Course Syllabus
Obiettivi formativi
Il Corso di propone:
a) di offrire conoscenze di
base e specialistiche in materia di Ragioni, Strumenti ed Effetti
dell'intervento pubblico nei mercati delle società capitalistiche
contemporanee quando questi mercati sono caratterizzati da condizioni non concorrenziali che generano un "potere di mercato" a favore delle imprese private.
b) di mettere in grado la/lo studentessa/te di valutare in modo critico le
politiche di riduzione del suddetto intervento pubblico seguite in vari Paesi negli
ultimi tre decenni e di analizzare gli effetti sull'uso efficiente delle risorse della conseguente eliminazione o
privatizzazione delle attività precedentemente svolte dal settore pubblico.
c) di permettere
alla/o studentessa/te di acquisire competenze professionali in materia di
programmazione e gestione delle imprese pubbliche ancora esistenti che offrono servizi pubblici non erogabili in modo efficiente dalle imprese private.
Contenuti sintetici
Programma esteso
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L 1 Efficienza allocativa e Concorrenza Perfetta I |
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L 2 Efficienza allocativa e Concorrenza Perfetta II |
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L3 Concorrenza perfetta e allocazione efficiente |
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L 4 Monopolio Naturale I |
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L 5 Monopolio Naturale II |
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L 6 Monopolio Naturale multiprodotto |
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L7 Rendimenti di scala e subadditività |
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L8 Prezzi pari al MC e perdita di bilancio |
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L9 Il modello di Hotelling I |
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L 10 Il modello di Hotelling II |
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L 11 Finanziamento non distorsivo del sussidio |
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L 12 Pregie e limiti della tariffazione di FB |
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L 13 Il SB |
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L14 prezzi di SB I |
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L 15 La correzione distributiva dei prezzi di SB |
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L 16 Interpretazioni alternative e complementari dei prezzi di SB |
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L 17 Il modello di Loeb e Magat |
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L 18 Regolamentazione Bayesiana |
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L 19 Modello RoR I^ |
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L 20 Modello RoR II^ |
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L 21 Price -cap II^ |
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L 22 Yardstick competion I^ |
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L 23 Critica concorrenza alla Demzets |
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L24 Teoria delle aste I |
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L 25 Teoria delle aste II |
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L26 Teoria delle aste III |
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L27 Applicazione Aste per concessioni |
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L 28 Critiche meccanismi d'asta e applicazioni |
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L 29 Oligopoli e regolamentazione |
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L 30 Modello di Cournot I |
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L 31 Cournot II |
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L32 Counot con N > 2 |
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L 33 Bertrand I |
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L 34 Bertrand con N > 2 |
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L 35 Surplus sociale in Oligopolio I |
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L 36 Intervento pubblico Oligopolio |
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L 37 Integrazione Verticale I |
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L 38 Integrazione Verticale II |
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L 39 Alternative all'integrazione vertical |
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L 40 Fusioni Orizzontali I |
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L 41 Guadagni di Efficienza |
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L 42 Effetti Unilaterali |
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L 43 Casi di Antitrust I |
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L 44 Casi di Antitrust II L 45 Casi di Antitrust III L46 Casi di Antitrust IV |
Prerequisiti
H. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus, W. W. Norton & Company – 2014
Metodi didattici
Lezioni frontali. Esercizi individuli con correzione in aula. Predisposizione del materiale didattico (testi e files di varia tipologia) nella pagina e-learning del corso.
Modalità di verifica dell'apprendimento
Esame finale scritto (6 domande di cui 3 esercizi; ciascuna domanda è suddivisa in singole parti).
Al termine del primo modulo (circa 45 h di lezione frontale) è prevista una prova intermedia relativa al programma trattato sino a quel momento a lezione. Il superamento della prova intermedia (con votazione tra 0 e 16; minimo 9) implica limitazione del contenuto della prova finale alla sola seconda parte del corso (sempre con votazione compresa tra 0 e 16; minimo 9). La prova intermdia non è obbligatoria. In sua assenza la/lo studentessa/studente sostiene la prova completa relativa ad entrambe le parti/moduli (votazione compresa tra 0 e 32=30 con lode; minimo 18).
Gli studenti non frequentanti non possono accedere alla prova intermedia e devono sostenere insieme ai frequentanti la prova completa.
Testi di riferimento
Bruno Bosco, LEZIONI DI TEORIA DELLA REGOLAMENTAZIONE, seconda edizione, Giappichelli, Torino, 2020 (except the paragraphs indicated with double asterisk)
M. Motta -M. Polo, Antitrust. Economia e politica della concorrenza, Il Mulino, 2005 (the chapters will be indicated at the beginning of the second module)
Bruno Bosco, Material included in the e-learning page of the course
Un riferimento bibliografico puramente integrativo ("più facile" e meno approfondito) contenente riferimenti a specifici casi di regolametazione è
C. Decker, Modern Economic Regulation, CUP, 2015
Periodo di erogazione dell’insegnamento
1st and 2nd term
Lingua di insegnamento
Italiano
Learning objectives
The course intends:
a) to offer basic and specialist knowledge about Reasons, Tools and Effects of public intervention in the markets of contemporary capitalist societies characterized by non-competitive conditions and strong market power in favor of private firms.
b) to enable the student to critically evaluate the policies of reduction of the aforementioned intervention followed in various countries over the past three decades and to analyze the effects of the consequent elimination or privatization of the activities previously carried out by the public sector.
c) to allow the student to acquire professional skills in the planning and management of still existing public enterprises still offering public services
Contents
The course is organized in two parts (modules), which cannot be separated.
The first part is called Public and Service Economics. It is dedicated to the study of the theory of business and market regulation in the public utility sectors where conditions of natural monopoly prevail. Economic theories that have dealt with this problem will be presented and discussed following their historical development and the relative results will be examined with reference to contexts characterized by both perfect information and information asymmetry. The theories that motivate the nationalization of natural monopolies and the theories that merely reccommend regulatory rules of conduct to be imposed on private companies will be exposed and analysed. In the latter case, the study will cover both the Bayesian and the non-Bayesian (or anonymous) models of regulation of the natural monopoly.The main oligopoly models will be subsequently taken up and the most common forms of regulation of these markets will be examined. Ample space will be dedicated to the analysis of the so-called competition for the market achieved through the application of auction mechanisms. In this context, specific cases of application of auction mechanisms to the regulation of sectors such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, etc. will also be treated.
The second part is called Economics of regulatory choices and deals with regulatory activity, carried out by applying the rules "to protect competition and the market as well as consumers", carried out through the activity of independent authorities. The historical profile of this form of "intervention" and the main guiding criteria for consumer and producer protection activities followed by the Authorities will be examined. Some cases derived from specific rulings of the European and national Anti Trust Authorities will be subsequently treated.
Detailed program
| L1 Allocation efficiency and perfect competition I L2 Allocation efficiency and perfect competition II L3 Perfect competition and efficient allocation L4 Natural Monopoly I L5 Natural Monopoly II L6 Multiproduct Natural Monopoly L7 Returns to scale and sub-additivity L8 Prices equal to MC and loss in the firms' balance sheet L9 The Hotelling model I L10 The Hotelling model II L 11 Non-distortionary forms of financing the subsidy L12 PROS and CONS of FB pricing L 13 The Second Best approach L14 SB prices I L15 The correction of SB prices for distribuitional purposes L16 Alternative and complementary interpretations of SB prices L17 The Loeb and Magat model L18 The introduction of uncertaint in FB and SB pricing. L19 The peack-load pricing L20 Peack-load, stocastic demand and rationing L 21 Non- Bayesian regulation. Introduction. L22 RoR regulation I L22 RoR regulation II L23 Price -cap L24 Yardstick competion and applications L25 Other regulatory schemes L 26 Baysian models of regulation and principal-agent L27 Baron-Myerson L28 Laffoint-Tirole L29 Demzets auction regulation and the Loeb and Magat model L24 Auction theory I L 25 Auction theory II L26 Auction theory III L27 Application Auctions to public franchise L28 Application of Auctions to market design; various cases. L 29 A (very) critical review of auction mechanisms and applications L 30 Oligopoly and regulation L 30 Cournot I basic model L 31 Cournot II L32 Counot with N> 2 L 33 Bertrand I L 34 Bertrand with N> 2 L 35 Social surplus in Oligopoly I L 36 Public intervention in Oligopoly IL 37 Vertical integration I L 38 Vertical Integration II L 39 Alternatives to vertical integration L 40 Horizontal Mergers I L 41 Efficiency gains L 42 Unilateral effects L 43 Cases of Antitrust I L 44 Cases of Antitrust II L 45 Cases of Antitrust III L46 Cases of Antitrust IV |
| L47 Privatization in theory and practice L48 Privatization and social impoverishment L49 Should we re-nationalise previously privatized Public Utilities? |
Prerequisites
H. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus, W. W. Norton & Company – 2014
is necessary.
Teaching methods
Class lectures
Assessment methods
Final written exam (6 questions including 3 exercises; each question is divided into individual parts).
At the end of the first module (after about 45 h of frontal lectures) students can take an intermediate test related to the program treated until then in class. Passing the intermediate test (with a mark between 0 and 16; minimum 9) implies limitation of the content of the final test to the second part of the course only (always with a mark between 0 and 16; minimum 9). The intermediate test is not mandatory. In its absence, the student takes the complete exam relating to both parts / modules (score between 0 and 32 = 30 with honors; minimum 18).
Non-attending students cannot access the intermediate test and must take the complete test together with the attending students.
Textbooks and Reading Materials
- Bruno Bosco, LEZIONI DI TEORIA DELLA REGOLAMENTAZIONE (Lectures on Regulation Theory), Second Edition, Giappichelli, Turin, 2020 (except the paragraphs indicated with double asterisk)
- M. Motta -M. Polo, Antitrust. Economia e politica della concorrenza (Antitrust and competition policy), Il Mulino, 2005 (chapters to be indicated at the beginning of the second module)
- Bruno Bosco, Additional Lecture Notes (Material included in the e-learning page of the course)
A purely supplementary ("not so hard going" and less thorough) bibliographic reference discussing specific regulatory topics and cases is
C. Decker, Modern Economic Regulation, CUP, 2015 (part III in particular)
Semester
First and Second
Teaching language
Italian