

CHAPTER 32

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I)

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INTRODUCTION

AUTHORIZED in April 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was part of the post-Cold War optimism that accompanied UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*. It comprised a small team of observers and a force of military personnel to protect them. Their mandate was to help facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and oversee a cease-fire agreement that had been signed by the principal factions in Somalia's civil war. However, continued hostilities in Mogadishu meant that UNOSOM I never fully deployed and was unable to perform these tasks. In a renewed attempt to deliver humanitarian assistance, from December 1992, UNOSOM worked alongside the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), an approximately 40,000-strong multinational force that operated in Somalia for four months. With the withdrawal of the UNITAF, UNOSOM I was replaced by a much larger mission (UNOSOM II) in March 1993 (see chapter 34). Unfortunately, UNOSOM I failed to make any major impact on the situation in and around Mogadishu. The mission therefore stands as a stark warning of the severe limitations of attempting peacekeeping in the absence of a genuine peace to keep and of handing unrealistic mandates to poorly resourced peacekeepers.

MANDATE AND KEY FACTS

Operation Mandate: UN Security Council Resolution 733 (23 January 1992) identified the situation in Somalia as a threat to international peace and security, called for an increase in humanitarian assistance, and authorized an arms embargo “on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia” (para. 5).

UN Security Council Resolution 746 (17 March 1992) authorized the deployment of a technical team to Somalia and the development of a plan “to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance” to the country (para. 7).

UN Security Council Resolution 751 (24 April 1992) authorized the deployment of fifty UN observers to monitor the 3 March ceasefire agreement in Mogadishu as well as a “UN security force” to protect those observers. UNOSOM I was further mandated to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the sea-ports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its immediate environs.

UN Security Council Resolution 775 (28 August 1992) authorized an increase in the size of UNOSOM to 3,500 security personnel and up to 719 military support personnel plus an appropriate civilian component.

Duration: 24 April 1992–5 March 1993

Strength: 3,500 security personnel and 719 military support personnel. Maximum deployed strength 893 troops and 54 observers.

Personnel: Pakistan, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, and Zimbabwe

Fatalities: 6 military personnel

Finance: US\$42.9m net.

COURSE OF THE OPERATION

UNOSOM I's origins lie in the aftermath of Somalia's civil war, which was fought between 1988 and 1991.¹ In January 1991 several Somali armed factions cooperated to drive long-time dictator, General Mohamed Siad Barre, from the capital city, Mogadishu. Barre had taken power in a military coup in October 1969 and ran a highly personalized and corrupt regime which dispensed money, land, and favors to his most loyal supporters, including over fifty members of his family who occupied official positions. Once Barre's forces fled Mogadishu, however, conflict erupted between his principal opponents, most notably the leaders of two factions of the United Somali Congress (USC), General Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi. Chairman of the USC, Aidid thought he should become president. But the USC leadership instead endorsed as

interim president, Ali Mahdi, a wealthy businessman who supported the pro-reform Manifesto Group comprising over one hundred important moderates, intellectuals, community organizers, and merchants. The subsequent fighting between their forces left Somalia without a government and continued to displace many thousands of people from Mogadishu and south-central Somalia.

Despite the ongoing hostilities, the large numbers of displaced people, and the spread of famine and disease across parts of Somalia, it was not until nearly a year after the fall of Siad Barre's regime that the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on the situation.² Throughout 1991 the dominant view at UN headquarters was that the UN's role was best confined to providing humanitarian assistance and staying out of the politics because there was no central government to request UN intervention. By late 1991, however, this started to change. First, James Jonah, the Sierra Leonean UN Under-Secretary-General and senior UN official on Somalia policy, was asked to act by officials from the Organization of Islamic Conference.³ Second, as part of his preparations for assuming the position of UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali tasked Jonah with finding out if the Somali factions would be willing to accept UN mediation.⁴ Later, Boutros-Ghali complained of a Western focus on the "rich man's war" in Yugoslavia while ignoring the plight of the people of Somalia.⁵ Jonah's subsequent discussions in Mogadishu in January 1992 revealed that Ali Mahdi welcomed a political role for the UN while Aidid opposed it. It appears that Aidid was confident he would achieve military victory over Mahdi in the near future and was highly suspicious of the UN's motives, not least because of his personal dislike for Boutros-Ghali who, as Egypt's former foreign minister, Aidid felt was responsible for Cairo's strong support for Siad Barre's regime.⁶ Nevertheless, Jonah convinced both Aidid and Mahdi to participate in UN-supported discussions.

It was in this context that the Security Council adopted its first resolution (733), on Somalia on 23 January 1992. This defined the situation in Somalia as a "threat to international peace and security" (thus invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter). The Council made this determination based on the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis afflicting Somalia's people but also because the conflict "threatened instability in the Horn of Africa region."⁷ Resolution 733 also called for an increase in humanitarian assistance, and authorized an arms embargo "on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia" (para. 5). Shortly thereafter, on 14 February, Mahdi and Aidid agreed in principle to a ceasefire. They eventually signed a ceasefire agreement three weeks later on 3 March. It was this that prompted the UN Security Council to authorize the deployment of a technical team to Somalia and to develop a plan "to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance" to the country.⁸

It was also at this stage that Boutros-Ghali asked former Algerian diplomat Mohammed Sahnoun to assume the task of coordinating the UN's political role in Somalia, first as an unofficial advisor and then as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Sahnoun made a concerted effort at engaging the Somali factions in genuine diplomacy in order to facilitate a political solution to the conflict.⁹ This was a difficult task for several reasons but a significant obstacle was Aidid's distrust

of the UN and his initial opposition to the idea of UN observers arriving in uniform or being armed.

The Security Council's next resolution (751) on Somalia was passed on 24 April 1992. It authorized the deployment of fifty UN observers to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu as well as a "UN security force" to protect those observers. Together these personnel constituted UNOSOM I. They were supposed to monitor the ceasefire and facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. This would help stem the famine conditions which had developed in parts of south-central Somalia as a result of continued fighting between the ousted Barre regime fighters and those of General Aidid. The UNOSOM force was supposed to "be deployed as soon as possible" and comprise 500 troops in addition to the observers.¹⁰ It was reported that the George H. W. Bush administration in the United States had initially opposed the deployment of 500 armed troops as it was concerned at the escalating cost of peacekeeping in an election year.¹¹ The UNOSOM I troops were permitted to use force only in self-defense, to protect UN personnel, and deter attacks on UN convoys of relief supplies within Mogadishu.¹²

In late June, the UN's relationship with Aidid worsened still further. Specifically, Aidid's suspicions about the UN were confirmed when a Russian plane bearing UN markings and chartered by a UN agency, delivered currency and military equipment to Aidid's major rival in the north of Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi. The plane was engaged in unauthorized moonlighting—whereby UN assets were used to engage in smuggling—but the incident was not investigated in a proper manner and the rumors about a partisan UN approach among local Somalis were not adequately rebutted.¹³ Aidid used this as a pretext for opposing UNOSOM's deployment. Accordingly, the UN peacekeepers did not deploy.

With growing anti-UN sentiment from Aidid's side and in the absence of a political settlement, fighting continued. This had the predictable effect of increasing the numbers of displaced people, which in turn exacerbated the risks of food insecurity and disease. By July 1992 approximately 500,000 refugees were scattered across Kenya and Ethiopia in addition to some 300,000 internally displaced, with an estimated 4.5 million people in urgent need of food assistance.¹⁴ The potential for medical catastrophe was further increased by the fact that only fifteen of the seventy hospitals in Somalia in 1988 were functioning and most lacked running water, electricity, and basic equipment.¹⁵

To help assuage this situation, the Security Council endorsed Boutros-Ghali's proposal for an emergency airlift to deliver supplies to the so-called "Triangle of Death" in southern Somalia. The US Operation Provide Relief was duly authorized in Resolution 767 (26 July). This airlift operation brought both supplies and, eventually, the first 500 armed peacekeepers to Somalia in September.¹⁶ The UNOSOM observers completed their deployment between 5 and 23 July 1992, the majority arriving after 15 July when SRSO Sahnoun had managed to persuade Aidid to accept their deployment.

The following month, the Security Council noted that the "proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia," "the magnitude of human suffering," and the subsequent "threat to international peace and security," necessitated an increase in the size of the UNOSOM security force from 500 to 3,500 security personnel and up to 719 military

support personnel plus an appropriate civilian component.¹⁷ This prompted the deployment of the first 500 soldiers from Pakistan in September. As it turned out, UNOSOM never deployed this 3,500-strong force (only a maximum of 893 troops and military support personnel were ever deployed, along with 54 military observers).¹⁸ Politically, however, the major problem was that the Security Council's decision to increase the size of the UNOSOM armed force was taken without consulting—or even informing—SRSG Sahnoun. It also angered Aidid, who suspected Sahnoun of being duplicitous.¹⁹ As a direct consequence, even after the Pakistani battalion arrived in Mogadishu it proved impossible for it to carry out its mandated tasks. These were supposed to involve securing the port and protecting relief convoys as they travelled around Mogadishu's feeding centers. In reality, the UNOSOM troops remained at the airport compound where they came under attack as well as persistent ridicule from local Somali fighters.

For Sahnoun, this was one of a number of incidents which led him to resign as SRSG on 26 October 1992.²⁰ After Sahnoun's departure, Ismat Kittani of Iraq took over as the new SRSG.²¹ Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen of Pakistan remained the force commander.

By late 1992, therefore, the UN Secretary-General was left with no good options. UNOSOM had only partially deployed; his Special Representative had resigned; the Security Council had alienated the leader of the principal armed faction in Mogadishu, General Aidid; and the war continued, exacerbating the already severe humanitarian crisis. In his report to the Security Council in November 1992, the Secretary-General outlined five options: 1) continue with a traditional peacekeeping mission; 2) withdraw UNOSOM; 3) be more assertive and forceful in the capital; 4) launch a UN enforcement mission; or 5) establish a UN-authorized enforcement mission to create a secure environment for humanitarian operations.²² In this period of post-Cold War optimism at the UN, it was widely felt that disengagement from Somalia was not an option, yet it was also clear that the UN was ill-suited to conduct military enforcement tasks.

Hence, although Boutros-Ghali had initially wanted a UN-led enforcement mission, it was soon conceded that this was unrealistic. Instead, the United States offered to lead a coalition of states and proposed that it should extend beyond Mogadishu, although not to northeast Somalia and Somaliland.²³ The US offer was implemented in December 1992 through the establishment of UNITAF. On 3 December, Security Council Resolution 794 acknowledged that "UNOSOM's existing course" was not "an adequate response to the tragedy in Somalia." It therefore authorized a nearly 40,000-strong US-led military intervention, UNITAF, "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia" (para. 10).

UNITAF peaked at 37,000 troops, including approximately 8,000 on ships offshore.²⁴ The United States supplied by far the largest contingent, approximately 28,000 marines and infantry. They were joined by some 9,000 troops from roughly two dozen other countries. Several elite units were provided, including the French Foreign Legion, Belgian paratroop commandos and Italian paratroopers. Full UNITAF deployment was completed by 28 December, a month ahead of schedule. UNOSOM I worked

in tandem with UNITAF for four months. It did so through a small UNOSOM liaison staff which was attached to UNITAF field headquarters but remained outside of the US chain of command.

UNITAF's operational plan was focused on delivering humanitarian relief supplies. To that end, it divided southern Somalia into eight humanitarian relief sectors across the famine belt with the aim of establishing food distribution centers in each sector. The plan was to eliminate looting, hoarding, and the use of food as a weapon, thereby weakening the power of the warlords.

Unfortunately, the UN Secretariat and United States disagreed over UNITAF's strategic objective. For Boutros-Ghali, the purpose of UNITAF was to "feed the starving, protect the defenceless and *prepare the way for political, economic and social reconstruction* [emphasis added]."²⁵ To that end, Boutros-Ghali thought it crucial that UNITAF neutralize the heavy weapons of the armed factions and disarm irregular forces before the UN could assume control. The United States, in contrast, did not see disarmament as part of the mission and accused the UN of being slow to take over the operation. The US position was encapsulated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell's view that disarmament was "not possible in a country where everyone has a weapon and, while it might be successful for a while, would only serve to make money for arms dealers in neighboring states."²⁶ A cloud of uncertainty thus hung over UNITAF's strategic objectives. Nevertheless, after a series of conferences and diplomatic meetings in early 1993, some fourteen Somali political movements agreed on a ceasefire and pledged to hand over all weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM. In that context, on 26 March 1993, Security Council Resolution 814 authorized the establishment of a much larger UNOSOM II to take over from UNITAF (see chapter 34).

ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

Given the absence of an effective political agreement and the persistence of fighting in Mogadishu it is difficult to attribute any major achievements to UNOSOM I. The best hope for a breakthrough lay with the efforts of SRSO Mohammed Sahnoun but he was increasingly marginalized and overruled, leading to his resignation in October 1992. As a result, UNOSOM I largely failed to achieve any of its mandated tasks.

The explanation for this failure lies with UNOSOM's strategic and operational limitations. Strategically, UNOSOM I was designed as a small observation mission but was deployed into an environment where there was no peace to monitor and where the UN was deeply distrusted by the most powerful armed faction on the ground. In that sense, it was not tied to an effective strategy for resolving conflict between the local parties. This has led the UN's critics to argue that it missed a number of early opportunities to forge such a strategy.²⁷ Later in the mission, UNITAF's deployment raised the question of whether it was a good idea to mix Chapter VI peacekeeping with Chapter VII peace enforcement. According to the UN's own lessons learned study on UNOSOM, "There is

wide agreement that it was a mistake in Somalia for a Chapter VII operation (UNITAF) to co-exist with a Chapter VI operation (UNOSOM I).²⁸

In operational terms, UNOSOM was limited in several key respects. Most notably, it failed to deploy on time or in full. Second, it suffered from poor planning, being established after only one short visit to Somalia by a small technical team which failed to consult widely with relevant experts (academics and NGOs) outside the UN system.²⁹ Not surprisingly, given its partial deployment, the capacity “to gather, analyse and feed information to the responsible security, political or humanitarian officials ... was non-existent in UNOSOM I.”³⁰ On a more positive note, even UNOSOM I’s minimal presence helped prepare the ground for the arrival of the two larger missions, UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

CONCLUSION

The problems faced by UNOSOM I represent a clear warning about the limitations of what traditional peacekeeping and observation can achieve in a country at war with itself. In Somalia’s case, the UN arrived late in the day, alienated the principal armed faction in Mogadishu, and failed to invest sufficient time and effort in conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms. Its deployment was hence hobbled by suspicious local parties, which in turn led potential troop-contributing countries to question the wisdom of participating. When UNOSOM observers and some troops did eventually deploy, their impact on the ground was minimal as they lacked freedom of movement and came under attack. The conclusion drawn by the UN in late 1992 that UNOSOM I was not the appropriate response to Somalia’s crisis was correct but it came too late and opened up another set of challenges related to the wisdom of mixing enforcement operations with more traditional forms of peacekeeping and observation. Arguments over the strategic purpose of the US-led UNITAF and its relationship to UN peacekeepers also ensured that there was a troubled transition when UNOSOM I was reconfigured into UNOSOM II (see chapter 34).

NOTES

1. For background on the civil war and Somali politics more generally see I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali* (Oxford: James Currey, 4th edn., 2002).
2. For a critical discussion of the UN’s policies towards Somalia see John Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* (London: Haan, 1994).
3. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 18.
4. Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 18.
5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished: A US–UN Saga* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 55.
6. Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?*, 55–56.
7. See Report of the Secretary-General, *The Situation in Somalia* (S/23693, 11 March 1992), para. 12.

8. Security Council Resolution 746, 17 March 1992, para. 7.
9. See Mohammed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1994).
10. See Security Council Resolution 751, para. 4 and Report of the Secretary-General, *The Situation in Somalia* (S/23829, 21 April 1992), para. 29. In Somalia at this time the situation was made more complicated for the UN by the fact that there was no central government with which to negotiate the terms of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), a key component of the legal framework under which UN military operations usually deploy.
11. Paul Lewis, "Reined in by US, UN Limits Mission to Somalia," *New York Times*, 26 April 1992, <www.nytimes.com/1992/04/26/world/reined-in-by-us-un-limits-mission-to-somalia.html>
12. Report of the Secretary-General, *The Situation in Somalia* (S/23829, 21 April 1992), paras. 27–29.
13. Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?*, 50–51 and Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 22.
14. *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia* (S/24343, 22 July 1992), para. 26.
15. Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 23–24.
16. Between August 1992 and February 1993, Operation Provide Relief undertook approximately 2,500 flights delivering more than 28,000 metric tonnes of relief supplies. Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 25.
17. Security Council Resolution 775, 28 August 1992.
18. Report of the Secretary-General, *The Situation in Somalia* (S/24480, 24 August 1992), para. 37.
19. Aidid's appropriate nickname was "one who does not take insults lying down." Lewis, *A Modern History*, 262–263.
20. See Sahnoun, *Somalia*, 37–41.
21. For a critical discussion of Kittani's performance see Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?*, chapter 6.
22. Letter from UN Secretary-General to President of the Security Council, 29 November 1992 (S/24868, 30 November 1992).
23. S/24868, 30 November 1992. For discussions of US motives for launching Operation Restore Hope see Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, chapter 3 and David N. Gibbs, "Realpolitik and humanitarian intervention: The case of Somalia," *International Politics*, 37 (March 2000), 41–55.
24. The best overview of the operation is Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, chapters 4–6.
25. UN press release SG/SM/4874, 8 December 1992.
26. Cited in Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 167.
27. See Sahnoun, *Somalia*, 5–11.
28. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992–March 1995* (UN DPKO, 1996), para. 86.
29. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia*, paras. 17, 27–31.
30. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia*, para. 17.

CHAPTER 34

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II (UNOSOM II)

PAUL D. WILLIAMS

INTRODUCTION

IN March 1993, the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was authorized to take over from the two existing international missions in the country: the approximately 40,000 strong US-led multinational task force (UNITAF), and the small UN monitoring mission, UNOSOM I (see chapter 32). Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNOSOM II was tasked with a wide range of military and political objectives, officially covering the entire territory of Somalia.¹ Its political objectives were commonly referred to as “nation-building” tasks although they were really designed to assist in resurrecting the basic elements of a Somali central government and encourage reconciliation between the conflict parties.

To that end, UNOSOM II was conceived as a robust, multidimensional operation that would be able to use force in response to tactical challenges but which was supposed to deploy into an environment already stabilized by the US-led UNITAF. It was given an authorized strength of approximately 28,000 military and police personnel, making it the largest ever UN peacekeeping operation to date. By the time it assumed control of operations in Somalia in early May 1993, UNOSOM II had deployed just under 20,000 personnel. Unfortunately, because the preceding UNITAF had not forcibly disarmed the Somali factions, UNOSOM’s peacekeepers deployed into a distinctly insecure environment where violence and looting of humanitarian relief was reduced but not stopped. Within five weeks of UNOSOM II’s arrival, dozens of its personnel had been killed and many more wounded. The UN declared that responsibility for these attacks lay with the most powerful Somali faction in Mogadishu: General Mohamed Farah Aidid’s United Somali Congress (USC)/Somali National Alliance (SNA).

Based on the potential capacity of two US military operations that worked alongside UNOSOM (the Quick Reaction Force and Task Force Ranger), the UN Security Council demanded that General Aidid be captured and brought to justice. Battles consequently raged across Mogadishu for the next five months until a decisive fire-fight occurred on 3–4 October between US (and later UN forces) and Aidid's supporters. Now commonly referred to as the "Black Hawk Down" episode (the title of a book by Mark Bowden and a subsequent 2001 Hollywood film), this battle resulted in the deaths of eighteen US soldiers, a Malaysian peacekeeper, and more than 300 Somalis.² It also prompted the gradual withdrawal of both US and UN forces from Somalia and the rescinding of the arrest warrant for General Aidid. In Washington, these events stimulated the production of Presidential Decision Directive 25, which reassessed US participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations.³ In other Western capitals, the battle—and the problems faced by the UN operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see chapter 30)—catalyzed a broader retreat from UN peacekeeping. US forces left Somalia by March 1994 while UNOSOM II officially concluded in March 1995.

In the history of UN peacekeeping operations, UNOSOM II is widely viewed as an unmitigated disaster. In large part, this was because it failed to achieve its mandated objectives, leaving Somalia in 1995 in roughly the same set of political circumstances as it was when UN peacekeepers arrived in 1992. In addition, the mission generated a new peacekeeping lexicon—the warning to other UN operations not to cross "the Mogadishu line" from peacekeeping to war-fighting. UNOSOM II also suffered 154 fatalities as well as major problems stemming from the complexity of its mandate and command and control issues, confusion over the appropriate rules of engagement (RoE), lack of effective intelligence gathering capabilities, and the huge challenges involved in a predominantly military mission being tasked with inherently political goals.

MANDATE AND KEY FACTS

Operation Mandate: UN Security Council Resolution 814 (26 March 1993) mandated UNOSOM II to:

- i) monitor the cessation of hostilities as agreed in the Addis Ababa accord of January 1993;
- ii) prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities;
- iii) maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions;
- iv) seize the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements;
- v) maintain security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- vi) protect the personnel, installations and equipment of the UN, ICRC as well as NGOs and neutralize armed elements that attack, or threaten to attack, such facilities and personnel;

- vii) engage in mine-clearing;
- viii) assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons.

Resolution 814 also encouraged the Secretary-General and his SRSG to assist in “rehabilitating Somalia’s political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation” (preamble). This included assisting the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, the re-establishment of Somali police, and mine clearance.

Following an attack on UN forces on 5 June 1993 which killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers, UN Security Council Resolution 837 (6 June 1993) emphasized “the crucial importance of the ... disarmament of all Somali parties ... and neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II” (para. 3). It therefore authorized the use of “all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks ... to secure ... their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment” (para. 5).

In light of the decision to terminate UNOSOM II by March 1995, UN Security Council Resolution 897 (4 February 1994) authorized a revised mandate for the mission which did not include the forcible disarmament of the Somali factions. Instead, UNOSOM II’s mandate was changed to:

- i) encourage the Somali parties to implement the Addis Ababa agreements;
- ii) protect major ports, airports and essential infrastructure for the provision of humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance;
- iii) continue to provide humanitarian relief throughout the country;
- iv) assist in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system;
- v) help with the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons;
- vi) assist in the ongoing political process with the aim of installing “a democratically elected government;”
- vii) protect UN and NGO personnel, installations and equipment engaged in humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.

Duration: UNOSOM II was authorized on 26 March 1993 but took over from UNITAF forces on 4 May. It completed operations on 31 March 1995.

Strength: 28,000 military and civilian police personnel plus approximately 2,800 international and local civilian staff.

Personnel: The major troop-contributing countries (TCCs) were Belgium, France, Italy, Pakistan, and the United States. Other contributing states were Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Fatalities: 154 personnel (with over 400 wounded).

Finance: US\$1.6 billion net.

COURSE OF THE OPERATION

UNOSOM II's experiences in Somalia can be divided into three phases. The first phase was the troubled transition from UNITAF from late March 1993, when UNOSOM was authorized, until the handover of command in early May. The second phase began after a series of attacks on UN peacekeepers in early June 1993. After these incidents, soldiers from UNOSOM and two sets of US forces launched a hunt for General Aidid which resulted in a considerable increase in violence throughout Mogadishu. The third phase, moving towards UNOSOM's eventual withdrawal, began in early October 1993 after the "Black Hawk Down" battle with Aidid's fighters. This precipitated Washington's decision to withdraw its troops (those within UNOSOM as well as its parallel deployments). This, in turn, led to the withdrawal of the entire UN force by 31 March 1995.

A troubled transition

As in the cases of UNOSOM I and UNITAF forces, the absence of a central government in Somalia complicated UNOSOM II's deployment. Specifically it meant UN peacekeepers were in the unusual position of being under the authority of the UN Secretary-General without being "subject to the agreement of any local faction leaders."⁴ Although UNOSOM II's Turkish Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Çvik Bir, and American Deputy Force Commander, Major-General Thomas Montgomery, arrived in Mogadishu on 8–9 March, it was soon agreed that the handover to UNOSOM II should be delayed until 1 May in order for the UN mission to deploy sufficient personnel and establish its command structures. Unfortunately, the planned transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II did not go smoothly for several reasons.

First, the planned 26,000 troops did not arrive until September.⁵ A related issue was the size of UNOSOM II: while UNITAF had approximately 37,000 troops to cover 40 percent of Somalia's territory, UNOSOM II was given a longer list of ambitious tasks than UNITAF and granted 28,000 military and police personnel to cover the entire country. The UN Secretary-General explained that the theory behind UNOSOM II being able to manage with fewer troops than UNITAF was based on four main assumptions. First, UNITAF had largely managed to end organized fighting with heavy weapons and hence UNOSOM II had only to contain sporadic and localized fighting. Second, intelligence-gathering capabilities developed by UNITAF could provide early warning of violent situations. Third, the re-establishment of a Somali police force should help improve law and order and release UNOSOM troops from guard duties for more demanding tasks. In addition, the United States' Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was available on call to the UNOSOM Force Commander.⁶ Nevertheless, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali warned that reinforcements might be needed, and emphasized the crucial importance of US logistic and other support.⁷ Regrettably, the first three of these

assumptions proved unfounded. Some parts of the country were left without a UN presence. For example, the Canadian and Australian contingents that had been in UNITAF quickly withdrew from UNOSOM without any replacements in their areas of operations in Belet Weyne and Baidoa respectively. UNOSOM also failed to inherit UNITAF's intelligence-gathering capabilities. Nor did it reach its full complement of uniformed personnel until late September 1993.

An additional problem was that the transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II occurred against the backdrop of arguments between the United States and the UN Secretary-General about whether UNITAF troops should forcibly disarm the Somali factions and what constituted "a secure environment" to enable UN peacekeepers to operate effectively. For the UN Secretary-General, disarmament of local armed factions was the central element in defining "a secure environment."⁸ The United States, in contrast, did not see disarmament as part of the mission and accused the UN of being slow to take over the operation. Consequently, UNITAF refused to undertake this task. As a result, when setting out UNOSOM II's mandate, Boutros-Ghali noted that "a secure environment has not yet been established."⁹ UNOSOM II was thus required to create a secure environment (rather than deploy into one) but lacked the necessary capabilities to complete the task.

The issue of forcible disarmament stimulated considerable debate: most notably, was it a wise policy, and did UNITAF and then UNOSOM II have the capabilities necessary to carry it out? The UN Secretary-General was clear from the outset that "[d]isarming the factions and placing their heavy weaponry under international control for eventual destruction or placement at the disposal of the new national army of Somalia is ... the most urgent and pressing task for UNOSOM II."¹⁰ According to one analyst, disarmament of heavy weapons was "an achievable goal at that time that would have laid the ground rules for the subsequent UN operation."¹¹ In contrast, when deploying UNITAF, senior US officials declared that such disarmament was an unrealistic and foolish objective. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, for instance, argued that "[d]isarmament is not possible in a country where everyone has a weapon and, while it might be successful for a while, would only serve to make money for arms dealers in neighbouring states."¹²

In terms of whether UNITAF had the capabilities to carry out such disarmament, several noted analysts concluded that it did. First, UNITAF clearly had the RoE appropriate for dealing with issues of disarmament, including forcible disarmament.¹³ One US general described UNITAF's RoE as the "most liberal" he had seen for a UN-sponsored mission since the Korean war.¹⁴ Put bluntly, the RoE stipulated four basic "noes:" no "technicals;"¹⁵ no banditry; no roadblocks; and no visible weapons.¹⁶ They were accepted, albeit with some modification, by all participating countries in UNOSOM II. Second, UNITAF was widely viewed as having the capacity to disarm the local warlords.¹⁷ Yet despite their significant military capabilities, UNITAF troops were generally unwilling to disarm local factions and suffered several unsuccessful efforts at negotiated, voluntary disarmament.¹⁸ Nevertheless, UNITAF was eventually drawn into limited forms of disarmament.¹⁹ Overall, however, one of the most thorough analyses of the

mission concluded that "US forces fail[ed] to forcibly disarm the warlords when they were militarily able to do so".²⁰

From peacekeeping to war-fighting: the hunt for General Aidid

The catalyst for UNOSOM II moving from a peacekeeping to a war-fighting posture was its attempt to implement the disarmament aspects of its mandate. This was something being contemplated in several UN missions during the early post-Cold War period. UNOSOM's disarmament strategy was premised on the assumption that the Somali factions would abide by the agreement signed on 27 March 1993 whereby "transition sites" would be established and opened up to verification by UNOSOM. In these sites, Somali fighters would receive temporary accommodation while they were disarmed and registered for various support packages which would facilitate the transition to civilian life. Factions that did not comply, however, would have their weapons forcibly confiscated.²¹ In a country as awash with weapons as Somalia in 1993 there was plenty of work to do, but a key issue was which faction should start disarming first? As Aidid's SNA was the most powerful group, other actors were unwilling to embark on the process without seeing it also start to disarm. The UN thus focused initially on Aidid's weapons. Predictably, this did not sit well with Aidid and his supporters.

To deal with the increasingly turbulent conditions, in May, Lt-General Bir, UNOSOM's Force Commander, broadened the mission's RoE giving his troops permission to engage *without provocation* any "armed militia, technicals and crew served weapons" that were considered "a threat."²² However, as the UN's inspection and disarmament strategy was being put into effect, on 5 June 1993 a series of attacks on UNOSOM peacekeepers killed twenty-four and wounded over fifty members of the Pakistani contingent. The peacekeepers had been conducting weapons inspections and carrying out food distribution to local Somalis.

The following day, Security Council Resolution 837 concluded that the attacks were premeditated, criminal, and carried out by "forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA)". It also condemned "the use of radio broadcast, in particular by the USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel". In response, the Security Council emphasized that it would neutralize such radio broadcasting systems, use "all necessary measures" to bring the "persons responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against United Nations forces and personnel ... to account for their actions", and "secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment." Critics of this approach noted that these conclusions were drawn without proper investigation and instead of seeking to marginalize all of the major warlords, the UN targeted Aidid.²³

Despite such criticisms, the Security Council felt it necessary to respond firmly to such criminal acts because of the negative consequences impunity would have for

UNOSOM but also because of the potential repercussions for UN peacekeepers around the world if such attacks went unchallenged. In effect, Resolution 837 meant going to war against Aidid's SNA.²⁴ By 12 June, UNOSOM II was ready to commence tactical operations. In conjunction with the US QRF, UNOSOM began launching attacks on suspected SNA weapons storage sites, enclaves, and Radio Aidid.²⁵ Thus began a major escalation of violence in Mogadishu with SNA supporters increasing their attacks on UN and US patrols and compounds, and US and UN forces trying to capture key SNA leaders. On the streets of Mogadishu UNOSOM and US personnel regularly confronted Somali fighters using the ubiquitous "technical."

On 17 June, the SRSF for Somalia, retired American admiral Jonathan Howe, ordered Aidid's arrest. Washington also offered a bounty of US\$25,000 for information leading to his capture—a sum that enraged some of Aidid's supporters for being paltry! The US and UN attacks on SNA bases continued unabated for several months, some of them causing controversy, most notably in relation to civilian casualties and so-called collateral damage.²⁶ By the end of July, the SNA retaliated by announcing a bounty of their own: US\$10,000 to anyone who could shoot down a US or UN helicopter.

In mid-August, a UN investigation led by American University's professor Tom Farer reiterated the Security Council's initial verdict about the 5 June attacks. Specifically, it blamed Aidid:

Who ... had the opportunity, the means and the motive to perpetrate this crime? A large and complex body of evidence leads ineluctably to the conclusion not simply that General Aidid had the requisite means, motive and opportunity, but that he had that trinity uniquely. ... The claim that General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aidid authorized the 5 June attack on Pakistani forces ... and that the attack was executed by elements of the political faction known as SNA is supported by clear and convincing evidence.²⁷

By this stage, further pressure had been placed on the US in particular to intensify the hunt for Aidid, especially after four US military police were killed by an IED in Mogadishu on 8 August. Shortly afterwards, the US bolstered its military presence in Somalia by deploying (in late August) an elite combat group: Task Force Ranger. Comprised of Delta Force commandos and the 3-75 Ranger Battalion, the task force was commanded by Major General William Garrison who reported to US Central Command not the UN. Its mission was to cripple the SNA by degrading its command infrastructure and capturing Aidid. After some initial successes, including the capture of one of Aidid's key supporters, Osman Atto, on 21 September, it was Task Force Ranger that became embroiled in the infamous Black Hawk Down episode on 3–4 October 1993. Although this raid captured 22 suspected SNA leaders, it cost the lives of 18 US soldiers with 84 wounded, one Malaysian peacekeeper along with 14 other UNOSOM personnel wounded, and more than 300 Somalis, with an additional 700+ wounded.²⁸ In political terms, however, the battle signaled the beginning of the end for the US and UN campaign to capture Aidid, and with it the UNOSOM mission as a whole.

The long withdrawal

In the immediate aftermath of the battle the Clinton Administration initially bolstered the US military presence in Somalia by deploying yet another force, the Joint Task Force Somalia.²⁹ Within a week, however, the White House announced that all US forces would leave Somalia by 31 March 1994. Given that the US contribution of about 4,000 personnel to UNOSOM II provided the backbone of the mission's logistical support, not to mention the political blow to the mission's longevity sent by Washington's decision to depart, UNOSOM II effectively began the long process of winding down its operations in late 1993, roughly eight months after it began.

On 16 November, UN Security Council Resolution 885 effectively rescinded the arrest order on General Aidid and other suspects related to the 5 June attacks not already detained. In December, the contingents from France and Belgium, both major TCCs to UNOSOM, departed Somalia and the QRF mission was handed over to the Malaysian battalion. The other major TCCs from Europe followed suit, albeit more slowly: the Turkish contingent left in February 1994, while the German and Italian forces departed the following month, by which time UNOSOM was down to about 18,000 personnel. The last US forces left Somalia on 25 March 1994 while the final UN personnel left roughly one year later in early March 1995.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

Given the failure of UNOSOM II to achieve most of its mandated tasks, the list of achievements is relatively insignificant in comparison to its failures. Nevertheless, UNOSOM II did facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies within Mogadishu and south-central Somalia. It is also important to note that outside of Mogadishu relations between UNOSOM and the locals were significantly better and UN peacekeepers were able to perform a number of their mandated tasks reasonably effectively. A good example was the Australian contingent's success in stabilizing the town of Baiddoa, previously a notable hotspot in the civil war. But on balance, UNOSOM II's legacy stems overwhelmingly from its inability to facilitate political stability in Mogadishu and the negative lessons learned from the experience of forcible disarmament and waging war on the SNA. Arguably, the most significant limitations were those related to:

- (1) the problematic transition from UNITAF;
- (2) UNOSOM II's unrealistic mandate and the subsequent gap between means and ends;
- (3) the mission's command and control challenges and subsequent issues with coordination; and
- (4) its lack of effective intelligence gathering capabilities.

In respect of the first set of limitations—UNOSOM's troubled transition from UNITAF—the fundamental problem was that UNOSOM II was premised on a series of interconnected assumptions which proved faulty. As a result, UNOSOM II not only deployed into an environment rife with insecurity, but its capabilities (military and civilian) were also significantly smaller than UNITAF's—despite a much broader mandate and a vastly increased area of operations. UNOSOM was also the victim of General Aidid's canny decision to wait out the UNITAF forces and engage militarily instead with the weaker UN mission. As one analyst noted, when US President Bush declared UNITAF would be a short mission, it “signalled clearly to Somali factions that any of them temporarily inconvenienced by the intervention could probably afford to wait it out, and that the USA was not proposing to fix what was broken in Somalia.”³⁰

A second set of limitations was inherent in UNOSOM II's mandate. In essence, this involved the transition from a theory of largely consensual peacekeeping with some forcible disarmament provisions to a war-fighting agenda against the most powerful faction in Mogadishu. This shift scuppered any chance of the UN brokering political reconciliation between the Somali factions and hence making significant progress on the state-building elements of UNOSOM's mandate.³¹ In addition, the UN's own “lessons learned” study on UNOSOM acknowledged that its mandate “was vague, changed frequently during the process and was open to myriad interpretations.”³² For example, there were multiple versions of the RoE cards carried by all military personnel, which contained a number of discrepancies.³³ According to UNOSOM II's operational plan, its personnel could use deadly force: (a) to defend themselves, other UN lives, or persons and areas under their protection against hostile acts or hostile intent; or (b) to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from discharging its duties. However, some contingents devised their own RoE. Germany, for instance, forbade its troops from participating in any enforcement action undertaken by UNOSOM II, or using force to help deliver humanitarian assistance or intervene in confrontations between local gangs or Somali ethnic rivals.³⁴

In substantive terms, several criticisms were frequently leveled against UNOSOM II's mandate. One strand of criticism was that the US idea that there could be a peace enforcement operation (in the form of UNITAF) and then the UN could simply revert back to a traditional peacekeeping role was highly questionable.³⁵ The UN's lessons learned study concluded that operations under Chapter VII (enforcement) and Chapter VI (pacific settlement) of the Charter should not coexist and that peacekeeping forces “should not enter a conflict area if there is no political will among the parties towards reconciliation.”³⁶

A second concern was that UNOSOM's mandate was also unrealistic, especially given the non-consensual operating environment, the mission's authorized personnel strength, and its lack of military enablers and specialized capabilities (particularly helicopters, engineering, and logistics units). Arguably the most unrealistic expectation was that UNOSOM troops could conduct large-scale enforcement actions, initially to

disarm unwilling factions, and later to capture Aidid on his home turf. The UN's lessons learned study of UNOSOM bluntly acknowledged that the organization was "not yet capable of launching a large-scale enforcement action."³⁷ Forcible disarmament is one of the most difficult tasks that peacekeepers can be asked to undertake and it is deeply questionable whether such a mandate was realistic in a society like Somalia where most adult males were armed. In UNOSOM II, this experiment lasted until February 1994 when the policy of forcible disarmament was reversed in UN Security Council Resolution 897. As one analyst summed up the situation, "the UN was called upon to do a range of impossible and confused tasks."³⁸

A third common criticism, particularly in the US, was that the UNOSOM mandate suffered from "mission creep" by being dragged into a wide-ranging state- and nation-building agenda instead of focusing on the provision of humanitarian relief. But this line of criticism is misplaced for two reasons. First, the political aspects of UNOSOM's mandate were a necessary part of addressing the underlying causes of Somalia's problems rather than just its symptoms as in the case of UNITAF. Second, the need to address such state-building issues was explicitly acknowledged by the United States from the start of the Somalia operations, including in Security Council resolutions.³⁹

An additional set of problems that plagued UNOSOM stemmed from the unworkable system of multiple operations and chains of command in the same theatre. Not only did UNOSOM's Force Commander have to ensure coordination among roughly 30 TCCs, but by late 1993 he had to work alongside three distinct parallel forces from the United States, which were not always coordinated amongst themselves: the QRF, Task Force Ranger, and finally, the Joint Task Force Somalia. The QRF was initially required because Washington refused to put its combat troops under the UN banner. When the US agreed to integrate large numbers of its troops into the UN chain of command—principally to provide logistics support to UNOSOM—it did so only with caveats, "none of which were conducive to a unified system of command and control under the Security Council."⁴⁰ When Task Force Ranger arrived in August 1993 to help capture Aidid, it increased the coalition's firepower but it complicated still further the parallel chains of command, not least because it often acted in secret or gave very little advance warning even to the QRF let alone UNOSOM. As Ray Murphy concluded: "It is difficult to describe this set-up as other than a recipe for confusion and ultimate disaster. It constituted the very antithesis of a unified system of command. It was also a dangerous and deceptive system of command in that it created an illusion of UN control."⁴¹ The UN Secretary-General agreed, describing UNOSOM II as a "strange and fragmented mission."⁴² The UN's lessons learned study on UNOSOM concluded that in light of experiences in Somalia, "parallel command structures [in peace operations] should be vigorously discouraged."⁴³

In relation to coordination challenges among its TCCs, the basic problem was that "some contingents that were ostensibly part of UNOSOM were in fact following orders from their respective capitals."⁴⁴ Although this has been a problem in many UN peacekeeping operations, it was particularly significant in the hostile setting of

Mogadishu. Perhaps the most extensive problems were generated by contingents within UNOSOM, such as those from Italy, one of Somalia's former colonial powers, and Saudi Arabia, which ignored directives from the Force Commander and made unilateral deals with Somali factions rather than fully supporting other UNOSOM contingents when they required assistance.⁴⁵ In the Italian case, arguments flared between the contingent commander and the force commander; the Italians favored a less confrontational approach to deal with local militias through negotiation and they linked the high casualties of the Pakistani contingent to the strict enforcement policy of UNOSOM II.⁴⁶ The Italian contingent sought approval from Rome before taking any significant military initiative and, in turn, the Italian government backed their contingent commander's actions.⁴⁷

A fourth important limitation was UNOSOM II's lack of intelligence capabilities, especially once the mission took on more enforcement tasks alongside the US forces. The problem started early when most of the US Central Command intelligence support elements which had assisted UNITAF departed when that mission withdrew. The result was that UNOSOM's intelligence collectors on the streets of Mogadishu dropped from several dozen to only a few.⁴⁸ As the UN's lessons learned report concluded "the capacity to gather, analyse and feed information to the responsible security, political or humanitarian officials ... did not begin to take shape until well into UNOSOM II."⁴⁹ Other limitations included the lack of an "overreaching concept of intelligence management" and guidelines for processing and interrogating detainees within UNOSOM.⁵⁰ UNOSOM II's tasks were difficult under any circumstances but arguably impossible without effective intelligence.

CONCLUSION

Despite the heroism displayed by some of its personnel, UNOSOM II's dismal experiences in Mogadishu stand as a stark warning for other peace operations. Strategically, UNOSOM II proved unable to alter the central conflict dynamics in Mogadishu. Consequently, when it departed Somalia in March 1995 UNOSOM II left behind political circumstances largely unchanged from when it arrived: a country at war with itself and lacking a central government. Politically, UNOSOM II fell victim to disagreements between the United States and the UN Secretariat over what constituted a secure environment for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II forces. UNOSOM II was conceived as a robust peacekeeping mission but it was forced to deploy into a situation where there was no genuine peace to keep. Nor was UNOSOM suited to conduct enforcement tasks, both because of the fragmented nature of its military components and its lack of appropriate capabilities. The parallel presence of distinct US forces only complicated matters without solving the core problems. The addition of a mandate to engage in forcible disarmament of the Somali factions added to the mission's problems. After generating a war with the

SNA, the Security Council ultimately ended this failed experiment after the Black Hawk Down incident.

NOTES

1. There were some arguments between the UN and Somaliland authorities over whether UNOSOM would operate in Somaliland.
2. Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York: Atlantic Press, 1999).
3. *Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (US Presidential Decision Directive 25, 6 May 1994). At <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm>.
4. *Further Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992)* (S/25354, 3 March 1993), para. 97.
5. This planned target was specified by the Secretary-General in *Financing of the United Nations Operation in Somalia* (A/47/916, 31 March 1993), Annex II, para. 1a.
6. The QRF comprised of units of the US 10th Mountain Division (Light). Its mandate was to: provide a military response capability to deal with attacks on, or threats to, UNOSOM, especially those threats that exceeded the capability of UNOSOM II units; support the expansion of UNOSOM's security zone through central and northern Somalia; and provide a reaction force to support contingency operations, especially in Mogadishu and Kismayo.
7. S/25354, paras. 70–78.
8. S/25354, para. 100.
9. S/25354, para. 90. See also para. 58.
10. S/25354, para. 100.
11. Ray Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 61.
12. Cited in Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 167.
13. See Findlay, *The Use of Force*, 172.
14. Maj.-Gen. L. S. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review*, 73 (1993), 32.
15. "Technical" were pick-up trucks and other vehicles kitted out with various armaments. The name originated from the fact that the NGOs who hired these fighters as escorts recorded their hire as "technical expenses." John Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* (London: Haan, 1994), 46–47.
16. Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 36.
17. Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 60; and Findlay, *The Use of Force*, 178.
18. See Findlay, *The Use of Force*, 179–180. One particular dilemma for UNITAF was what to do about the heavily armed private guards retained by most of the relief organizations before UNITAF's arrival. UNITAF were anxious that they were unreliable and would complicate any emergency response and in some instances forcibly disarmed them. This, however, made the NGOs in question feel even more vulnerable. This dilemma was never fully resolved. See Findlay, *The Use of Force*, 175 and John L. Hirsh and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 69.

19. Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council that in March and April 1993 UNITAF had confiscated about 150 handguns; more than 750 rifles; more than 200 machine guns and an equal number of other heavy weapons such as rocket launchers and mortars; nearly 50 armored vehicles including tanks, APCs and self-propelled guns; more than 400 artillery pieces; almost 700 other weapons; and close to 79,000 items of ordnance. *Further report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraph 18 of Resolution 814 (1993) (S/26317, 17 August 1993)*, para. 18.
20. Findlay, *The Use of Force*, 184.
21. Findlay, *The Use of Force*, 191.
22. Cited in Ray Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 163.
23. Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 188, 308.
24. See *Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel (S/1994/653, 1 June 1994)*, paras. 124–261.
25. Although under the tactical control of Major-General Montgomery, the QRF remained under the operational control of General Joseph Hoar at US Central Command.
26. Probably the most hotly debated incident was the attack by coalition forces on Abdi House, a suspected SNA control building, which resulted in a series of arguments about how many civilian casualties had occurred. For a good summary of the episode see Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates, “My Clan Against the World” *US and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992–1994* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 116–120. See also S/1994/653, para. 154.
27. S/26351, 24 August 1993, paras. 15c and 24.
28. Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*.
29. The Joint Task Force deployed between 10 and 20 October 1993 and commenced operations shortly thereafter. It was commanded by Major General Carl F. Ernst and had a full headquarters and joint combined arms formations.
30. William J. Durch, “Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and ‘State Building’ in Somalia,” in W. J. Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 321.
31. For an analysis of UNOSOM’s poor performance in the areas of reconciliation and institution-building see *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), April 1992–March 1995* (UN DPKO, 1995), paras. 32–39.
32. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, para. 10.
33. Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 164–165.
34. Jarat Chopra, Åge Eknes, Toralv Nordbø, *Fighting for Hope in Somalia* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 1995), 88–91. At <www.jha.ac/articles/a007.htm>.
35. Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 29.
36. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, paras. 85–88.
37. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, para. 85.
38. Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 310.
39. Baumann and Yates, “My Clan Against the World”, 205–206.
40. Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 128.
41. Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 130.
42. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished: A US–UN Saga* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 93.
43. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, para. 116.

44. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, para. 44.
45. Baumann and Yates, "My Clan Against the World", 122, 133.
46. See Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, 96. See also Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 189–190 and S/1994/653, paras. 163–165.
47. See Murphy, *UN Peacekeeping*, 189 and 133.
48. Baumann and Yates, "My Clan Against the World", 104.
49. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, para. 17.
50. *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, paras. 71, 73.