Section outline

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  • Game Theory for Ph.D. Students


  • Basic Informations

  • Topic 1: models of strategic interaction and the role of information

    Introduction to the basic language to deal with situations of strategic interaction.

    It is probably the most difficult part of the course, however it is important to get able to manage the fundamental basic tools of game theory. Hence, we will use much time to be sure everyone is able to use such language.

    • Lecture 1

      • Day: January 31 
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time:  09.30-12.30 am

    • Main points of the lecture:

      1. Introduction to game theory
      2. Formal models of games:
        1. extensive form games
        2. strategic form games
      3. Perfect recall and Kuhn Theorem.
    • File
      Slides lecture 1 File

      Slides of lecture 1 on models of strategic interaction

    • Forum
      Questions on models of strategic interaction Forum

      Forum for students to ask questions on models of strategic interaction

  • Topic 2: Games Solution using Dominance and Bayesian Rationality, and the Role of (In)Complete Information

    Introduction to the most basic concepts of games' solution: dominance (strict and weak, simple and iterated) and Bayesian rationality (simple and iterated), with a specific emphasis on the role of Complete or Incomplete Information

    • Lecture 2

      • Day: February 1
      • Room:  DEMS Seminar Room U7/2104
      • Time: 10.30-01.30 p.m.

    • Main point of the lectures:

      1. Solving game in strategic situations
      2. Dominance criteria, strict and weak
      3. Bayesian rationality
      4. Iteration and knowledge on other players
      5. Use of these solutions in economic models.
    • File
      Slides lecture 2 File

      Slides of lecture 2 on dominace and Bayesian rationality as criteria to solve games.

    • Forum
      Forum on dominance and Bayesian rationality

      Forum for students' questions on the solution concepts of dominance and rationalizability

  • Homework 1 on Game Models, Rationalizability and Information

    • File
      Homework 1 File

      Set 1 of  exercises on decision theory and on models of strategic interaction

    • Forum
      Questions on Homework 1 Forum

      Forum for students to ask questions on first homework

    • Solution Homework 1

    • Main points of the class: 

      Solution of the exercises of the first homework on the different ways of modeling strategic interaction, rationalizability and players' information.

      • Day: February 14 
      • Room: DEMS Seminar room U7/2104
      • Time: 02.30-04.30 p.m.
    • File
      Solution Homework 1 File

      Solution of the set 1 of  exercises on models of strategic interaction and on solutions

  • Topic 3: Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria


    • Lecture 3

      • Day: February 8
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time: 08.30-11.30 a.m.

    • Main points of the lectures:

      1. Definiton and meaning of Nash Equilibria
      2. Existence of Equilibria
      3. Calculation of equilibria
      4.  Sequential rationality
    • File
      Slides lecture 3 File

      Slides of lecture 3 on Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria.

    • Forum
      Forum on equilibria in extensive form games

      Forum for students' questions on Nash equilibria

  • Topic 4: Equilibrium and refinements in extensive form games

    Analysis of equilibrium behavior in extensive form games

    • Lectures 4 and 5

      • Day: February 14
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time: 08.30-11.30 a.m.

      • Day: February 15
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time: 08.30-11.30 a.m.

    • Main points of the lectures:

      1. problems with equilibria in extensive form games: rational behavior out of the equilibrium path 
      2. sequential rationality
      3. backward induction
      4. subgame perfection
      5. how to formalize equilibrium concept in extensive form games with imperfect information
        1. weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
        2. Sequential Equilibria
        3. further refinements.
      6. Signaling games and forward induction.
    • File
      Slides lecture 4 File

      Slides of lectures 4 on problems with Nash equilibria in extensive form games and refinements

    • File
      Slides lecture 5 File

      Slides of lectures 5 on equilibrium refinements, forward induction and signaling games

    • Forum
      Forum on equilibria in extensive form games

      Forum for students' questions on equilibria in extensive form games

  • Homework 2 on Nash equilibria and Refinements

    • File
      Homework 2 File

      Set of exercises 2 to solve as homework

    • Forum
      Questions on Homework 2 Forum

      Forum for students to ask questions on second homework

    • Solution Homework 2

      • Day: February 21 
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time: 02.30-04.30 p.m.

    • Main points of the class: 

      solution of the exercises of the second homework on calculation of Nash Equilibria and extensive form refinements.

    • File
      Solution homework 2 File

      Solution of the set of exercises 2 to solve as homework available from February 22.

  • Homework 3 on equilibrium refinements in extensive form games and signalling

    • File
      Homework 3 File

      Set of exercises to be solved as Homework 3

    • Forum
      Questions on Homework 3 Forum

      Forum for students to ask questions on third homework

    • Solution Homework 3

    • Main points of the class: 

      solution of the exercises of the third homework on calculation of Nash Equilibrium refinements in the extensive form.

      • Day: March 2 
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time:  10.45-12.30 a.m.

    • Main points of the class: 

      solution of the exercises of the third homework on calculation of Nash Equilibrium refinements in the extensive form.

    • File
      Solution homework 3 File

      Solution of exercises of homework 3 available after March 2.

  • Presentations by students

    • Main points of the class: 

      presentations by group of students of one or more research papers.

      • Day: March 8
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time: 02.30-04.30 p.m.

  • Mock Exam

      • Day: March 8
      • Room: Demographic Seminar Room U7/2062
      • Time: 04.30-05.30 p.m.
    • File
      Mock exam part of game theory File

      Mock exam, part of game theory, available after March 2.

    • File
      Solution mock exam part of game theory File

      Solution of mock exam, part of game theory, available after March 5.

  • Evaluation of the course, suggestions and critics

    This part, before the written exam, is to collect students evaluation of course and suggestions and critics to improve the course.

  • Final exams: solutions and marks

      • Day: ??? 
      • Room:  ???
      • Time:  ???
      • Topic:   Microeconomics