where UN Secretary-General's reports had on several occasions warned against UNPROFOR's withdrawal "before a final political settlement" that "would increase the risk of renewed hostilities in the area."²⁷

Third, UNPROFOR provided an external presence that may have prevented human rights violations. In July 1992, the UN Secretary-General claimed that "UNPROFOR ha[d] been able, as a result of intense patrolling and control at checkpoints, to put a stop to mass expulsions."²⁸ Whether this was indeed the result of UNPROFOR's actions or the fact that most non-Serbs had already fled was difficult to assess.²⁹ Also, if mass expulsions did stop, ethnic cleansing continued relatively unchecked throughout the years of the UN presence. Nevertheless, after three years, the UN claimed that UNPROFOR "played a major role in protecting the rights of minorities in the protected areas and the Croat population there has been relatively stable since the ceasefire agreement."³⁰ In any case, UN troops acted as witnesses that could not be ignored by actors in a quest for international legitimacy, and were able to report on human rights violations. UNPROFOR also provided assistance to the UNHCR efforts in dealing with the refugees coming from neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Krajina, and was involved in the transport and delivery of humanitarian aid in the UNPAs.

UNPROFOR's passive posture

This being said, these modest achievements cannot distract from the huge difficulties that UNPROFOR faced throughout its mandate. First, the operation initially appeared as a way to freeze the situation to the benefit of the Serbs and their war gains. The Vance plan clearly stated that the peacekeeping presence was not to pre-judge the outcome of negotiations but was rather supposed to create the space for political progress. However, in reality, UNPROFOR reinforced the stalemate on the ground. This increased frustration on the Croatian side that often complained about the slow progress of the political process. It eventually led President Tudjman to reject a further extension of UNPROFOR's mandate (beyond 31 March 1995) on the basis that "although it had played an important role in stopping violence and major conflicts in Croatia, it was an indisputable fact that the present character of the UNPROFOR mission [did] not provide conditions necessary for establishing lasting peace and order in Croatia."³¹

Second, several key aspects of the Vance plan and subsequent UNSC resolutions were not implemented. For instance, while the operation was mandated to "supervise the demilitarization of the 'protected areas'" as well as the demobilization of armed groups, and to ensure, in collaboration with UN humanitarian agencies, the return of refugees and displaced persons to the "protected areas," these aspects of the mandate were hardly implemented. Most notably, Croats who had fled the UNPAs during the 1991 fighting were never able to return, and demilitarization of the UNPAs was at best partial, with elements of the JNA that were integrated in the Serb militias, in violation of the Vance plan. Equally problematic was the monitoring of human rights by police observers. In reality the human rights situation in the protected areas remained a constant concern for civilian populations and expulsion of non-Serbs could not be prevented. In his November 1992 report, the UN Secretary-General mentioned daily reports of "murder,

the burning and demolition of houses, the destruction of churches, the killing of cattle and other domestic animals, armed robberies and assaults, all of which crimes are usually aimed at members of national minorities."³² In addition, external borders of Croatia remained porous, with movements of Serb militaries from the UNPAs to Serbia or Serb-held territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina largely reported. Overall, UNPROFOR failed to facilitate any kind of trust between the two parties, prompting the Croatian side to believe that UNPROFOR's presence would not contribute to a satisfactory solution.

Third, UNPROFOR was confronted with a continuous lack of cooperation from the parties, together with weak support from the operation's main stakeholders. The status of forces agreement (SOFA) was never signed by the Croatian government; both parties restricted UNPROFOR's freedom of movement and exploited the UN's ambivalence and posture to their own advantages. The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali acknowledged the difficulties encountered in implementing UNPROFOR's mandate, and on several occasions considered the withdrawal of the Force. In early 1995 he stated that "before each renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate," he "faced the choice of either recommending the withdrawal of the Force or recommending a continuation of the Force on the ground that its presence was essential to prevent renewal of large-scale hostilities."³³ Weak cooperation of the parties was further complicated by a faltering commitment of the Security Council and the main UNPROFOR troop contributors. States such as France and the United Kingdom were strongly involved both within the Security Council and as troop contributors on the ground, yet their commitment remained risk averse and was reflected by UNPROFOR's low-key consent-based mandate. Such a posture did little to deter the parties, but rather encouraged them to take advantage of the UN Force.

The role of the United States was also important. Washington altered the situation on the ground to the benefit of one party through the involvement of the private military company Military Professional Resources Inc., which equipped and trained the Croatian armed forces as of 1994.³⁴ But this became another impediment to the implementation of UNPROFOR's mandate. Furthermore, whether the Americans gave a green light to the Croats' Operation Storm in August 1995 was uncertain.³⁵ Nevertheless, the Clinton administration openly supported the Croatian regime, was fully aware of Tudjman's intention to retake the Serb-held territories, and in the end welcomed the military offensive as "an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement on a fair basis."³⁶

On the UN side, UNCRO's passivity was illustrated by its lack of response to the Croatian military operations of May and August 1995. In both cases, the changes on the ground raised the issue of the operation's role as a conflict prevention mechanism as well as its utility once the territories were back under Croatian rule. The very fact that the peacekeeping force could not prevent the resumption of violence underlined its limited stabilizing effect. Insofar as the peacekeepers were not themselves the target of military actions, they had neither the mandate nor the equipment to oppose the Croatian offensives. However, the relapse into violence after three years of the UN presence was equated with an overall failure of its mission. Not only did the military deployment fail to deter the Croatian offensive and subsequent human rights

violations perpetrated against the Serbs, but the diplomatic efforts produced in parallel in the framework of the implementation of the Vance plan were equally unsuccessful. For the Croats, what was not achieved with UNPROFOR or a broader diplomatic process in three years was to be achieved through the use of force—precisely what the UN had tried to prevent.

CONCLUSION

UNPROFOR in Croatia was not symptomatic of many post-Cold War peacekeeping operations in the sense that it was more about traditional military interposition than multidimensional activities. It was aimed at creating the political space for negotiations by freezing the situation on the ground after violent confrontation. Yet, it illustrated the difficulties that a peacekeeping operation can face in the absence of a successful political process. The operation then became associated with the diplomatic failure and paid the price by being confronted with the relapse into violence. This was especially difficult as the operation lacked a strong political backing of the Security Council and its main troop contributors were unwilling to go beyond the consensual approach.

Similarly, while cooperation of the parties is a basic condition of peacekeeping effectiveness, such cooperation was never observed in the case of UNPROFOR. The UN Force was utilized by both parties to their own benefit, and there was little evidence that either of them genuinely cooperated with the operation in order to achieve a diplomatic solution. If UNPROFOR was accepted reluctantly by the Croats, it eventually gave them time to build up their military forces to then launch counter-offensives, so as to regain control over most of their territory. With hindsight, while the operation may have prevented some human rights violations, the way it ended raises questions about its real added value for the resolution of the Croatian conflict.

These various observations question the appropriateness of the UNPROFOR mandate to the situation in Croatia. In essence, UNPROFOR would probably have increased its chances of effectiveness—particularly in preventing human rights abuses in the UNPAs and deterring the breaches of the ceasefire—with a more robust mandate and reinforced capacities. However, the mission reflected the general attitude of the United Nations and the operation's troop-contributing countries towards the former Yugoslavia's crises (i.e. a consensual policy, excluding any form of coercion). This was partly taken up in the subsequent Brahimi report and its insistence on the fact that "once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence."³⁷

NOTES

1. UNSC S/RES/743, 21 February 1992, para. 5.
2. For a historical background of the Yugoslav wars, see John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a Country*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
3. The Muslims—to designate the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina—acquired the status of “constitutive nation” together with the other five nationalities with the 1974 Constitution.
4. For an account of the 1989–92 period, see Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1995); and Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia. The Third Balkan War*, 3rd edn. (London: Penguin Books, 1996).
5. Interim Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Annex I of Letter dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Security Council Document S/25274, 10 February 1993, para. 55. See also United Nations, Report of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1995/37, 12 January 1995, “Situation of Missing Persons. Republic of Croatia,” paras 27–35.
6. Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), UN Security Council Document S/23280, 11 December 1991, Annex III, para. 7.
7. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 721 (1991), UN Security Council Document S/23592, 15 February 1992, paras 21–25.
8. Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peace-Keeping Operations as of 30 April 1992, accessed at <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml>
9. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), UN Security Council Document S/1994/300, 16 March 1994, 18–19.
10. Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peace-Keeping Operations as of 30 April 1992, accessed at <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml>
11. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 3rd edn. (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996), 748.
12. Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 981 (1995), UN Security Council Document S/1995/320, 18 April 1995, para. 29.
13. Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peace-Keeping Operations as of 31 October 1995, accessed at <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml>
14. See Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 713 (1991), UN Security Council Document S/23169, 25 October 1991.
15. Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), UN Security Council Document S/23280, 11 December 1991, Annex III.
16. UNSC Resolution 743, 21 February 1992, para. 5.
17. Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), UN Security Council Document S/23280, 11 December 1991, para. 12.
18. UNSC Resolution 802, 25 January 1993.
19. See “Former Yugoslavia—UNPROFOR. Background,” Department of Public Information, United Nations, September 1996, UN website, accessed at <www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm>

20. See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 908 (1994), UN Security Council Document S/1994/1067, 17 September 1994, paras 6–9.
21. See UNSC Resolution 981 (1995), 982 (1995), and 983 (1995), 31 March 1995.
22. See UNSC Resolution 981, 31 March 1995, and Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to UNSC Resolution 947 (1994), UN Security Council Document S/1995/222, para. 72.
23. See Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (“Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia”), Economic and Social Council, United Nations, E/CN.4/1996/6, 5 July 1995.
24. 150,000 according to the UNHCR, see Report of the Secretary-General, UN Security Council Document S/1995/730, 23 August 1995, para. 11.
25. See ICTY, “Prosecutor vs. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak, Mladen Markac,” Judgment, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Volume I and II, 15 April 2011.
26. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of UNSC Resolution 981 (1995), S/1995/320, 18 April 1995, para.34; see also Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to UNSC Resolution 947 (1994), UN Security Council Document S/1995/222, 22 March 1995, paras 60–69.
27. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to UNSC Resolution 947 (1994), UN Security Council Document S/1995/222, 22 March 1995, para. 15.
28. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to UNSC Resolution 762 (1992), UN Security Council Document S/24353, 27 July 1992, para. 14.
29. See Erin D. Mooney, “Presence, Ergo Protection? UNPROFOR, UNHCR and the ICRC in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 7, no. 3 (1995), 413–415.
30. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to UNSC Resolution 947 (1994), UN Security Council Document S/1995/222, 22 March 1995, para. 5.
31. Letter of President Tudjman to the UN Secretary-General, quoted in Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 947 (1994), UN Security Council Document S/1995/38, 14 January 1995, para. 4.
32. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 743 (1992), UN Security Council Document S/24848, 24 November 1992, para. 15.
33. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, UN Security Council Document S/1995/38, 14 January 1995, para. 3.
34. David Shearer, “Private Armies and Military Intervention,” *Adelphi Paper* 316 (London: IISS, 1998), 57–63.
35. See John Ashbrook and Spencer Bakich, “Storming to Partition: Croatia, the United States, and Krajina in the Yugoslav War,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 21, no. 4 (2010), 548–549; “Croats Widen Threat to Rebel Serbs, and Diplomats Seem to Acquiesce,” *The New York Times*, 1 August 1995; and “US Took a Calculated Risk in Not Curbing Croat Attack,” *The New York Times*, 13 August 1995.
36. Statement by US Ambassador Peter Galbraith to the BBC, quoted in Richard Caplan, “Bombing and Negotiating,” in Ben Cohen and George Stamkoski (eds.), *With no Peace to Keep: UN Peacekeeping and the War in the Former Yugoslavia* (London: Gainpress, 1995), 159.
37. Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, UN Security Council Document S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 55.