Schema della sezione

  • Topic 4: Equilibrium and refinements in extensive form games

    Analysis of equilibrium behavior in extensive form games

    • Lectures 4 and 5

      • Day: February 14
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time: 08.30-11.30 a.m.

      • Day: February 15
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time: 08.30-11.30 a.m.

    • Main points of the lectures:

      1. problems with equilibria in extensive form games: rational behavior out of the equilibrium path 
      2. sequential rationality
      3. backward induction
      4. subgame perfection
      5. how to formalize equilibrium concept in extensive form games with imperfect information
        1. weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
        2. Sequential Equilibria
        3. further refinements.
      6. Signaling games and forward induction.
    • File
      Slides lecture 4 File

      Slides of lectures 4 on problems with Nash equilibria in extensive form games and refinements

    • File
      Slides lecture 5 File

      Slides of lectures 5 on equilibrium refinements, forward induction and signaling games

    • Forum
      Forum on equilibria in extensive form games

      Forum for students' questions on equilibria in extensive form games