Syllabus del corso
Obiettivi formativi
Il Corso di propone:
a) di offrire conoscenze di
base e specialistiche in materia di Ragioni, Strumenti ed Effetti
dell'intervento pubblico nei mercati delle società capitalistiche
contemporanee.
b) di mettere in grado la/lo studentessa/te di valutare in modo critico le
politiche di riduzione del suddetto intervento seguite in vari Paesi negli
ultimi trent'anni e di analizzare gli effetti della conseguente eliminazione o
privatizzazione delle attività precedentemente svolte dal settore pubblico.
c) di permettere
alla/o studentessa/te di acquisire competenze professionali in materia di
programmazione e gestione dei servizi pubblici ancora esistenti.
Contenuti sintetici
Programma esteso
|
L 1 Allocative efficiency I |
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L 2 Allocative efficiency II |
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L3 Perfect competition and efficiency |
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L 4 Natural monopoly II |
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L 5 Natural monopolyII |
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L 6 Multi product natural monopoly |
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L7 Scale return and subadditivity |
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L8 Marginal cost pricing and firm's loss |
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L9 Hotelling I |
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L 10 Hotelling II |
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L 11 Financing firm's loss |
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L 12 First best pricing:a balance |
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L 13 the SB |
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L14 SB pricing I |
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L 15 Distribution and SB pricing |
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L 16 SB pricing: interpretations and balance |
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L 17 The Loeb and Magat model |
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L 18 Bayesian regulation |
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L 19 RoR I^ |
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L 20 RoR II^ |
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L 21 Price -cap |
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L 22 Yardstick competion I^ |
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L 23 Back to Loeb and Magat and Demzets auction |
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L24 Auctions I |
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L 25 Auctions II |
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L26 auctions III |
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L27 Examples and applications |
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L 28 Criticisms |
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L 29 Oligopoly and regulation |
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L 30Cournot I |
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L 31 II |
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L32 Counot with N > 2 |
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L 33 Bertrand I^ |
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L 34 Bertrand with N > 2 |
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L 35 Social surplus andoligopoly |
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L 36 State intervention in oligopoly |
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IL 37 Vertical Integration I |
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L 38 Vertical Integration II |
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L 39 Alternatives to vertical integration |
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L 40 Mergers I |
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L 41 Mergers II |
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L 42 Unilateral effects |
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L 43 Antitrust cases I |
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L 44 Antitrust cases II L 45 Antitrust cases III L46 Antitrust cases IV |
Prerequisiti
Norton & Company – 2014
Metodi didattici
Lezioni frontali registrate in versione asincrona. Esercizi individuli con correzione in aula. Predisposizione del materiale didattico (testi e files di varia tipologia) nella pagina e-learning del corso. Modalità soggette alle direttive anti COVID dell'Ateneo. Si consiglia di visianare il sito del Mages e dell'ateneo.
Modalità di verifica dell'apprendimento
Esame finale scritto (6 domande di cui 3 esercizi; ciascuna domanda è suddivisa in singole parti). Al termine del primo modulo (circa 45 h di lezione frontale) è prevista una prova intermedia relativa al programma trattato sino a quel momento a lezione. Il superamento della prova intermedia (con votazione tra 0 e 16; minimo 9) implica limitazione del contenuto della prova finale alla sola seconda parte del corso (sempre con votazione compresa tra 0 e 16; minimo 9). La prova intermdia non è obbligatoria. In sua assenza la/lo studentessa/studente sostiene la prova completa relativa ad entrambe le parti/moduli (votazione compresa tra 0 e 32=30 con lode; minimo 18).
Gli studenti non frequentanti non possono accedere alla prova intermedia e devono sostenere la prova completa.
Methods are subjected to Bicocca anti Corona virus regulation.
Testi di riferimento
Bruno Bosco, LEZIONI DI TEORIA DELLA REGOLAMENTAZIONE (Lectures on Regulation Theory),
Second Edition, Giappichelli, Turin, 2020 (except the paragraphs indicated with double asterisk in the general introduction)
M. Motta -M. Polo, Antitrust. Economia e politica della concorrenza (Antitrust and competition policy), Il
Mulino, 2005 (chapters to be indicated at the beginning of the second module)
Bruno Bosco, Additional Lecture Notes (Material included in the e-learning page of the course)
A purely supplementary ("not so hard going" and less thorough) bibliographic reference discussing specific
regulatory topics and cases is
C. Decker, Modern Economic Regulation, CUP, 2015 (part III in particular)
Periodo di erogazione dell’insegnamento
Primo e secondo semestre
Lingua di insegnamento
Italiano
Learning objectives
The course proposes are:
a) to offer basic and specialist knowledge on Reasons, Tools and Effects of public intervention in the markets of
contemporary capitalist societies characterized by non-competitive conditions from which market power in favor of
private companies derives.
b) to enable the student to critically evaluate the policies of reduction of the aforementioned intervention followed
in various countries over the past three decades and to analyze the effects of the consequent elimination or
privatization of the activities previously carried out by the public sector.
c) to allow the student to acquire professional skills in the planning and management of still existing public
enterprises still offering public services
Contents
The course is organized in two parts (modules), which cannot be separated.
The first part is called Public and Service Economics. It is dedicated to the study of the theory of business and
market regulation in the public utility sectors where conditions of natural monopoly prevail. Economic theories that
have dealt with this problem will be presented and discussed following their historical development and the relative
results will be examined with reference to contexts characterized by both perfect information and information
asymmetry. The theories that motivate the nationalization of natural monopolies and the theories that merely
reccommend regulatory rules of conduct to be imposed on private companies will be exposed and analysed. In the
latter case, the study will cover both the Bayesian and the non-Bayesian (or anonymous) models of regulation of
the natural monopoly.The main oligopoly models will be subsequently taken up and the most common forms of
regulation of these markets will be examined. Ample space will be dedicated to the analysis of the so-called competition for the market achieved through the application of auction mechanisms. In this context, specific cases
of application of auction mechanisms to the regulation of sectors such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, etc.
will also be treated.
The second part is called Economics of regulatory choices and deals with regulatory activity, carried out by
applying the rules "to protect competition and the market as well as consumers", carried out through the activity of
independent authorities. The historical profile of this form of "intervention" and the main guiding criteria for
consumer and producer protection activities followed by the Authorities will be examined. Some cases derived from
specific rulings of the European and national Anti Trust Authorities will be subsequently treated.
Detailed program
1 Allocative efficiency I |
|
L 2 Allocative efficiency II |
|
L3 Perfect competition and efficiency |
|
L 4 Natural monopoly II |
|
L 5 Natural monopolyII |
|
L 6 Multi product natural monopoly |
|
L7 Scale return and subadditivity |
|
L8 Marginal cost pricing and firm's loss |
|
L9 Hotelling I |
|
L 10 Hotelling II |
|
L 11 Financing firm's loss |
|
L 12 First best pricing:a balance |
|
L 13 the SB |
|
L14 SB pricing I |
|
L 15 Distribution and SB pricing |
|
L 16 SB pricing: interpretations and balance |
|
L 17 The Loeb and Magat model |
|
L 18 Bayesian regulation |
|
L 19 RoR I^ |
|
L 20 RoR II^ |
|
L 21 Price -cap |
|
L 22 Yardstick competion I^ |
|
L 23 Back to Loeb and Magat and Demzets auction |
|
L24 Auctions I |
|
L 25 Auctions II |
|
L26 auctions III |
|
L27 Examples and applications |
|
L 28 Criticisms |
|
L 29 Oligopoly and regulation |
|
L 30Cournot I |
|
L 31 II |
|
L32 Counot with N > 2 |
|
L 33 Bertrand I^ |
|
L 34 Bertrand with N > 2 |
|
L 35 Social surplus andoligopoly |
|
L 36 State intervention in oligopoly |
|
IL 37 Vertical Integration I |
|
L 38 Vertical Integration II |
|
L 39 Alternatives to vertical integration |
|
L 40 Mergers I |
|
L 41 Mergers II |
|
L 42 Unilateral effects |
|
L 43 Antitrust cases I |
|
L 44 Antitrust cases II L 45 Antitrust cases III L46 Antitrust cases IV |
Prerequisites
Basic microeconomics as presented for instance in
H. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus, W. W. Norton & Company – 2014
is necessary.
Calculus and optimization are highly recommended.
Teaching methods
Recorded class lectures with exercises. The e learning page contains slides, notes, exercises and examples. Modalities are subjected to Bicocca anti Corona virus regulations.
Assessment methods
Final written exam (6 questions including 3 exercises; each question is divided into individual parts).
At the end of the first module (after about 45 h of frontal lectures) students can take an intermediate test related to
the program treated until then in class. Passing the intermediate test (with a mark between 0 and 16; minimum 9)
implies limitation of the content of the final test to the second part of the course only (always with a mark between 0
and 16; minimum 9). The intermediate test is not mandatory. In its absence, the student takes the complete exam
relating to both parts / modules (score between 0 and 32 = 30 with honors; minimum 18).
Non-attending students cannot access the intermediate test and must take the complete test together with the
attending students.
Methods may change according to Bicocca's anti Corona virus policy.
Textbooks and Reading Materials
Textbooks and Reading Materials
Bruno Bosco, LEZIONI DI TEORIA DELLA REGOLAMENTAZIONE (Lectures on Regulation Theory),
Second Edition, Giappichelli, Turin, 2020 (except the paragraphs indicated with double asterisk in the general introduction)
M. Motta -M. Polo, Antitrust. Economia e politica della concorrenza (Antitrust and competition policy), Il
Mulino, 2005 (chapters to be indicated at the beginning of the second module)
Bruno Bosco, Additional Lecture Notes (Material included in the e-learning page of the course)
A purely supplementary ("not so hard going" and less thorough) bibliographic reference discussing specific
regulatory topics and cases is
C. Decker, Modern Economic Regulation, CUP, 2015 (part III in particular)
Semester
First and Second Semester
Teaching language
Italian