

CHAPTER 53

UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK)

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INTRODUCTION

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized the establishment of an interim administration mission in Kosovo on 10 June 1999 following NATO's 78-day bombing campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The campaign began on 24 March 1999 in the wake of the collapse of negotiations at Rambouillet (and then Paris) between Belgrade and Kosovar Albanians on an interim political settlement for the governance of Kosovo. There had been tensions in Kosovo with regard to governance of the Albanian-majority Serb province for more than two decades prior to the NATO campaign.¹ However, with the escalation of violence in Kosovo beginning in early 1998, and haunted by the failure earlier to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many European and other states were concerned that the situation in Kosovo was beginning to spiral out of control, leading NATO's North Atlantic Council to demand that both parties sign the Rambouillet peace agreement.² Belgrade's unwillingness to sign and its failure to heed NATO's warnings to desist in its use of force against Kosovar Albanians—which by late March 1999 had resulted in the displacement of some 250,000 Kosovars from their homes—precipitated NATO's military actions in the FRY.³

The signing of the Military Technical Agreement between NATO and Belgrade on 9 June 1999 led to the withdrawal of Yugoslav/Serb military and police forces from Kosovo and, with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1244, the deployment of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) shortly thereafter.⁴ UNMIK comprised some 4,000 police officers, over 1,000 international civilian staff and a small number of military observers, and has functioned continuously since 1999. However, with Kosovo's declaration

of independence on 17 February 2008, UNMIK transferred many of its powers to the Government of Kosovo and the European Union (EU) Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which deployed to Kosovo on 9 December 2008. The absence of a “sunset clause” in Resolution 1244 means that UNMIK’s duration is open-ended, pending an affirmative decision by the Security Council to close the mission.

MANDATE AND KEY FACTS

Operation Mandate: UNSC Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999, authorized the establishment of: (1) an international security presence in Kosovo to deter renewed hostilities and ensure the withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serb Republic forces from the territory, and (2) an international civil presence to provide an interim administration for Kosovo, oversee the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions, and facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status.

Duration: June 1999–present

*Personnel:*⁵ military observers: 38; civilian police: 3,372; formed police units: 1,129; international staff: 1,168; national officers: 7; local staff: 3,619; UN volunteers: 224

Finance: June 1999–June 2012: US\$3.02 billion⁶

COURSE OF THE OPERATION

At the time of its deployment, the transitional administration functions of UNMIK made it one of the most complex and ambitious operations that the United Nations had ever undertaken. UNMIK’s responsibilities extended well beyond peacekeeping and peacebuilding to comprise an exceptionally wide range of governance functions. So broad was the scope of UNMIK’s authority—encompassing plenary executive, legislative, and judicial authority⁷—that UNMIK can be said to belong to a *sui generis* class of operations (soon to include the UN mission in East Timor) sometimes referred to as “neo-trusteeships,” “international protectorates,” and, more accurately, “international territorial administrations.”⁸

UNMIK has had four broad functions: to maintain peace and security on the borders and in the territory of Kosovo; to provide transitional administration of the territory; to establish and oversee the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions; and to facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status. Because of the scope of the operation, several multilateral organizations have played major roles together with the United Nations in the execution of these functions. The NATO-led KFOR—comprising some 50,000 troops at its height—was tasked with establishing a secure environment, which entailed monitoring the withdrawal of FRY/Serb forces and deterring renewed violent conflict, demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation

Army and other armed groups, and ensuring public safety and order (pending the deployment of UNMIK police). On the civilian side, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was responsible for overseeing humanitarian assistance; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was responsible for institution-building, including democratization, elections, and human rights; the EU was responsible for economic reconstruction; and the UN Secretariat was responsible for civil administration, the police, and the judiciary.⁹

In view of the numerous participating organizations, one of UNMIK's challenges was to ensure a coherent international approach. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High Representative could only mobilize and, "as appropriate," coordinate the activities of the international organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of peace implementation.¹⁰ The consequence was that the High Representative often had limited authority and effectiveness in this regard, at least initially. In an attempt to achieve greater coordination in Kosovo, while allowing the lead organizations a significant degree of autonomy, the civilian components of the operation were organized in a "pillar" structure under the overall direction of the UN's Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Bernard Kouchner (from 15 July 1999). The pillar structure helped to avoid some of the coordination problems encountered in Bosnia but it also proved to be a hindrance in dealing with cross-cutting issues that involved more than one organization.¹¹ KFOR, meanwhile, remained outside of UN command and control: the experience of serving in UN operations in Croatia and Bosnia (UNPROFOR), with their unwieldy "dual key" arrangements, led NATO to favor an arrangement with fewer constraints. However, General Sir Michael Jackson, the first KFOR commander, was committed to close coordination with, and in support of, the SRSG—the two would usually meet daily—thus demonstrating the critical, and contingent, difference that effective leadership (military and civilian) can make in the implementation of Security Council mandates.

Security

In contrast to the experiences of many other UN peace operations, the international security forces were able to deploy very quickly to Kosovo: the first elements of KFOR entered the territory on 12 June 1999, only two days after the UN Security Council authorized their deployment. NATO had begun planning for a deployment as early as May 1998, when it was envisaged that there would be a need for an international security force to support an interim political settlement, and was also preparing for a ground offensive in the late stages of its air campaign against FRY/Serbia. Despite its rapid deployment, KFOR was ill-prepared for the widespread attacks by Kosovar Albanians on Kosovar Serbs and their alleged supporters as some 650,000 Albanian refugees and several hundred thousand internally displaced persons—nearly half of the Kosovo Albanian community—flooded home once the NATO campaign had ended.¹² About a hundred civilians—mostly Serbs—were being killed each week as NATO troops

arrived.¹³ Vengeance was a factor—Albanians returned to houses and buildings that had been burned and looted—but jockeying for power was also important as Albanian militants sought to fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of FRY/Serb personnel from the province. KFOR was simply not configured for civilian policing functions and the UNMIK police had not yet deployed. The failure to protect the Serbs and other minorities initially would have implications for efforts to foster trust and cooperation between these beleaguered groups and the international authorities.

Although FRY/Serb forces largely complied with the terms of the Military Technical Agreement—by 20 June 1999 the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo was complete—UNMIK was never able to extend its writ fully over the entire territory. As Serb forces fled north out of Kosovo, French KFOR troops stopped at the Ibar River, which runs through the northern city of Mitrovica, and erected a checkpoint, thus effectively dividing the city—and Kosovo. Many Serbs from the south sought refuge in the north, where there had been a large Serb presence before the war, while Albanians who had been living in the north were prevented from returning home or were forced by Serbs to flee if they remained there.¹⁴ Even though the majority of Kosovo Serbs would continue to live south of the Ibar—largely in mono-ethnic enclaves—the *de facto* border between the Serb-dominated north and the rest of Kosovo would reinforce the ethnic divide and hinder the effective administration of the territory by UNMIK (and, later, the Government of Kosovo). Northern Kosovo has enjoyed the backing of Belgrade—politically, financially, and security-wise—and has often been encouraged by Belgrade to resist efforts by UNMIK to extend the reach of Kosovo institutions in the territory.

Civilian policing, as indicated above, was the responsibility initially of KFOR, pending the deployment of the UNMIK police (CIVPOL) and the eventual establishment of a Kosovo police service. In contrast to KFOR, UNMIK police were slower to deploy: as of 1 March 2000, only 65 percent of the total initial authorized strength of 3,618 civilian and border police officers had arrived in Kosovo.¹⁵ As a result, five months after the establishment of the mission, UNMIK police were wholly reliant on KFOR for law enforcement in three out of five regions. Typically UN civilian police responsibilities are limited to monitoring, assisting, and training local police forces but in Kosovo, where the withdrawal of FRY/Serb forces meant that no local police remained, UNMIK police were given full executive law enforcement authority—extending to the power of arrest and the use of firearms.¹⁶

UNMIK was also mandated to establish a new police force, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), trained by the OSCE. Nearly three years after the training began in September 1999, the KPS school had produced one of the more multi-ethnic public institutions in Kosovo, with 15 percent of the force drawn from minority communities, including 8 percent from the Kosovo Serb community (who constituted approximately 10 percent of the population before the FRY/Serb withdrawal).¹⁷ By June 2002 KPS officers had begun to outnumber UNMIK police (4,770–4,524), whose size would be reduced to a mere twenty-two officers by May 2009 with the reconfiguration of UNMIK once EULEX was fully operational in April 2009.¹⁸

Humanitarian assistance

The humanitarian challenges that UNMIK confronted appeared primarily in the early stages of the mission. Those challenges were three-fold: first, to provide support to the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons returning, often to badly damaged or destroyed homes; second, to provide interim social welfare, health, and public services pending the establishment of the UN civil administration; and third, to extend protection to the minority communities. UNHCR, the lead humanitarian agency and the head of UNMIK's humanitarian pillar, oversaw and coordinated these efforts but the execution of many of these tasks was initially facilitated by the resourcefulness of the Kosovar Albanians themselves, who had access to considerable domestic and diaspora assets.¹⁹

UNMIK was mandated by UNSC Resolution 1244 to assure more than “the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons”; it also had a requirement to assure their return “*to their homes* in Kosovo” (emphasis added). This further requirement arose not only out of consideration for international human rights, including the right to property and the enjoyment of protection against forced displacement, but also from a normative commitment to the principle of multi-ethnicity. While this commitment was not unique to Kosovo—the UN and other international bodies have pursued similar objectives in war-torn Croatia and Bosnia—it is fair to say that it is largely a contemporary concern: in the past there has been greater tolerance of, even support for, the “unmixing” of peoples (for example, the 1923 Lausanne Convention).²⁰ Despite its commitment, UNMIK's efforts in this regard were largely unsuccessful: of the roughly 245,000 minorities (mostly Serbs) who were either displaced within Kosovo or to neighboring territories after the NATO campaign had ended, only 24,020 had returned as of September 2012.²¹ In a concession to reality, UNMIK's Office for Returns and Communities revised its policy in 2006 and adopted a more pragmatic approach to returns that allowed “the most affected people to take decisions best suited to them and de-politicise the returns issue.”²²

Civil administration and institution-building

In addition to its responsibility for the police, the UN Secretariat also had responsibility for the civil administration of Kosovo, including the judiciary, while the OSCE had responsibility for institution-building. The UN adopted a phased approach to civil administration, starting with direct administration of Kosovo, followed by co-administration, and finally, a near-total transfer of responsibility to the Kosovar authorities. After an initial six-month period of direct administration, during which the UN was competing with local parallel structures that emerged in the wake of the FRY/Serb withdrawal, UNMIK established the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS).²³ A key component of the JIAS was twenty administrative units responsible for the

management and delivery of public services organized on the basis of a “dual desk” model. Each administrative department, along with four independent agencies, was co-directed by a Kosovar and a senior UNMIK international staff member, all selected by the SRSG, with the Kosovars being drawn from the principal ethnic groups and political parties. In addition, an eight-member advisory group—the Interim Administrative Council—made up of four UNMIK officials and four Kosovars (three Albanian political leaders and a representative of the Kosovo Serb community) was established to propose policy guidelines for the twenty administrative units, among other functions.

From co-administration, UNMIK moved to put into place structures and practices of self-government. In May 2001, SRSG Hans Haekkerup promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, which envisaged a transfer of political and administrative responsibilities to local authorities following elections for a Kosovo-wide Assembly in November 2001, leading in turn to the establishment of Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in March 2002.²⁴ (There was a parallel transfer of responsibilities to authorities at the municipal level.) The devolved responsibilities were extensive but not unlimited: certain powers were reserved for the SRSG, notably those deemed to be too sensitive (for example, police and the judiciary, military issues, external relations), and the SRSG continued to enjoy the supreme authority vested in him by Resolution 1244 and UNMIK Regulation 1991/1, which, however, he would now exercise largely to promulgate laws adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo.

Economic reconstruction

Kosovo suffered considerable damage to its economic infrastructure as a consequence of the war: more than 50 percent of its agricultural assets were damaged or lost, properties had been looted extensively and key parts of its telecommunications system were destroyed.²⁵ War-related damage, however, was only part of the problem. Kosovo was also suffering from more than a decade of neglect and under-investment by Federal and Serbian authorities, and with the departure of Kosovar Serbs—many of whom had occupied key positions in utilities, industry, and public administration—there was now also a critical shortage of technical and managerial expertise. Moreover, Kosovo was embedded in a defunct and largely dysfunctional socialist economy.

For UNMIK, then, the challenge was not to restore what had existed before the war but, rather, to transform the economy by developing a market-oriented, open economy and the necessary public institutions (for example, central bank, treasury, customs service) and the legal/regulatory frameworks to support it, with the two-fold aim of mitigating the effects of the conflict while at the same time laying the foundations for sustainable longer-term economic development. The European Commission had primary responsibility for the coordination of economic reconstruction efforts—reflecting also the prospect of Kosovo’s integration into the

EU—and together with the World Bank has played a major role in the formulation of strategic guidance and the provision of budget support and project lending throughout UNMIK's tenure.

In addition to the various governance functions outlined above, UNMIK was also mandated to facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status. The difficulty with this aspect of the mandate was that its implementation required agreement among the five permanent members of the Security Council, which was not forthcoming as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States favored an independent Kosovo, while Russia and China supported Belgrade's insistence on maintaining Kosovo within Serbia. As a consequence, UNMIK was unable even to initiate a political process. What broke the deadlock was, first, violent unrest in Kosovo in March 2004 and, then, Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008.

Violence erupted in Kosovo on 16 March 2004 when Albanians clashed with Serbs following two separate incidents: the shooting of a Kosovo Serb youth and the drowning of two Albanian boys. The violence—the worst that Kosovo had experienced since the 1999 war and its immediate aftermath—quickly spread across Kosovo, killing nineteen and wounding another 954, while 730 houses belonging to minorities (mostly Serbs) were damaged or destroyed and thirty-six Serb Orthodox churches and other religious sites were desecrated.²⁶ International authorities condemned the violence, which UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan characterized as “an organized, widespread and targeted campaign” led by Albanian extremists, but they also viewed the events as a wake-up call. “There is a limit to how long you can keep a place in limbo,” Søren Jessen-Petersen would observe soon after taking up the post as SRSG in August 2004.²⁷ The UN Security Council finally agreed to set the status resolution process in motion with the appointment in November 2005 of former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari as UN special envoy, who, after wide consultation, drafted a Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (February 2007) that recommended that Kosovo be granted independence “supervised for an initial period by the international community,” after which “UNMIK's mandate [would] expire, and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK [would] be transferred en bloc to the governing authorities in Kosovo.”²⁸ Despite the endorsement of the proposal by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Belgrade's rejection of it made it unacceptable to Russia and the Security Council once again became deadlocked.

The unilateral declaration of independence, adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo (without Kosovo Serb support) on 17 February 2008, meant that states were now free to recognize Kosovo, which, as of 16 March 2013, 99 out of 193 UN Member States had done (including 22 out of 27 EU Member States). On 10 September 2012, the Kosovo authorities and the International Steering Group, composed of states that recognize Kosovo, declared the end of the “supervised independence,” thus marking, in effect, the end of UNMIK as an interim administration, notwithstanding the continuation of UNMIK's mandate as long as Resolution 1244 remains in force.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

UNMIK's mandate was one of the most extensive in the UN's history. Among its numerous responsibilities, civil administration alone, for instance, represented some twenty diverse functional areas—including education; health and social welfare; trade and industry; general public services; local administration; and fiscal matters—each of which in itself would be difficult to assess in broad terms. There is also the question of agency: it is not always clear who bears responsibility for the success or failure of specific aspects of the mission—the UN Secretariat? UN Member States? Other international organizations? Belgrade? The Kosovar (Albanian or Serb) leadership?—all of whom have had a decisive influence on outcomes. The final caveat relates to a structural problem. The uncertainty surrounding Kosovo's future status proved to be a significant factor affecting UNMIK's implementation of its mandate. Resolution 1244 both affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY *and* allowed for a political process that anticipated the possibility of Kosovo's independence. As a result, as Alexandros Yannis, an advisor to SRSG Bernard Kouchner, has observed, “virtually any policy or decision by the international administration, particularly in the early days, was interpreted by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs as promoting either independence or the return to Serb rule and thus was openly contested and/or undermined by one side or the other.”²⁹ UNMIK could do nothing to clarify the status question and in this respect was not the master of its own mission.

With these caveats in mind, it is still possible to make a number of summary observations of UNMIK's performance in relation to key aspects of its operation. The picture that emerges is, not surprisingly, a mixed one.

With regard to planning the operation, the UN Secretariat had very little time, having been given just one month's notice that the UN would lead the mission. The Secretariat had a contingency plan in place for a police mission only and no sense of the immensity of the responsibility that it would have to assume. As Michael Dziedzic observed, “A severely understaffed UN bureaucracy struggled for many months to mobilize the required personnel from its member states, which, with few exceptions, were totally unprepared for such a demand.”³⁰ The Secretariat would have benefited from broader contingency planning and a roster of pre-approved civilian experts available to deploy on short notice. The mission's pillar structure, on the other hand, reflected a serious and reasonably successful attempt to draw appropriate lessons from parallel experiences (notably Bosnia) for the management of the mission.

Neither KFOR nor the UN was prepared adequately for the revenge attacks by Kosovar Albanians on Kosovo Serbs in the aftermath of the NATO military campaign and for the further attacks on Serbs and other minorities in March 2004—perhaps the chief failing of the mission. This shortcoming represented inadequate intelligence and the absence more broadly of conflict analysis as an integral part of mission planning, as well as the chronic difficulties of deploying civilian police rapidly (in the first instance).³¹ In other respects, however, KFOR, the UNMIK police, and the Kosovo

Police have all contributed to the maintenance of peace and security on the border and within Kosovo—levels of violence have remained relatively low over the years, on average, while the mobility of national minorities has increased—and these security forces, especially the Kosovo Police, appear generally to have earned the trust of the population, including the minority populations, although trust in all security institutions has declined among Kosovar Albanians and Serbs in recent years.³²

UNMIK deserves credit for having established viable governmental institutions. While Kosovo's constitutional order is of the Kosovars' own making, it is clearly the legacy of UNMIK's original design (the PISG). These institutions are judged broadly to conform to (European) norms of democracy.³³ However, many of the institutions are weak and poorly performing, and among Serbs their political legitimacy is limited. A chronic weakness has been the judiciary. Subject to sectarian pressures, judges have not always performed their duties fairly and impartially, especially with regard to political and ethnically motivated crimes. As a consequence, international judges and prosecutors have had to be brought into the process from the start to ensure its integrity, and in one form or another they have remained vital to the process throughout. Other chronic weaknesses or problems include: insufficient legislative oversight of the executive; inadequate entrenchment of the rule of law; and low Serb participation in elections and government. With regard to the plight of minorities more broadly, the OSCE has found that while there is an adequate legislative framework in place, much remains to be achieved to provide meaningful protection of minorities that meet domestic and international standards.³⁴

UNMIK's contribution to Kosovo's economic development is difficult to gauge. Significant progress was made in economic management, especially fiscal reform, and Kosovo was one of only four countries in Europe that recorded positive growth rates in every year during the crisis period 2008–12, averaging 4.5 percent. But Kosovo was and remains impoverished. It has struggled with high rates of unemployment, which thirteen years after the establishment of UNMIK was more than 40 percent—the worst rate in Europe—while it has failed to attract significant foreign investment.³⁵ According to the World Bank and International Finance Corporation's *Doing Business Report 2011*, Kosovo ranked 119 out of 183 countries for “ease of doing business” and 173 out of 183 for “protecting investors.”³⁶ Among the impediments to doing business, an OECD-EU SIGMA study concluded, were corruption, inadequate rule of law, high taxes, excessive bureaucracy, and insecurity.³⁷ Kosovo's economic difficulties have been compounded by the uncertainty surrounding its future status—whether it would remain a part of Serbia or achieve independent statehood—and the implications that this uncertainty has had for the proprietary use of assets.

CONCLUSION

With the termination of NATO's Operation Allied Force in June 1999, external actors faced a grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, the prospect of renewed violence, and an urgent need to restore governance following the total collapse of the existing

political order. UNMIK represented a bold and unprecedented response to these challenges.

Countless lessons have been drawn from the experience in how to run—and how *not* to run—a post-war territorial administration. However, two broad lessons are particularly noteworthy. The first concerns the limits of power. Although UNMIK enjoyed extensive authority and considerable resources, it could not effect many of the changes that were required to establish a stable peace. Without the support of Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs, UNMIK's efforts would always be limited. Even with respect to Kosovar Albanians, whose support UNMIK largely enjoyed, there was resistance to initiatives—including measures designed to accommodate ethnic minority concerns—that were perceived to represent a challenge to their ultimate objective of independent statehood. UNMIK was further hindered by divisions on the UN Security Council, which prevented it from implementing a number of measures as long as there was any possibility that they could be prejudicial to the resolution of the status question.

The second lesson concerns the importance of follow-on measures to consolidate post-conflict peace- and state-building efforts. Kosovo is fortunate enough to be in Europe and to have the prospect of eventual membership in the EU. Such a perspective has made it possible to ensure both high levels of assistance—external assistance to Kosovo as a percentage of GDP has been higher than that of most other conflict-affected countries³⁸—and continued engagement, largely on the part of the EU. Through its accession process, moreover, the EU is able to exert an ongoing influence on the pace and character of peace- and state-building in Kosovo. However, this influence, while quite considerable, has its limitations too.

NOTES

1. For background to the crisis in Kosovo, see Marc Weller, *Contested Statehood: Kosovo's Struggle for Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
2. Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo, Press Release 99(12), 30 January 1999.
3. Conflict, Security and Development Group, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change* (London: King's College London, 2003), 135.
4. Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.
5. UN General Assembly, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, financial performance reports of UNMIK from 10 June 1999 to 30 June 2012. Figures are not necessarily concurrent.
6. UN General Assembly, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, financial performance reports of UNMIK from 10 June 1999 to 30 June 2012.
7. "All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General." UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1, "On the Authority of the Interim Administration of Kosovo," 25 June 1999.

8. For a discussion of these terms, see Ralph Wilde, *International Territorial Administration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
9. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/1999/779, 12 July 1999).
10. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 10.
11. *A Review of Peace Operations*, 138, 140.
12. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/1999/779, 12 July 1999), para. 8.
13. Michael J. Dziedzic, "Kosovo," in William J. Durch (ed.), *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 329.
14. William G. O'Neill, *Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 45–46.
15. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2000/177, 3 March 2000), para. 37.
16. On executive policing, see Annika S. Hansen, *From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations*, Adelphi Paper no. 343 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002).
17. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2002/779, 17 July 2002), para. 28. These levels have remained more or less constant although at times Kosovo Serbs have boycotted the Kosovo police and other public institutions as an expression of their dissatisfaction with particular policies.
18. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2002/779, 17 July 2002), Annex 1; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2009/300, 10 June 2009), para. 18.
19. UNICEF, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), and the World Food Programme (WFP) all stressed the importance of the Albanians' own coping mechanisms. See M. Greene, K. Madi, R. Stevens, and J. Telford, *UNICEF Preparedness and Response in the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency: A Joint UNICEF/DFID Evaluation* (New York: DFID/UNICEF, 2000).
20. For further discussion, see Richard Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 80–85.
21. UNHCR, Office of the Chief of Mission, Pristina, Kosovo, "Statistical Overview: Update at end September 2012" (undated), available at <[www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/D108F6188A98652EC1257A9200494DE2/\\$file/Statistical+overview+September+2012.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/D108F6188A98652EC1257A9200494DE2/$file/Statistical+overview+September+2012.pdf)>.
22. United Nations, Human Rights Committee, "Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee," CCPR/C/UNK/CO/1/Add.1, 1 April 2008, paras. 19–26.
23. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/1, "On the Kosovo Joint Interim Administrative Structure," 14 January 2000.
24. UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9, "On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo," 15 May 2001.
25. European Commission and World Bank, *Toward Stability and Prosperity: A Program for Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo*, 3 November 1999, 2.

26. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2004/348, 30 April 2004), para. 2.
27. Cited in Ben Crampton, "Kosovo," in Richard Caplan (ed.), *Exit Strategies and State Building* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 166.
28. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 27 February 2007, Art 14.1(g).
29. Alexandros Yannis, "The UN as Government in Kosovo," *Global Governance* 10, no. 1 (2004), 76.
30. Dziedzic, "Kosovo," 320.
31. For a discussion of this point in the East Timor context and more broadly, see Olav Ofstad, *Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution in East Timor: Lessons for Future Peace Operations*, Working Paper (Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, April 2012).
32. Christine Bennett and Saferworld, *Public Perceptions of Safety and Security in Kosovo: Time to Act* (London: Saferworld, 2011), ii.
33. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo, COM(2012) 602 final, 10 October 2012, para. 3.1.
34. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission in Kosovo, *Community Rights Assessment Report*, third edn., July 2012, 5.
35. World Bank, "World Bank-Kosovo Partnership: Country Program Snapshot," September 2012, 6, available at <www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/kos-snapshot-sep-2012.pdf>.
36. World Bank and International Finance Corporation, *Doing Business 2011* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), 174.
37. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the European Union, *Assessment Kosovo (Under UNSCR 1244/99) 2011: Democracy and Rule of Law*, available at <www.oecd.org/site/sigma/publicationsdocuments/assessmentreportskosovo.htm>.
38. James Dobbins *et al.*, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 156–160.