

CHAPTER 37

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA (UNOMUR) AND UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA I (UNAMIR I)

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INTRODUCTION

THE Rwanda civil war began on 1 October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), comprising some 2,000 troops, invaded northern Rwanda across the border with Uganda. The RPA was the armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), initially a clandestine group, created in Uganda in 1987. The RPF was dedicated to returning home the stateless Rwandan refugees whose numbers by 1990 had reached an estimated 900,000 people living in camps in Uganda, Burundi, Zaire, and Tanzania.¹ The government in Rwanda refused their right of return.

The refugee problem resulted from political turmoil when in 1957 there was a first serious challenge to the then Tutsi oligarchy and a call for the emancipation of the majority Hutu.² The Tutsi minority had dominated the country's political and economic life and a Hutu solidarity movement called for an end to oppression and poverty. In 1959 the Tutsi monarchy was swept away in what was called a "social revolution," encouraged by Belgium, the former colonial power, which had used Catholic priests and a strong military presence to garner support. The resulting political violence culminated in widespread and organized massacres of Tutsi and large numbers

fled the country. On 1 July 1962, the monarchy was formally abolished and an independent state was declared.

The following year an armed group of monarchists twice invaded Rwanda from Burundi failing each time to take any territory.³ A brutal reaction to the invasions followed with hundreds of arrests and violence which was said to mark the end of any further meaningful role for Tutsi in public life. In December 1963 there were state-organized massacres of Tutsi with murders committed by the local population in the most cruel and atrocious manner. The methods of killing were the same as those which would become familiar during the genocide of Tutsi which took place in 1994.⁴

The Rwanda civil war ran from October 1990 until mid-1993. As a result, the Rwanda Government army, with help from France, its staunch ally, rapidly increased in size from 5,000 to 28,000, and was equipped with modern weaponry. The RPA, with continuing help from Uganda, was eventually transformed into a 15,000-strong and disciplined light infantry army which relied on resupply by foot. The RPA soldiers had extraordinary endurance levels and they were indoctrinated to be highly motivated. In August 1993, after a number of ceasefires, a peace agreement was concluded which provided for refugee return and a power-sharing government.

The UN Security Council had first become involved in Rwanda's civil war on 22 June 1993 when its Resolution 846 created the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). This was designed to monitor the supplies going to the RPF across the 150 kilometer border with Uganda. UNOMUR had only eighty-one military observers and lacked equipment for aerial surveillance. The Security Council, hoping to save money, decided that UNOMUR would focus its efforts on main roads. On 4 August a peace agreement was signed between the Rwandan government and the RPF which provided for a neutral international force to monitor a transition to a power-sharing government. The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was duly created on 5 October 1993 with Resolution 872.

On 6 April 1994, however, any chance there had been for a peaceful settlement was destroyed when Rwanda's President Juvenal Habyarimana, who had just conceded power-sharing, was assassinated in a missile attack on his plane. Among those on board was the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira. The civil war resumed and in the next three months of fighting the RPF ousted the government forces. As the fighting intensified a campaign to kill Tutsi civilians took place, together with the elimination of the political opposition. The killing spread throughout the country. It was organized by military and political extremists in the name of a racist ideology known as "Hutu Power" and was intended to eliminate the Tutsi population. These extremists, determined to avoid power-sharing, used state resources to perpetrate the killing. It is estimated that in three months (6 April to 17 July 1994), one million people were killed.⁵ A UN Commission of Experts later concluded that in Rwanda the 1948 Genocide Convention had been "massively violated."⁶ The genocide of the Tutsi is one of the greatest human tragedies since the Second World War.

MANDATE AND KEY FACTS (UNOMUR)

Operation Mandate: UN Security Council Resolution 846 (22 June 1993) authorized the establishment of the UN Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR). Its verification would focus primarily on transit or transport, by road or tracks of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border.

Duration: 16 August 1993–21 September 1994.

Strength: initial authorized 81 military observers

Deployed: 81 military observers

Personnel: Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Hungary, Netherlands, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Zimbabwe.

MANDATE AND KEY FACTS (UNAMIR I)

Operation Mandate: Under UN Security Council Resolution 872 (5 October 1993), UNAMIR I's main tasks were to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali, monitor the ceasefire agreement, including the establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone, and to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate leading to elections.

Duration: 5 October 1993–17 May 1994.

Strength: Authorized peak military strength: 2,548 military personnel, including 2,217 formed troops and 331 military observers.

Deployed: 31 March 1994: UNAMIR I had 2,539 military personnel. Following the outbreak of civil war and genocide on 17 May the Security Council adjusted UNAMIR I's mandate and reduced the mission to 270 military personnel.

Personnel: Belgium, Bangladesh, Ghana.

Finance: US\$197.5 million (including costs related to UNOMUR).

COURSE OF THE OPERATIONS

In February 1993, the question of Rwanda had come to the Security Council when both sides in the civil war had asked the UN to establish the truth of accusations that Uganda was helping the RPF. After considerable reluctance, due to the pressure on UN peacekeeping finances, the Security Council was persuaded that UN military observers could assist in containing the cross-border elements of the civil war. The RPA had close links with Uganda and most of its troops had come from the ranks of Uganda's National Resistance Army (NRA). The Rwandan youth in refugee camps in Uganda had been encouraged to enlist in order to receive military training and experience. In October 1990 hundreds of soldiers from NRA ranks had stolen their Ugandan uniforms and equipment and deserted. The soldiers in the RPA were thought to have had almost unlimited access to hardware from Uganda's NRA including artillery, and a steady stream of ammunition, food, and logistics.

On 22 June 1993 the UN Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda (UNOMUR) was created by the UN Security Council under Resolution 846 with eighty-one military observers mandated to monitor the 150-kilometer border between Uganda and Rwanda. Canadian Lt.-General, Roméo Dallaire, was appointed the commander.

UNOMUR led to UN involvement in peace negotiations taking place between the RPF rebels and the Rwandan government in Arusha, Tanzania. A peace agreement—called the Arusha Peace Accords—was subsequently concluded in August 1993.⁷ It is widely thought that the agreement might never have emerged without international pressure.⁸ Rwanda's civil war had a devastating effect, displacing thousands of people, dividing society and affecting tea and coffee production. Yet Rwanda had become the third-largest importer of weapons in Africa, and an estimated US\$100 million was spent on arms imported from France, South Africa, and Egypt.⁹

The Arusha Accords stipulated political, military, and constitutional reform and a transition period that would lead to national elections for a power-sharing government. A neutral force was to play a major role during the transition. The French military units which had been present in the country since 1990 and had been largely responsible for creating Rwanda's 30,000-strong army would leave. There would also be disarmament and demobilization and refugees would be allowed home. As a first step, a battalion of RPF soldiers would be stationed in Kigali.

In this context, on 5 October 1993 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 872, creating UNAMIR, which was to monitor Rwanda's transition. It was designed as a classic peacekeeping mission—an impartial buffer between two enemies—with four phases, of ninety days each, theoretically leaving UNAMIR to conclude its mission by the end of 1995. The Accords also envisaged a negotiated weapons-secure area in the capital, Kigali. Of central importance was the concept of the security operations that were a part of UNAMIR's role and which entailed the confiscation of illegal weapons. UNAMIR was to operate with the consent of the parties and so was thought not to need a Chapter VII mandate. Yet the seizure of weapons went beyond classic peacekeeping.¹⁰ The Security Council, when considering UNAMIR's mandate, had explicitly rejected the idea of a vigorous disarmament program.

Another fault line built into the mission was that it had been designed to cost as little money as possible. The US had wanted only a symbolic presence of 100 soldiers for Rwanda and insisted that any operation should cost no more than US\$10 million a month.¹¹ The mission for Rwanda was being discussed only two days after the deaths of eighteen US soldiers in Mogadishu on 3–4 October 1993 and Washington was reluctant about any further UN endeavor in another African civil war.

In order to cut costs the US, with the support of Russia and the UK, argued in the Council for a limited role for UNAMIR's peacekeepers. As a consequence the Council agreed to substantially water down the provisions of the Arusha Accords. Under the Accords the neutral force was to have ensured security throughout the country, but the Council decided that the peacekeepers should only "assist in ensuring the security of the city of Kigali." The Accords had also provided that peacekeepers were to confiscate arms—"the tracking of arm caches and neutralization of armed gangs throughout the country"—yet the Council determined that a weapons-secure

area would be limited to Kigali. Similarly, whilst the Arusha Accords had provided a comprehensive mandate calling for the collection of illegal arms, neutralizing armed gangs, and the protection of civilians at risk, the Council reduced the operation to an observer role.

Despite these parameters, there were problems finding troops for UNAMIR. Belgium, the former colonial power, offered 400 of all ranks, spread out in fourteen different locations in or near Kigali. Bangladesh offered 940 personnel, including soldiers, logisticians, military police, and medical staff. Ghana offered 800 soldiers. UNAMIR's force commander was Brigadier-General Roméo A. Dallaire, the Chief Military Observer of UNOMUR. In August 1993, Dallaire led a UN reconnaissance mission to Rwanda and had subsequently asked for a minimum requirement of 4,500 troops. This figure had been pared down by officials in the UN Secretariat even before being submitted to the Security Council. In the end, a total of 2,548 personnel was agreed.

In late 1993 as the mission established its force headquarters in Kigali, it soon became clear that UNAMIR's force structure, in particular the equipment, and the readiness level of the force, bore no relationship to the realities on the ground. General Dallaire lacked the barest essentials, everything from ammunition to sandbags, fuel, and barbed wire.¹² The mission did not have essential personnel; there was no public affairs officer, no legal advisor, and no humanitarian or human rights experts.¹³ Dallaire was reduced to borrowing petty cash from the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).

The military component of UNAMIR was supposed to comprise three infantry battalions, one engineer company, a transportation section with four utility helicopters, one logistics company, one medical platoon, and 331 unarmed military observers, a movement control unit, and a field hospital. There were to be twenty-two armored personnel carriers (APCs) and eight military helicopters to allow for a quick-reaction capability. In reality, no military helicopters arrived and only eight APCs were provided, of which only five were serviceable. They were Czech-made BTR-80s which were worn out from use in the UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique. They did not arrive until early March 1994 (i.e. one month before the beginning of the genocide), without tools, spare parts, mechanics, or manuals and with limited ammunition.

The UNAMIR flag was raised for the first time in Kinihira, a northern hill in Ruhengeri, on 1 November 1993, when the UN mission officially integrated with UNOMUR. Most of Dallaire's time and energy went into trying to sort out a logistics nightmare. He would spend more than 70 percent of his time, and his principal staff's time, battling with the UN's administrative and logistics structure, upon which his mission depended. Dallaire considered it a major achievement that UNAMIR was conducting any operational activities on the ground even six months after the mandate was approved: "Seeing to the most immediate needs stopped us from seeing what was reserved for us in the future" he stated.¹⁴

There were serious delays in the peace process and a failure to establish the transitional government, the cornerstone of the Accords. There was also civil unrest and political violence. How deadly the situation really was became clearer early

in January 1994 when an informer came forward claiming to be from the heart of the "Hutu Power" network—a racist group militating against the peace agreement and refusing the very idea of power-sharing with the RPF. He claimed to be a senior trainer in the *Interahamwe*, a youth wing attached to the then ruling party the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*, and said that this militia, trained in army camps and scattered in groups of forty throughout the city, was to kill people at speed. He supposed that the *Interahamwe* had been created to protect Kigali from the RPF, but he had been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali and was certain that it was for their extermination. He said that there had been plans to trap Belgian UN peacekeepers and to kill them in order to provoke a withdrawal of UN troops from Rwanda. He said there were hundreds of AK47s, in secret stockpiles of weapons, throughout the city.

On hearing the informant's story Dallaire had immediately written a cable to the UN Secretariat to inform the Secretary-General's military advisor, a fellow Canadian, Major General J. Maurice Baril. Dallaire did not rule out that this was a trap and was preparing to test the story by planning a weapons raid on the illegal stockpiles the informant had mentioned. The code cable, dated 11 January 1994, would later become famous in UN history for it was a first and obvious warning that genocide was being prepared—yet the warning was ignored. Dallaire's cable caused the utmost consternation, but not because of the informer's story. What concerned UN officials was the idea of weapons seizures. They feared a repeat of Somalia when, six months earlier, twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers had been killed during a weapons inspection.¹⁵

The next day a meeting was held with Baril, the Assistant Secretary-General and advisor to the Secretary-General, Iqbal Riza, and with Hedi Annabi, the director of the Africa Division in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). It was agreed that on no account was Dallaire to seize weapons as it was clearly outside his mandate.¹⁶ Kofi Annan, head of DPKO, explained later that it had been reasonable to conclude that the Security Council did not want aggressive force used in Rwanda.

The 11 January cable was by no means the only warning of impending disaster.¹⁷ The first three months of 1994 saw increasing civil unrest, violent demonstrations, and murders committed by militia members. The hate radio broadcasts of *Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* demonized Tutsi and included virulent attacks on the peace process and the presence of UNAMIR.

On 5 April 1994, the Security Council met to discuss what to do about its mission in Rwanda.¹⁸ The spiraling costs of peacekeeping were generating pressure from the US, which was liable for one-third of the total cost, to close the mission.¹⁹ In addition, in the US there was a backlash against UN peace operations following the deaths of its soldiers in Somalia in October 1993. The serious delays in the implementation of the Arusha Accords also caused reluctance. France was hoping for a six-month extension but in the end the only basis upon which both the US and the UK would agree to extend UNAMIR's mandate was to give it a short lease of life. Resolution 909 (5 April 1994) stipulated that unless the peace agreement was back on track in the next six weeks then UNAMIR would pull out.

The following evening the President of Rwanda was assassinated. Two missiles were fired at his jet by unknown assailants as it came in to land at Kigali International Airport. UNAMIR went on red alert an hour later. The next morning ten UNAMIR peacekeepers from Belgium sent to protect the Rwandan Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was to make a radio appeal for calm, were brutally murdered by Rwandan army troops. The Prime Minister was also murdered, most of the members of her cabinet, and there followed the targeted assassination of anyone who supported the peace agreement. On 9 April a government of hardliners was sworn into office. It seemed to all intents and purposes that a coup had taken place. The civil war resumed and within hours of the President's assassination the slaughter of Tutsi and moderate Hutus began.

A first detailed assessment of the situation was sent to New York by Dallaire on 8 April. He described a campaign of terror which was well planned and organized. Roadblocks had been constructed to prevent escape. Yet in the first weeks of the crisis the Security Council concentrated on three issues: the possibility of a ceasefire, an emergency withdrawal of expatriates from Rwanda, and the future of UNAMIR.²⁰ Those that had advocated a tough line on compliance with Arusha a few weeks earlier—the US and the UK—were now inclined to carry out their threat to withdraw the force.

On 9 April, troops from Belgium, France, and Italy flew to Kigali, with specific orders to rescue expatriates but no Rwandans. The withdrawal plans needed the help of Dallaire and the UNAMIR forces. Dallaire was instructed from New York that only when rescuing expatriates was he to take any risks.²¹ In a matter of four days, almost all the expatriates had left.²² A total of 3,900 people of twenty-two nationalities were safely transported out of the country.

The mission was now in desperate trouble. Dallaire had discovered that some of the peacekeepers were no longer taking his orders and parts of the Bangladeshi contingent were deserting.²³ The Belgian troops were taking orders from Brussels. Under its mandate UNAMIR was not authorized to intervene actively to halt hostilities nor was it explicitly permitted to defend civilians at risk. Force was only to be used for self-defense. The killing was spreading through the country: men, women, and children were shot, blown up by rockets or grenades, hacked to death by machete, or buried, or burned alive. Many were attacked in the churches, clinics, and schools in which they had sought refuge. Tens of thousands of bodies were hurled into the rivers and carried downstream.

On 12 April the government of Belgium announced that it was withdrawing its battalion from UNAMIR, which it justified given the deaths of the peacekeepers; it also lobbied at the UN for the mission to close completely.²⁴ The Security Council now had to decide UNAMIR's future. For all practical purposes UNAMIR's mandate was over.

On 21 April 1994, the Security Council discussed three options: massive reinforcement, complete withdrawal, or a much reduced mission. The decision came in Resolution 912 to reduce UNAMIR to 270 personnel, a decision later called one of the most ignominious in the Council's history. The mandate was adjusted to allow UNAMIR to act as an intermediary between the parties to try to secure an agreement to a ceasefire and it was to assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent

feasible and monitor developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR.

By the end of April the death toll was estimated at 200,000 and a few weeks later this had reached an estimated half a million.²⁵ The word genocide was now being used to describe the killing. On 29 April 1994, Oxfam issued a press release that genocide was taking place and in the first weeks of May many human rights groups concluded the same. The Western press was becoming critical of the decision to reduce UNAMIR troops.²⁶ By early May UNAMIR strength stood at 444 in Rwanda, with 179 military observers in Nairobi pending repatriation or redeployment to the mission.

On 17 May 1994, the Security Council in Resolution 918 imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. It also expanded UNAMIR's mandate to enable it to contribute to the security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk, including the establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas, and the provision of security for relief operations to the extent that these were possible. It authorized the expansion of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops, and requested the Secretary-General to redeploy immediately, as a first phase. The new mission would be known as UNAMIR II (see chapter 38).

CONCLUSION

The failure to prevent, and subsequently to stop the genocide was a failure by the UN system as a whole. The problems of UNAMIR, including lack of essential equipment and resupply, were never properly addressed at UN headquarters. The Security Council had even questioned the very feasibility of an effective UN response. The Council also failed to resupply the tiny garrison of UN peacekeepers and military observers who stayed on when the bulk of the troops were withdrawn. Yet throughout the genocide and civil war the measures to protect and defend civilians that were put in place by General Dallaire on a daily basis demonstrate how a relatively modest force could have had a significant deterrent effect. Dallaire was told to plan a total withdrawal but he had argued that this was out of the question. Furthermore, the residual force comprised mostly of Ghanaians, plus forty Tunisians and the President of Ghana, Jerry John Rawlings, fully supported the decision, despite the fact that other troop contributors decided to withdraw.²⁷

After Rwanda's genocide there was a series of inquiries and commissions to determine lessons learned from the UN's role during 1993-94.²⁸ One classified report prepared by the Belgian military had concluded that peacekeeping had been completely inappropriate for Rwanda. A UN inquiry was established in March 1999, and it was critical of the Security Council and particularly the US government which was preoccupied with minimizing costs.²⁹

The UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, should have done more to argue for reinforcements but there was constant tension between the Security Council and Secretary-General about the appropriate level of Council involvement in decision-making. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), which had played a

central role in the negotiations in Arusha, launched its own report in July 2000. Its title, *Rwanda, the Preventable Genocide*, reflected the main conclusion—that the genocide could have been entirely prevented and, once allowed to start, could have been significantly reduced. All that had been required was a reasonably sized international military force with a strong mandate to enforce the peace agreement; nothing of the kind had ever been authorized by the Security Council either before or during the genocide.

Officials in the UN Secretariat did not escape criticism either. The President of the Security Council in April 1994, Ambassador Colin Keating, the representative of New Zealand, said that the Rwandan experience had proven that the UN needed to drastically improve the quality of the information it provided to the Security Council. The situation in Rwanda had been much more complex and dangerous than was ever presented by officials to the members of the Council.³⁰ There was a gulf between what Dallaire was reporting in his meticulous accounts of the violence and the information Secretariat officials told the Council.³¹ The non-permanent members, in ignorance, had been completely won over by the Arusha process and were convinced by the joint Rwandan government–RPF delegation that came to New York would abide by the peace agreement. The British ambassador to the UN, David Hannay, claimed later that Rwanda had been “landed on the UN’s doorstep without adequate preparation or consideration.”³²

When UNAMIR was in the field there had been 71,543 peacekeepers in seventeen different trouble spots around the globe, with 300 officials coping with logistics for them; there was no genuine peacekeeping headquarters, there were too few planning staff, no timely intelligence, and no adequate command-and-control operations room. There were institutional weaknesses, no infrastructure for emergency operations, and no contingency planning. The situation in Rwanda had needed military and technical advisors to sit together to discuss the options. Large-scale field operations needed advance planning, clear mandates, trained peacekeepers, assured financing, and effective and integrated UN command and logistical support. A deliberately weakened UNAMIR and a feeble UN effort had proved to the Hutu Power faction that it had nothing to fear from the outside world. A force capable of dealing with the growing violence and eventual genocide had been required.

NOTES

1. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) cited in Gérard Prunier, “The Rwandan Patriotic Front,” in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 121.
2. For a better understanding of the divisions in Rwandan society, see Jan Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda. The Nyiginya Kingdom* (Oxford: James Currey, 2004).
3. Aaron Segal, “Massacre in Rwanda,” *Fabian Society* (April 1964).
4. See René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (London: Pall Mall, 1970), 72.
5. The counting of the dead was not systematic. A death toll of up to one million people is agreed by Philippe Gaillard, who was the Chief Delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). His figure is based on information gathered by the ICRC as the

- genocide unfolded. The up to one million figure was agreed by Charles Petrie, the vice coordinator of the UN Rwandan Emergency Office, who said on 24 August 1994 that he did not think that the million figure was an exaggeration. See Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed, rev. edn., 2009), 248.
6. *Final report of the Commission of Experts established in accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (S/1994/1405, 9 December 1994).*
 7. Bruce D. Jones, "The Arusha Peace Process," in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (eds.), *The Path of a Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1999), 141.
 8. There was involvement of delegations from five African states: Burundi, Zaire, Senegal, Uganda, and Tanzania. The negotiations were organized by the OAU with leadership provided by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania, whose government acted as facilitator. Four Western countries had observer status: France, Belgium, Germany, and the US. The talks were monitored by Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and the European Union from local embassies.
 9. *The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in Arming Rwanda* (Human Rights Watch Arms Project 6(1), January 1994).
 10. Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide. The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 70.
 11. Steven A. Dimoff, "Congress's Budget-cutting Fervor Threatens US Standing at UN," *Independent*, 19 (United Nations Association of the US, Autumn 1993), 5.
 12. Dallaire was ranked Brigadier General in Rwanda and was promoted to Lt.-General in 1998.
 13. Roméo A. Dallaire, "End of Innocence: Rwanda, 1994," in Jonathan Moore (ed.), *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 73.
 14. Jacques Castonguay, *Les Casques Bleus au Rwanda* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998), 141.
 15. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 93.
 16. *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, 26.
 17. Barnett, *Eyewitness*, 86.
 18. Barnett, *Eyewitness*, 95.
 19. In 1990 peacekeeping expenditures totaled US\$464 million. By 1994 they had risen to US\$3.342 million. See Michael Renner, "Peacekeeping Expenditures 1947–2001," *Global Policy Forum* at <[www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/pko\\$.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/pko$.htm)>.
 20. Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 170–174.
 21. UN Security Council, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, 15 December 1999, 16.
 22. *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience* (Copenhagen: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), ch. 2, 36.
 23. *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide*, 36.
 24. Barnett, *Eyewitness*, 104.
 25. Marijke Verpoorten, "The Death Toll of the Rwandan Genocide: A Detailed Analysis for Gikongoro Province," *Population* 60 (English edn.), no. 4 (2005), 331–367.
 26. Editorial, "It is not Too Late for Rwanda," *The Observer*, 1 May 1994.

27. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996* (New York: The UN Blue Book series, vol. 10, UN Department of Public Information, 1996), 62–65.
28. See Madeleine K. Albright, William S. Cohen (co-chairs), *Preventing Genocide. A Blueprint for US Policymakers* (Washington DC: the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the American Academy of Diplomacy, and the United States Institute of Peace, 2008); Scott R. Feill, *Preventing Genocide. How the Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, pre-publication draft, December 1997); Joint Evaluation, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide*; Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue. Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda* (Paris: Développement Centre of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1996); *Report of the Independent Inquiry*; and Organization of African Unity, *Rwanda. The Preventable Genocide, Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events* (July 2000), at <www.africa-union.org/official_documents/reports/report_rowanda_genocide.pdf>.
29. *Report of the Independent Inquiry*.
30. “The Security Council role in the Rwanda crisis,” statement by Ambassador Colin Keating, Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the UN, at Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons Learned from UNAMIR, 12 June 1996.
31. Barnett, *Eyewitness*, 108.
32. David Hannay, *New World Disorder. The UN after the Cold War—An Insider’s View* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008), 45.

CHAPTER 38

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA II (UNAMIR II)

LINDA MELVERN

INTRODUCTION

THE second United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR II) was created on 17 May 1994 by UN Security Council Resolution 918, eight weeks after the civil war and genocide of the Tutsi had started.¹ There were pleas to the Council from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for action, among them an unprecedented call to the Security Council from the International Committee of the Red Cross, urging the Council to react to the “terrifying mechanism” of the killing as whole families were being exterminated in the most atrocious circumstances. The only peacekeepers were in Kigali, a garrison of 450 personnel, the majority of them troops from Ghana, who had stayed when the bulk of the UNAMIR I had been withdrawn on 21 April 1994 (see chapter 37).

In response to growing concern in the international press about the huge numbers of civilian deaths in Rwanda, Resolution 918 authorized an increase in the force level for UNAMIR to 5,500 troops and a revised mandate to allow for the establishment, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas. Although welcomed as rescue for Rwanda, in reality the resolution provided no such thing. The United States had insisted that deployment was conditional, and had to await a further report from the UN Secretary-General about the possible cooperation of the parties to the conflict. As a consequence, it was not until October 1994 that UNAMIR II reached its fully authorized strength of 5,500, four months after the genocide and civil war had ended.

For the next eighteen months UNAMIR II tried to address the humanitarian catastrophe which followed the war and genocide, and in July 1994 the mission began to transform from a peacekeeping into a peacebuilding mission: troops helped to establish law and order, transport prisoners and refugees, and facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid. In November 1994, under Security Council Resolution 965, UNAMIR II was mandated to provide security

for staff of the newly created International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), including full-time protection of the prosecutor's office and forensic investigators who were to compile evidence against perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide.

MANDATE AND KEY FACTS

Operation Mandate: UN Security Council Resolution 918 (19 May 1994) authorized the expansion and strengthening of UNAMIR, which became known as UNAMIR II. The mandate was amended from that of a neutral mediator in civil war to recognizing a need for an increase in force level to try to bring to an end the massacres of civilians and to protect humanitarian aid.

In November 1994, Resolution 965 authorized UNAMIR II to provide security for staff of the newly created International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

On 9 June 1995, Resolution 997 authorized a reduction of the force to 2,330 within three months and to 1,800 in four months and adjusted its mandate to support the provision of humanitarian aid, help with engineering and logistics, and provide medical care and de-mining.

Duration: 17 May 1994–April 1996

Strength: authorized 5,500 troops

Actual: October 1994: 5,500 troops

Personnel: Ghana, Ethiopia, India, Canada (communications specialists), UK (engineers and medical), Australia (medical team), Senegal, Congo, Mali, Togo.

Finance: US\$256.4 million.

COURSE OF THE OPERATION

Under the terms of Resolution 918, UNAMIR II was intended to be a force of 5,500 troops including infantry battalions with the credibility, armament, and high mobility to deter hostilities.² The resolution invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter placing an embargo on the delivery of arms, ammunition, and related material to Rwanda. At the time there were 444 UN troops in UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali, Rwanda's capital, more than the 270 peacekeepers that had been required under Resolution 912 (21 April 1994).

A proposed first step under Resolution 918 was to send 150 unarmed military observers to Rwanda. In discussions in the Security Council the United States and the United Kingdom also wanted a ceasefire brokered before the troops were sent. Troops were offered for UNAMIR II almost immediately after Resolution 918 was passed: the government of Ghana offered to dispatch several hundred troops in order to fulfill Phase one of the mandate which was intended to provide security to the major concentrations of people who were in constant danger. But the Ghanaian forces did not possess the required equipment, particularly the armored personnel carriers (APCs) which would ensure

mobility and their own protection. The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations sent urgent requests to all member states with spare military capacity for either equipment or air transport but no immediate or useful offers were forthcoming. As a matter of record, the equipment offered to UNAMIR II as the genocide progressed were: fifty trucks from the UK; a promise from Italy of one C-130 aircraft plus crew, and six water trucks; a signals squadron plus aircraft from Canada; from the US, fifty APCs, leasehold; and from Japan, US\$3 million towards the cost of equipment.³

The initial offer of troops from Ghana was followed by other African countries: Ethiopia offered an 800-strong battalion and Malawi promised an infantry company. Offers also came from Senegal, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Congo, Mali, Malawi, and Tunisia. But all these countries had wanted equipment for their troops with the costs underwritten by the UN. Given the state of the UN finances, help for Rwanda obviously depended on Western states.

Furthermore, there was no agreement in place about what the reinforcements would do once they arrived in Rwanda. Throughout May the United States argued against a plan, devised by the UNAMIR II Force Commander, Lt.-General Dallaire, which entailed airlifting a brigade to Kigali.⁴ The US had wanted instead a series of safe havens to be created on Rwanda's borders with Tanzania and Zaire. These would require fewer soldiers and be cheaper to create. Dallaire believed that the US plan would not work: the people would be killed before they reached the borders—and those who had escaped to the borders were not necessarily those most at risk.⁵

The civil war between the Rwanda Patriotic Front's army (the RPA) and the Rwandan government troops had cut the country in two: there was no effective humanitarian assistance in the zone controlled by the Rwandan government forces and systematic humanitarian assistance in the RPF zone was subject to strict controls. A humanitarian crisis of enormous and historic proportions with an estimated 1.5 million displaced people facing starvation and disease now existed.⁶ At the beginning of May, in the fastest exodus the world had seen, a quarter of a million Rwandans crossed into Tanzania in twenty-four hours. Whole communities were on the move, not fleeing genocide, but the advancing troops of the RPA. In each of these communities there were gangs of Hutu Power militia and other genocide perpetrators including local government administrators. At first, the Tanzanian officials had disarmed them and huge piles of machetes were to be seen at border posts.

On 8 June 1994 in Resolution 925, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNAMIR II, scheduled to expire on 29 July 1994, until 9 December 1994. The resolution urged member states to support the rapid deployment of additional forces. Ten days later, on 18 June, the French government announced its intention to send a humanitarian mission to Rwanda and sought authorization from the Security Council. The French hoped to maintain an international presence in Rwanda pending the arrival of an expanded UNAMIR II. The Security Council endorsed the French plan on 22 June (Resolution 929). The troops would not be wearing blue berets but the mission was to be coordinated by the UN Secretary-General and last no longer than sixty days. It was hoped that by then a reinforced UNAMIR II, the mission that the Council had voted for on 17 May, would

be operational. The UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had argued that the French were acting out of "bitter frustration with the US obstruction."⁷ France obtained a Chapter VII mandate to allow for the use of force, needed to protect French soldiers and to arrest those responsible for the killings. It was called Operation Turquoise and was mandated to secure humanitarian areas, and protect displaced people and relief workers.

Not everyone believed Operation Turquoise was a purely humanitarian exercise.⁸ The French military had trained and supplied the Rwandan government army and France had been Rwanda's staunchest ally. The Council vote for Resolution 929 saw five abstentions: Brazil, China, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Pakistan. The New Zealand ambassador, Colin Keating, urged member states to provide resources for UNAMIR II.⁹ This view was shared by Lt.-General Dallaire who believed the French mission would reduce the chances of any other country donating troops or equipment to UNAMIR II.¹⁰ The US was in favor of the French mission: Ambassador Madeleine Albright argued that the Council should be flexible enough to accept imperfect solutions and this was a way to bridge the gap until the 5,500 troops authorized for UNAMIR II had arrived.¹¹

Dallaire travelled to Goma, Zaire, on the western front to meet Brigadier General Jean-Claude Lafourcade, the commander of the French operation. Dallaire had been asked to be the link between the French and the RPF. Lafourcade had 2,500 elite troops, under the *Commandement des Opérations Spéciales* (COS).¹² There were communications vehicles, antennae, satellite dishes, and landlines. Operation Turquoise had both the equipment and the Chapter VII mandate which UNAMIR II lacked. However, although possessing armored cars, the French lacked the trucks which would be needed to transport the fleeing victims to safety. The Tutsi who were any distance from this French-created zone would be slaughtered.¹³

The French secured their zone in the south-west, their military keeping forward bases at the major towns of Gikongoro and Kibuye. This effectively stopped the advance of the RPA and the zone provided sanctuary for the militia and genocidal government. By the time the winning RPF proclaimed a new government on 19 July, an estimated 1.2 million had fled to the French zone. There were no arrests. The immediate concern for UNAMIR II when the French troops arrived was the safety of ninety unarmed military observers from French-speaking Franco-African countries—from the Congo, Senegal, and Togo. Considered by the RPA to be French stooges, and beaten and abused, they had to be withdrawn. They had been the liaison between the UNAMIR II command and the Rwandan government army and had played a crucial role in the protection of civilians trapped in Kigali. They had come under constant threat from Hutu Power militia, and were particularly important in the protection of the Hôtel des Mille Collines. They left Kigali on 21 June 1994.¹⁴

The UNAMIR II headquarters was changing. The first reinforcements had arrived in what would be a slow build-up of UNAMIR II forces. A Canadian signals regiment arrived on 26 July along with a Ghanaian company. The deputy force commander, Brigadier General Henry Anyidoho, from Ghana, had organized an overland route from Nairobi to Kampala by air and ten hours by road to Kigali.¹⁵ It was Anyidoho who led the first convoy of fifty Ghanaian troops, made possible only when the World Food Programme provided

heavy-lift trucks. "We were no longer alone," Dallaire wrote later on. "We had lived to see the cavalry."¹⁶ The RPA established military control over most of the country. The guns fell silent in Kigali on 4 July. A unilateral ceasefire was declared by the RPF on 18 July.

Only gradually did UNAMIR II build its force. By mid-July 1994 troops from Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, and Zambia, with a contingent of observers from European and African countries, had arrived in Kigali. But the 5,500 mandated troops had not materialized and in August, two and a half months after the expansion of the mandate, UNAMIR still had fewer than 500 troops on the ground.

The exodus north to Goma, in Zaire, had begun on 14 July a few days before the RPF's declaration of a ceasefire. This exodus was later recorded as the largest and fastest flight of people ever recorded when an estimated 1.5 million people had crossed the frontier and huge camps had been created near the border.¹⁷ "We have lost the military battle but the war is by no means over because we have the people behind us," announced a member of the now exiled interim government which had overseen the genocide.¹⁸ The Rwandan army crossed too—some 20,000 troops transporting artillery, mortars, anti-aircraft guns. Sixty percent of Rwanda's population was now either dead or displaced.¹⁹

A principal post-war task for UNAMIR II was replacing the French military in their humanitarian protection zone, some 20 percent of Rwandan territory. The French were leaving behind huge camps where an estimated 350,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were living in some squalor; the largest at Kibeho and N'Dago with populations of 60,000 and 40,000 people respectively.²⁰ There were reports that Hutu Power militia organizing in the camps were infiltrating rural communes at night and killing Tutsi; they returned to the camps before daybreak.²¹ The French zone was being systematically looted and Radio Télévision des Milles Collines continued from there to broadcast vitriolic propaganda. There were risks for UNAMIR II from the local population for they considered the French military their allies. There were fears of another massive exodus, this time in the south-west and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) prepared to receive a million people in Zaire. Lt.-General Dallaire sent French-speaking military observers to the zone, their visits coupled with food distribution.²² UNAMIR II went in as scheduled on 22 August, and the mission was a success.²³ By the end of September 1994 Rwandan territory was under the control of the new government.

In September 1994 the credibility of UNAMIR II was challenged when a senior UNHCR official claimed to possess information proving that the RPA had engaged in a systematic and pre-planned operation to kill Hutu in the south near the borders with Tanzania and Burundi. The official, Robert Gersony, said the killings were unrelated to random acts of revenge by the RPA and he believed an estimated 30,000 people had been killed.²⁴ The story was quickly picked up by the Western media, which was a propaganda coup for the extremist Hutu, and it damaged efforts to persuade refugees to return home, but the information ran counter to intelligence from UN military observers and peacekeepers. The notion of a systematic pre-ordained campaign of killing by the RPA was rejected by a senior UN official.²⁵ Rwanda's new government had been installed on 18 July, and the RPA commander, Paul Kagame, became

vice-president. Whilst admitting that revenge killings occurred, the government claimed that Hutu extremists were operating from camps in Tanzania, and that people had been killed because they were returnees—the killing intended to deter refugee return.²⁶

The return and resettlement of refugees and IDPs was considered essential to Rwanda's long-term stability. By October 1994, UNHCR estimated that there were about 1.5 million Rwandese refugees in neighboring countries, including 850,000 in North Kivu, 300,000 in South Kivu (Zaire) and 460,000 in Tanzania.²⁷ At least 50,000 refugees had died of diseases, particularly from the cholera epidemic that had spread throughout the camps in Zaire.²⁸ The large-scale repatriations from Zaire that had occurred immediately after the ceasefire in July had begun to level off. The camp populations were now controlled by the perpetrators of genocide including the Hutu Power militia. A vigorous propaganda campaign was under way against a return home. The leaders toured the camps making political speeches conveying messages with disinformation and threats. There were reports of arms shipments to Goma and rumors of an armed invasion of Rwanda. UNAMIR II military observers were assigned to the prefectures bordering Zaire.²⁹

The Rwandan government was keen to close the southern camps, created in the south-west during the French intervention and now home to an estimated 350,000 people.³⁰ Like the camps in Zaire, there were militia and armed units of the defeated army and the government feared the camps were being used to create a new anti-RPA militia. In the first months of 1995 the Rwandan government and UNAMIR II discussed how best to empty the southern camps without violence. On 29 December 1994 a joint operation was launched called Operation Retour combining UN agencies, troops from UNAMIR II, Rwandan ministries, and NGOs. They were to gradually reduce the food supplies to the camps and people who chose to remain behind would be investigated as perpetrators of genocide. The returnees would be escorted home by the RPA and UNAMIR. Along the routes there would be food stations manned by NGOs. Operation Retour was initially successful and an estimated 150,000 people returned to their communes.³¹ A radio station, established by UNAMIR II, was created in January 1995 to try to counter the propaganda from Hutu Power warning refugees not to go home. The UNAMIR radio began broadcasting on 16 February, four hours a day, seven days a week in French, English, and Kinyarwanda. During the first half of 1995, UNAMIR logistic resources were made available throughout the country to help in the restoration of essential services and facilities, including the reconstruction of bridges, the repair of roads, and water supply schemes.³²

Between February and May 1995 the security situation deteriorated with armed infiltrators from the camps in Zaire. The RPA tightened internal security and as a result its working relationship with UNAMIR II was damaged. The RPA denied UNAMIR II access to parts of the country and searched and seized UNAMIR vehicles. The bi-monthly meetings between the RPA and UNAMIR were suspended. The UNAMIR II presence was said to be eroding Rwanda's sovereignty.³³ There were anti-UN demonstrations in the streets.

The largest camp in the south-west was Kibeho, with an estimated 60,000 people.³⁴ At the end of February, the Integrated Operations Centre, established to coordinate Operation Retour, had information that the camp, with almost half of the remaining IDPs, was being transformed into a criminal sanctuary and possibly used for the recruitment and training of Hutu Power militia as insurgents.³⁵ The Rwandan government wanted forcible closure of all the IDP camps; if there was a voluntary system it would only result in the extremists being left in control. It was eventually decided that the UN agencies and humanitarian groups whose food aid sustained the camps would gradually withdraw and it was hoped that this gradual method might lead to a mass return. Those who stayed behind would be investigated as perpetrators of genocide. The operation was to start on 6 April 1995, but there were delays.

On 18 April 1995, with two battalions, the RPA tried to cordon the Kibeho camp, which sprawled over five hills. As the operation got under way, a sudden breakout saw 20,000 people escape, later on said to have been an extremist group of militia and genocidaires. Little is known about them.³⁶ The RPA prevented food aid and water from reaching the camps. On day two of the crisis, a large crowd of people were either stampeded or panicked and tried to break through the cordon. The RPA allegedly suffered casualties and fired into the crowd. In late afternoon the cordon was breached again and the RPA used rocket-propelled grenades against civilians. The evacuation of the camp deteriorated into a full-scale battle with innocent victims as expendable tools of war. The monitoring of the camps fell within the UNAMIR II mandate and there was a unit of UN peacekeepers present at Kibeho. On the fifth day, 22 April, the RPA fired on massed crowds in a hospital compound using rifles and machine guns.³⁷ There was another attempted break out at 5 p.m. as crowds of people waiting to be processed by the RPA were harassed by Hutu militia.

An estimated 2,000 people were killed in five days at Kibeho.³⁸ A Zambian captain in UNAMIR II personally counted 1,500 dead bodies and a later investigation by a US official agreed this figure.³⁹ The Rwanda government announced that some 300 people had lost their lives. For UNAMIR II, Kibeho was a low point. A single contingent of fewer than 100 Zambian peacekeepers had stood by as the killing took place, ordered not to intervene by officials in the UN Headquarters in New York. The force was criticized for failing to ensure a sufficient presence in the camps prior to or during the crisis. UNAMIR officers and human rights field officers could have played a more substantial monitoring role in the camps. An Australian medical team, a part of UNAMIR II, witnessed the killing in the UN compound and claimed a much higher death toll.⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch determined that the Kibeho killing was a deliberately planned murder by the RPA of innocent people.⁴¹

There was an international outcry and in response an Independent International Commission of Inquiry was created by the Rwandan government requesting that the US, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, the Organization of African Unity, and UNAMIR take part. The report, published on 17 May 1995, found no evidence of a deliberate plan to kill by the RPA.⁴² Killing by militia in the camps was confirmed given the corpses with machete wounds; the RPA was guilty of the mass shooting of civilians. The RPA was criticized for not taking steps to prevent the killings and was seen to be at fault

for its lack of communications, its inexperience, and its inappropriate training for what was basically a police operation.

The Kibeho massacre further damaged the relationship between UNAMIR and the Rwandan government. In the first six months of 1995, UNAMIR II maintained its authorized strength of 5,500 together with 320 military observers but on 4 June 1995 the Secretary-General announced to the Security Council that the government of Rwanda was questioning the role and the force strength of the mission.⁴³ The government was calling for a more limited mandate, proposing a maximum force level of 1,800 troops. On 9 June 1995, in Resolution 997 the Council extended UNAMIR's mandate until 8 December 1995. It authorized a reduction of the force to 2,330 within three months and to 1,800 in four months. It was given an adjusted mandate providing for the troops to support the provision of humanitarian aid, help in engineering and logistics, and provide medical care and de-mining.

In December 1995 the Rwandan government decided to close 38 of the 90 NGOs operating in Rwanda and it requested that UNAMIR II cease operations, arguing the mission no longer responded to Rwanda's needs.⁴⁴ The government said that the presence of UNAMIR II had provided no inducement for the return of the refugees who should judge for themselves the security conditions in Rwanda, as that would reflect the reality of where they would be living.⁴⁵ The government found unanimous opposition: The UN Secretary-General, the UN agencies and all members of the Security Council argued that UNAMIR II was vital if only to help maintain humanitarian aid deliveries. The UN presence in Rwanda could only encourage refugee return. A compromise was reached. On 12 December 1995 the Council passed Resolution 1029 which extended UNAMIR II's mandate for one final time. The UNAMIR II civilian police (CIVPOL) component was to close immediately. CIVPOL, with 120 police observers, was training a new integrated Rwandan police force, a training program which had been the first cooperative venture between UNAMIR II and the Rwandan government. CIVPOL was monitoring the increasingly difficult situation in Rwanda's grossly overcrowded prisons and providing monitoring and investigatory assistance to human rights officers and the military and civilian components of UNAMIR. CIVPOL had teams of three to four observers in each of the Rwanda's eleven prefectures working in close cooperation with local authorities.

In Resolution 1029, the UNAMIR II mission was required to cease all operations on 8 March 1996. Until then the force level was to be reduced to 1,200 troops, 200 military observers, and support staff. The UNAMIR II Force Commander, Canadian General Guy Tousignant, who had taken command of UNAMIR II in August 1994, left the mission on 15 December 1995 and Brigadier-General Siva Kumar of India was designated Acting Force Commander. By January 1996 CIVPOL was gone, its personnel repatriated. A further reduction in force levels came on 16 January 1995 when the government of Canada decided unilaterally to withdraw its personnel and with the departure of this key component, the acting Force Commander restricted the remaining troops to a garrison in Kigali with an Indian battalion of Gurkhas as the largest component. Troops from

Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi, and Mali were pulled back and sent home. Two logistics bases remained, each with forty personnel, present at Nyundo in the north and in Cyangugu in the south-west, to facilitate the repatriation of refugees. In 1995 the voluntary return of refugees saw around 5,000 people a month come home. By January 1996 the Rwandan government increased this figure to more than 14,000 returnees a month.⁴⁶

On 9 March 1996, the Security Council passed Resolution 1050 which ended UNAMIR.⁴⁷ It contained a one-line tribute to the force. A small group of Ghanaian troops remained in Rwanda to protect ICTR staff and the resolution encouraged the Secretary-General to maintain a UN office in Rwanda for the purpose of supporting the efforts of the government to promote national reconciliation, strengthen the judicial system, facilitate a return of refugees, and rehabilitate the country's infrastructure.

The UNAMIR flag was lowered for the last time at the Amahoro Stadium headquarters in Kigali on 19 April 1996 when the withdrawal of UNAMIR II from Rwanda was completed.

CONCLUSION

The greatest challenge which UNAMIR II had faced, and its most obvious failing, was to stop the genocide. Despite the efforts of troops on the ground, they were unable to protect those targeted by the Hutu Power forces. UNAMIR had lacked political, financial, and material support. If the 5,500 troops mandated for UNAMIR in Resolution 918 (17 May 1994) had been speedily and effectively deployed, then tens of thousands of people may have been saved and the extremists deterred from further killing. But there was reluctance by the US, the UK, and France and they undermined all attempts to strengthen UNAMIR II. In late May 1994 the Secretary-General had suggested a voluntary fund of US\$50-80 million, enough money to launch UNAMIR II. But not one of the UN's economically powerful states came forward to subscribe.

UNAMIR II certainly had some successes. After the genocide and civil war, its accomplishments were said to have been substantial in the medical, communications, and transport sectors. UNAMIR II supported the work of agencies carrying out direct relief activities and buttressed and reinforced traditional humanitarian groups. In August 1995 the UN force had quickly established a presence after the French military left the south-west zone and had provided invaluable support for humanitarian relief. The part played by UNAMIR II in August 1995 was also commended when in a joint operation with the RPA they had seen the safe and rapid return home of 14,000 Rwandans who had been suddenly expelled from camps in Zaire by the Zairian army. In a well-managed operation, the UN agencies and NGOs had established well-stocked transit camps: the screening for extremists by Rwandan soldiers had taken place in the presence of UNAMIR II military observers.⁴⁸

A major drawback, however, was the Security Council's determination—in spite of failing to act in the face of genocide—to keep UNAMIR II as cheap as possible: its budget was limited to US\$115 million for six months, slightly under US\$20 million a month. This was the same rate as UNAMIR I, which had cost US\$10 million per month for a force half the size.⁴⁹ A lack of political will is therefore the principal reason why the story of UNAMIR is largely one of failure.

NOTES

1. The final approval for establishing UNAMIR II came in the form of an implementing resolution on 8 June 1994 in UN Security Council resolution 925.
2. The name UNAMIR II was used in *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda* (S/1994/546, 13 May 1994).
3. Written Answers, UK House of Commons, Hansard, 21 July 1994, 473.
4. Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed, revised edition, 2009), 221.
5. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 222.
6. *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993–1996* (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996), 45.
7. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished. A US–UN Saga* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 140.
8. Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959–1994. History of a Genocide* (London: Hurst 1998), 35.
9. New Zealand Mission to the UN, New York, Fax, Subject: Security Council: Rwanda, 17 May 1994, see Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 220.
10. Lt-Gen. Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House, 2003), 425.
11. United Nations, S/PV.3392, 22 June 1994.
12. J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The politics of genocide: peacekeeping and Rwanda," in William J. Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
13. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 293.
14. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 236.
15. Aidan Hartley, *The Zanzibar Chest. A Memoir of Love and War* (London: HarperCollins, 2003), 375.
16. Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 458.
17. Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue. Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda* (OECD, 1996), 63.
18. Abbas H. Gnamo, "The Role of the Interahamwe in the Regional Conflict," in Howard Adelman and Govind C. Rao (eds.), *War and Peace in Zaire/Congo: Analyzing and Evaluating Intervention, 1996–1997* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004), 95.
19. *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda* (Copenhagen: DANIDA, March 1996), Study 3, 43.
20. UN Commission on Human Rights, *Report of the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. René Deqni-Séqui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994* (E/CN.4/1995/12, 12 August 1994).

21. Tom Mullarkey, *A Thousand Hills. A Story of Crisis in Rwanda* (Cheshire, UK: Ballintava Books, 2000), 54.
22. Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 473.
23. Shaharyar Khan, *The Shallow Graves of Rwanda* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 73.
24. Alison des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story. Genocide in Rwanda* (London: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 726.
25. Khan, *The Shallow Graves*, 76.
26. Mullarkey, *A Thousand Hills*, 37.
27. *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda* (S/1994/1133, 6 October 1994).
28. S/1994/1133, 6 October 1994.
29. *The Blue Helmets* (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996), 356.
30. Minear and Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue*, 85.
31. Mullarkey, *A Thousand Hills*, 76.
32. *The Blue Helmets*, 363.
33. *The Blue Helmets*, 98.
34. *The International Response to Conflict*, 62.
35. *The International Response to Conflict*, 62.
36. *The International Response to Conflict*, note 139.
37. *The International Response to Conflict*, 63.
38. Médecins Sans Frontières, *Report on Events in Kibeho Camp, April 1995* (16 May 1995).
39. Unclassified cable: US Department of State. American Embassy, Kigali to Secretary of State. Analysis of Kibeho Commission Report, 31 May 2007.
40. Terry Pickard, *Combat Medic: An Australian Eyewitness Account of the Kibeho Massacre* (Australia: Big Sky Publishing, 2008).
41. Philip Verwimp and Els Vanheusden, "The Foreign Policy of Belgium during the Zaire/Congo Crisis," in Adelman and Rao (eds.), *War and Peace in Zaire-Congo*, 342 note 34.
42. *The Independent International Commission of Enquiry into the events at Kibeho, April 1995* (S/1995/411, 23 May 1995).
43. *Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR* (S/1995/457, 4 June 1995).
44. Khan, *The Shallow Graves*, 175.
45. Robert E. Gribbin, *In the Aftermath of Genocide* (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2005), 101.
46. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda* (S/1996/149, 29 February 1996).
47. Gribbin, *In the Aftermath*, 174.
48. Khan, *The Shallow Graves*, 144.
49. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke with Bruce D. Jones, *Early Warning and Conflict Management in Rwanda: Report of Study II of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda* (Copenhagen: DANIDA, 1996), 50.