Section outline

  • Topic 2: Games Solution using Dominance and Bayesian Rationality, and the Role of (In)Complete Information

    Introduction to the most basic concepts of games' solution: dominance (strict and weak, simple and iterated) and Bayesian rationality (simple and iterated), with a specific emphasis on the role of Complete or Incomplete Information

    • Lecture 2

      • Day: February 1
      • Room:  DEMS Seminar Room U7/2104
      • Time: 10.30-01.30 p.m.

    • Main point of the lectures:

      1. Solving game in strategic situations
      2. Dominance criteria, strict and weak
      3. Bayesian rationality
      4. Iteration and knowledge on other players
      5. Use of these solutions in economic models.
    • File
      Slides lecture 2 File

      Slides of lecture 2 on dominace and Bayesian rationality as criteria to solve games.

    • Forum
      Forum on dominance and Bayesian rationality

      Forum for students' questions on the solution concepts of dominance and rationalizability